Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

In 2019, MO CANN Do, Inc. (MCD) applied for a medical marijuana cultivation license in Missouri. However, the Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) rejected MCD's application as it failed to include a certificate of good standing demonstrating its authorization to operate as a business in Missouri. An administrative hearing commission upheld DHSS's decision, and MCD appealed to the circuit court, which also affirmed the decision.The Supreme Court of Missouri found that MCD's application did not meet the minimum standards for licensure, as it failed to provide a certificate of good standing from the Secretary of State, as required by DHSS's regulations. MCD argued that its certificate of incorporation satisfied the standard requiring proof of authorization to operate as a business in Missouri, but the Court disagreed, stating that the regulatory language was unambiguous and the certificate of good standing was a specific requirement.MCD further argued that DHSS waived the certificate of good standing requirement by failing to specify it in the deficiency letter sent to MCD. The Court rejected this argument, stating that DHSS never affirmatively waived the deficiencies in MCD's application.Lastly, MCD claimed that DHSS should be estopped from denying its application based on the missing certificate of good standing due to its failure to notify MCD of this specific deficiency. The Court denied this claim, stating that it is generally inappropriate to estop governmental agencies tasked with administrating licensure in highly regulated industries, which include the marijuana industry. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "MO CANN Do, Inc. vs. Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services" on Justia Law

The Florida Supreme Court was asked to review a proposed amendment to the state constitution legalizing the recreational use of marijuana. The court evaluated the amendment for adherence to the constitution’s single-subject requirement, the clarity of the ballot summary, and whether the amendment was facially invalid under the federal constitution. The amendment, titled "Adult Personal Use of Marijuana," aimed to modify the Florida Constitution to legalize the personal use of marijuana by adults and allow licensed centers to sell and distribute marijuana for personal use.The court ruled that the amendment adhered to the single-subject requirement as it focused on a single dominant plan or scheme, which is the legalization of marijuana for personal use. The court disagreed with the argument that the amendment violated the single-subject requirement by both decriminalizing and commercializing recreational marijuana, stating that the sale and possession are logically and naturally related as part of a dominant plan or scheme.The court also ruled that the ballot summary met the statutory standard for clarity. The court disagreed with the opposition that the ballot summary was misleading because it implied that there were already other state-licensed entities ready to engage in the sale of recreational marijuana.Lastly, the court ruled that the amendment is not facially invalid under the U.S. Constitution. The court rejected the argument that the proposed amendment is preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act and thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause.In conclusion, the court approved the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot, finding it complies with the requirements imposed by the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes. View "Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Adult Personal Use of Marijuana" on Justia Law

This case before the Supreme Court of Florida concerned a constitutional challenge to an amended Florida statute that prohibits abortions if the gestational age of the fetus is more than 15 weeks, with certain exceptions. The petitioners, a group of abortion clinics and a medical doctor collectively known as Planned Parenthood, alleged that the statute violated the Privacy Clause of the Florida Constitution, which guarantees the right to be let alone and free from government intrusion into private life.While acknowledging the moral, ethical, and policy issues implicated in the subject matter of abortion, the court focused on the Privacy Clause’s text, its context, and the historical evidence surrounding its adoption. The court concluded that there was no basis under the Privacy Clause to invalidate the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the court receded from prior decisions in which it held that the Privacy Clause guaranteed the right to receive an abortion through the end of the second trimester.As such, the court found that the petitioners were not entitled to the temporary injunction granted by the trial court. The court approved the outcome reached by the First District Court of Appeal, which had reversed the temporary injunction on the basis that Planned Parenthood could not establish irreparable harm. Therefore, the Florida statute prohibiting abortions after 15 weeks of gestational age, subject to certain exceptions, was upheld. View "Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

The case involves Haitham Yousef Alhindi, the defendant-appellant, who was charged with five counts of cyberstalking. Alhindi's counsel requested a competency evaluation, which was conducted by the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau), albeit late. Based on limited information and caution, the Bureau's report deemed Alhindi incompetent. The court ordered Alhindi to be hospitalized for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). However, before Alhindi was hospitalized, the Bureau reported that he was not exhibiting any signs of mental illness and recommended a second competency evaluation, which the court ordered over Alhindi's objection. The second evaluation also concluded that Alhindi was incompetent. Alhindi appealed, arguing that the district court lacked authority to order a second competency evaluation and commitment for hospitalization.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 4241 authorizes district courts to order multiple competency evaluations and commitments for hospitalization when appropriate under the statute's terms. The court also found that the four-month limit in § 4241(d)(1) applies to the period of hospitalization, not the entire commitment period. The court emphasized the importance of district courts’ continued close supervision of competency proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's entry of the commitment order. View "USA v. Haitham Alhindi" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled on a case involving a plaintiff, Joann Ford, and a healthcare provider, Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc. Ford, a former patient of Sandhills, alleged negligence, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, and breach of confidentiality against Sandhills for failure to protect her personally identifying information (PII). Her PII was stolen from Sandhills' third-party computer system in a cyberattack after she had ceased being a patient.The district court had previously granted Sandhills immunity from the suit, concluding that the theft of Ford's PII arose out of Sandhills' performance of “medical, surgical, dental, or related functions,” as per 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), thus substituting the United States as the defendant. However, the Fourth Circuit Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of § 233(a).The appellate court determined that data security does not fall under a “related function” within the meaning of the statute. The court emphasized that § 233(a) immunity applies when alleged damages arise from the provision of healthcare, which was not the case here. Ford’s injury did not arise from Sandhills’ provision of healthcare, but from a data security breach that occurred at least a year after she ceased being a patient at Sandhills.Therefore, the court concluded that Sandhills was not immune from the suit under § 233(a) and that the United States could not be substituted as the defendant. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ford v. Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Mississippi was asked to decide whether the Mississippi State Department of Health (MSDH) was required to admit evidence of a concurrent Certificate of Need (CON) application during the CON hearing for another healthcare facility. The MSDH had simultaneously considered two CON applications, one from Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital and one from Baptist Memorial Rehabilitation Hospital, for the same category of services. The MSDH did not admit the Baptist application or certificate, and the chancery court reversed the decision solely on this issue.The Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that the chancery court was in error, and that the MSDH's decision on relevance or its decision not to reopen a closed hearing was not reversible error. The Supreme Court found that the MSDH did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in determining that the Baptist CON application was not relevant to the Encompass' CON application proceedings.The Supreme Court vacated the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case to the chancery court for a decision on the merits of Methodist’s appeal. The chancery court had failed to address the substance of Methodist’s appeal regarding the granting of a CON to Encompass, and the issue was not squarely before the Supreme Court. View "Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Flowood, LLC v. Mississippi Methodist Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of California considered whether a health care agent, who had signed two contracts with a skilled nursing facility on behalf of a principal, had the authority to sign an optional, separate arbitration agreement. The first contract ensured the principal’s admission to the facility, while the second made arbitration the exclusive method for resolving disputes with the facility. The court concluded that the execution of the arbitration contract was not a "health care decision" within the authority of the health care agent. Therefore, the facility’s owners and operators could not rely on the agent’s execution of the arbitration agreement to compel arbitration of claims arising from the principal’s alleged maltreatment. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

This case deals with the importation of two transcatheter heart valve systems by Meril Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. and Meril, Inc. (collectively, "Meril") into the United States for a medical conference in San Francisco. The plaintiff, Edwards Lifesciences Corporation and Edwards Lifesciences LLC (collectively, "Edwards"), a competitor medical device company, alleged that this act constituted patent infringement. Meril argued that the importation was covered by the "safe harbor" provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which exempts certain activities from being considered patent infringement if they are reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Meril, and Edwards appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, noting that the undisputed evidence showed that the importation of the valve systems was reasonably related to submitting information to the United States Food and Drug Administration. The court rejected Edwards' arguments that the district court had disregarded contemporaneous evidence, applied the safe harbor with an objective standard, and relied improperly on declarations from Meril employees. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that Meril was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORPORATION v. MERIL LIFE SCIENCES PVT. LTD. " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled on a case involving Halikierra Community Services LLC (Halikierra), a provider of home personal care services to Medicaid beneficiaries and the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS had placed Halikierra on Medicaid reimbursement prepayment review following several overbilling complaints, leading to several post-payment audits. The audits revealed that Halikierra had erroneously received excess Medicaid reimbursement funds on multiple occasions and found suspicious reimbursement claims.Halikierra filed a lawsuit against DHHS, alleging that the decision to place them on prepayment review violated their substantive due process and equal protection rights under the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DHHS, leading to an appeal from Halikierra.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that summary judgment was properly entered against Halikierra. The Court found that Halikierra’s evidentiary forecast failed to disclose any genuine issues of material fact in support of its claims. The Court concluded that DHHS's actions were not arbitrary or capricious, as the prepayment review was rationally related to a legitimate government interest, namely combating Medicaid fraud and ensuring that claims meet the requirements of federal and state laws and regulations. The Court also found no evidence of unequal treatment of Halikierra compared to other Medicaid providers. View "Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed a case where a defendant, Ramon Torres, was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of his four-year-old daughter. The State’s evidence included testimony that Torres tested positive for chlamydia in 2013 and again in 2016. On appeal, Torres argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the admission of evidence of these two test results. He maintained that the test results fell under the purview of the physician-patient privilege statute and that none of the statutory exceptions to the physician-patient privilege applied.This case required the court to interpret the physician-patient privilege statute and whether the test results would have been excluded from evidence at his jury trial had his attorney objected. The appellate court disagreed with Torres and affirmed his conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts’ judgments.The court held that the physician-patient privilege statute did not apply to the 2016 test results as Torres submitted to testing in 2016 not for the purpose of seeking medical treatment, but because he was ordered to do so by the Department of Children and Family Services. Therefore, the privilege and the exceptions to the privilege were irrelevant to the admissibility of the 2016 test results.Regarding the 2013 test results, the court found that the physician-patient privilege statute does apply. The court, however, determined that the exception set out in subsection (7) authorizes physicians to disclose information subject to the physician-patient privilege “in actions, civil or criminal, arising from the filing of a report in compliance with the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act.” Therefore, the 2013 chlamydia test results were admissible even though the physician-patient privilege attached to those test results. The court concluded that the defendant has not satisfied the first prong of the Strickland standard, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. View "People v. Torres" on Justia Law