Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed a case involving a new law that prohibits certain medical treatments for children if administered for the purpose of transitioning a child's biological sex or affirming the child's perception of their sex if it is inconsistent with their biological sex. Several parents of children with gender dysphoria, along with physicians and groups that would be affected by the law, sued to enjoin its enforcement, alleging that it is facially unconstitutional. The trial court concluded that the law likely violates the Texas Constitution and temporarily enjoined the law's enforcement.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the trial court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a probable right to relief on their claims that the prohibition of certain treatments for children suffering from gender dysphoria violates the Texas Constitution. The court emphasized that while parents have a fundamental interest in directing the care, custody, and control of their children, this interest is not absolute. The court concluded that the Legislature made a permissible, rational policy choice to limit the types of available medical procedures for children, particularly in light of the relative nascency of both gender dysphoria and its various modes of treatment. The court also concluded that the law does not unconstitutionally deprive parents of their rights or physicians or health care providers of an alleged property right in their medical licenses or claimed right to occupational freedom. The court further concluded that the law does not unconstitutionally deny or abridge equality under the law because of sex or any other characteristic asserted by plaintiffs. The court therefore reversed and vacated the trial court's order. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. LOE" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the interpretation of a statute that regulates healthcare providers participating in the federal Medicaid program. The State of Texas, acting through the Attorney General, sought to enforce a statute that imposes penalties on a provider who submits a claim for payment and knowingly fails to indicate the type of professional license and the identification number of the person who actually provided the service. The defendant, a dentist, argued that the statute only applies if a claim fails to indicate both the license type and the identification number of the actual provider.Previously, the trial court granted the State's motion for partial summary judgment and denied the defendant's motion. The court rendered a final judgment awarding the State more than $16,500,000. The defendant appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, except for the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court agreed with the defendant's interpretation of the statute. The court held that the statute applies only if a claim fails to indicate both the license type and the identification number of the actual provider. The court found that the 1,842 claims at issue did indicate the actual providers’ license type, so they did not constitute an unlawful act under the statute. The court rendered judgment in the dentist’s favor. View "MALOUF v. THE STATE OF TEXAS EX RELS. ELLIS AND CASTILLO" on Justia Law

The case involves Image API, LLC, a company that provided services to the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) from 2009 to 2015. Image's job was to manage a processing center for incoming mail related to Medicaid and other benefits programs. The agreement between the parties stated that HHSC would compensate Image using its “retrospective cost settlement model”. In 2016, HHSC notified Image that an independent external firm would conduct an audit of Image’s performance and billing for the years 2010 and 2011. The audit concluded that HHSC had overpaid Image approximately $440,000 in costs relating to bonuses, holiday pay, overtime, and other unauthorized labor expenses. HHSC then sought to recoup the overpayments by deducting from payments on Image’s invoices.The trial court granted HHSC’s motion for summary judgment and signed a final judgment for the commissioner. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and dismissed Image’s entire suit for want of jurisdiction. Image sought review.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Image is a Medicaid contractor under Section 32.0705(a), and that the deadline in Section 32.0705(d) for auditing HHSC’s Medicaid contractors is mandatory. However, the court ruled that HHSC’s failure to meet the deadline does not preclude it from using the result of the audit or pursuing recoupment of overcharges found in the audit. The court affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing Image’s claims arising from the 2016 audit for lack of jurisdiction, reversed the part of the judgment dismissing the remainder of Image’s suit, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "IMAGE API, LLC v. YOUNG" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed a case involving the State of Texas, Ken Paxton in his official capacity as Attorney General of Texas, the Texas Medical Board, and Stephen Brint Carlton in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Medical Board (collectively, the State) against a group of women and physicians. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Texas's abortion laws, specifically the Human Life Protection Act, which generally prohibits performing an abortion except when a pregnant woman has a life-threatening physical condition that poses a risk of death or serious physical impairment unless an abortion is performed.The case reached the Supreme Court of Texas as a direct appeal from a temporary injunction issued by the 353rd District Court, Travis County, Texas, which halted the enforcement of Texas's abortion laws in various circumstances. The State contested the injunction, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the State had sovereign immunity, and the current Texas law permitting life-saving abortion was not more limiting than the Texas Constitution permits.The Supreme Court of Texas held that one of the plaintiffs, Dr. Damla Karsan, had standing to challenge the Attorney General’s enforcement of the Human Life Protection Act against her. The court also concluded that the Declaratory Judgments Act waives the State’s immunity for a claim that a statute violates the state constitution. The court further clarified that under the Human Life Protection Act, a woman with a life-threatening physical condition and her physician have the legal authority to proceed with an abortion to save the woman’s life or major bodily function, in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment and with the woman’s informed consent. The court concluded that Dr. Karsan had not demonstrated that the part of the Human Life Protection Act that permits life-saving abortion is narrower than the Texas Constitution allows. As a result, the court vacated the lower court's injunction order. View "State v. Zurawski" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the interpretation of the term "home" in the context of Medicaid eligibility. The applicants, Clyde and Dorothy Burt, sold their house to their daughter and son-in-law, Linda and Robby Wallace, and moved into a rental property owned by the Wallaces. Later, they moved into a skilled-nursing facility. After moving into the facility, the Burts used their cash assets to buy an undivided one-half interest in the house they had previously sold to the Wallaces. They then executed a Lady Bird deed in favor of the Wallaces, granting their newly acquired one-half interest back to the Wallaces, reserving an enhanced life estate. The Burts then applied for Medicaid assistance, but the Texas Health and Human Services Commission denied their claim, arguing that the property interest was not excluded from the calculation of resources for Medicaid eligibility.The trial court reversed the agency’s determination, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The court of appeals held that a property interest created after admission to a skilled-nursing facility can be excluded from the resources used to determine Medicaid eligibility if the applicant states an intent to live at the property in the future.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' interpretation. The court held that a “home” is the applicant’s principal place of residence before the claim for Medicaid assistance arises, coupled with the intent to reside there in the future. A property interest purchased with qualifying resources after the applicant moves to a skilled-nursing facility is an available resource for determining Medicaid eligibility under federal eligibility rules, as the property was not the applicant’s principal place of residence at the time the claim for benefits arose. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment in favor of the Commission. View "TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION v. ESTATE OF CLYDE L. BURT" on Justia Law

The case in question was heard by the Supreme Court of Texas and revolved around the interpretation of the term "psychiatrist" as it applies to the involuntary civil commitment of individuals exhibiting signs of mental illness. The case involved a 34-year-old man, A.R.C., who had exhibited psychotic symptoms and delusional behavior. Two second-year psychiatry residents completed the required "certificates of medical examination for mental illness," as outlined in Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.009(a). However, a question arose as to whether these residents could be considered psychiatrists under the statute.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that these residents were indeed psychiatrists, reversing the lower court's judgment. The court determined that the residents, who were licensed under a physician-in-training program and were engaged in specialized psychiatric training, fell within the definition of a physician specializing in psychiatry. The court rejected the argument that only board-certified psychiatrists qualify under the statute, stating that physicians who specialize in psychiatry qualify as psychiatrists under § 574.009(a).The court emphasized that it is the judge, not the physician, who ultimately decides whether involuntary commitment is necessary or lawful. The court also noted that the legislature has the power to amend the qualifications for psychiatrists and other physicians as it sees fit, provided it adheres to the constitutional requirement of competent medical or psychiatric testimony.The Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of A.R.C.'s remaining challenges. View "IN RE A.R.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas handled a case in which a nurse claimed her employer, Scott & White Memorial Hospital, wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for reporting potential child abuse or neglect to the Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), which is considered a protected conduct under Section 261.110(b) of the Texas Family Code.The nurse, Dawn Thompson, had previously received two written reprimands for violating the hospital's personal-conduct policy. On the third occasion, she disclosed a child patient's protected health information to a school nurse without the parents' authorization. This was considered by the hospital as a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and a breach of the patient's rights. Consequently, Thompson was terminated.Thompson filed a lawsuit against the hospital, asserting that her termination was in violation of Family Code Section 261.110(b), which protects professionals who report child abuse or neglect in good faith from adverse employment actions.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Section 261.110 imposes a "but-for causation" requirement, which means that the protected conduct must be such that without it, the adverse employment action would not have occurred when it did. In this case, the court found that Thompson would have been terminated when she was due to her HIPAA violation, regardless of her report to CPS. Therefore, the court rejected Thompson's retaliation claim and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the hospital. View "SCOTT & WHITE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

In this case handled by the Supreme Court of Texas, the parents of two children, Kate Cox and Justin Cox, along with their doctor, Dr. Damla Karsan, filed a suit to challenge the enforcement of Texas laws that prohibit abortion. Mrs. Cox was about 20 weeks pregnant with a baby diagnosed with trisomy 18, a serious genetic disorder. The suit sought to apply a medical-necessity exception provided in the Texas law, which allows an abortion if a woman's life is threatened or she faces a serious risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily function due to her pregnancy.The court, in its decision, clarified that the exception to the abortion prohibition is based on the reasonable medical judgment of a doctor, not a court. It was noted that Dr. Karsan presented a "good faith belief" that Mrs. Cox meets the exception's requirements but did not assert that her belief meets the objective standard of "reasonable medical judgment."The court held that judges lack the authority to broaden the statutory exception by interpreting it and held the trial court erred in applying a different, lower standard instead of requiring reasonable medical judgment. The court emphasized that the exception requires a doctor's decision whether a pregnant woman’s complications pose the required risks.The court conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate the temporary restraining order that had restrained the Attorney General from enforcing the abortion laws against Dr. Karsan and others related to the case, based solely on the verified pleading. The court also noted that nothing in their opinion prevents a physician from acting if, in that physician’s reasonable medical judgment, they determine that the pregnant woman has a life-threatening physical condition. View "IN RE STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

In this case involving mandates requiring people to wear face masks or other coverings to prevent the spread of COVID-19 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and opinion of the court of appeals and dismissed this interlocutory appeal, holding that the appeal was moot.In 2021, the City of El Paso obtained a temporary injunction against the enforcement of GA-38, a gubernatorial executive order that prohibited local mask-wearing requirements. The court of appeals affirmed. In 2023, Senate Bill 29, codified as Tex. Health & Safety Code 81.B.001-.004, which provided that a governmental entity may not impose mask-wearing requirement to prevent the spread of COVID-19, went into effect. Further, GA-38 expired. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and dismissed this appeal, holding that no live controversy remained between the parties. View "Abbott v. City of El Paso" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal as moot and vacated the judgment of the court of appeals in this case arising from the Covid-19 pandemic, holding that the public interest was best served by vacatur of the court of appeals' opinion and that the State was prevented from challenging on the merits due to mootness.When the San Antonio Independent School District (ISD) required that its employees take a Covid-19 vaccine by October 15 2021, the State sued, seeking a temporary injunction arguing that the vaccine requirement violated a gubernatorial executive order. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied the ensuing appeal as moot, holding that neither the enforceability of the ISD's vaccine mandate, which was barred by Senate Bill 29, nor the enforceability of executive order GA-39, which had expired, left a live controversy between the parties. View "State v. San Antonio Independent School District" on Justia Law