Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Campbell, the owner and lead doctor at Physicians Primary Care (PPC), and Mark Dyer, a nurse practitioner at PPC, were indicted in 2020 on multiple counts related to overprescribing opioids and engaging in a scheme to seek fraudulent reimbursements from health insurance providers. The indictment included charges of unlawfully distributing controlled substances, conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances, health-care fraud, conspiracy to commit health-care fraud, and money laundering.The case proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The jury found Campbell guilty on several counts, including conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances, health-care fraud, conspiracy to commit health-care fraud, and money laundering. Dyer was also found guilty on similar counts. The district court sentenced Campbell to 105 months of imprisonment and Dyer to 60 months, followed by three years of supervised release for both. The district court also ordered restitution payments from both defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The defendants challenged the jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The appellate court found that the jury instructions, although not fully compliant with the Supreme Court's decision in Ruan v. United States, were adequate under the court's precedents. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions for conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances, health-care fraud, and money laundering. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of government experts and other evidence.The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentences, concluding that any potential errors in the district court’s intended-loss calculation for sentencing were harmless, as the sentences imposed were well below the applicable Guidelines range. The court also noted that the defendants failed to properly appeal the restitution order, making it outside the scope of the current appeal. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Sardar Ashrafkhan owned and operated a fraudulent medical practice where doctors wrote and billed Medicare for fake prescriptions. These prescriptions were filled at specific pharmacies, which paid Ashrafkhan kickbacks. The scheme resulted in millions of dollars in fraudulent Medicare claims and the illegal sale of opioid-based drugs. Ashrafkhan was indicted in 2013 and tried in 2015, where the government presented evidence that he masterminded the scheme. The jury convicted him of drug conspiracy, health care fraud conspiracy, and money laundering. At sentencing, he received an adjustment for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan sentenced Ashrafkhan to 276 months of imprisonment, varying downward from the guidelines range of 600 months. Ashrafkhan appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. After his sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated a new guideline, USSG § 4C1.1, which provides a two-point reduction in the offense level for defendants with no criminal history points, known as "zero-point offenders." Ashrafkhan moved for a sentence reduction under this new guideline, but the district court denied his motion, reasoning that his aggravating role adjustment rendered him ineligible for the reduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that to be eligible for the zero-point offender reduction under USSG § 4C1.1, a defendant must not have received an aggravating role adjustment and must not have engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. Since Ashrafkhan received an aggravating role adjustment, he was ineligible for the reduction, regardless of whether he engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. The court's interpretation was based on the plain text and context of the guideline, as well as precedent from similar cases. View "United States v. Ashrafkhan" on Justia Law

Nashaun Drake pleaded guilty to several drug offenses after police found significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and drug trafficking tools in his apartment. He was charged with five counts of possessing illegal drugs with intent to distribute. At sentencing, the district court classified Drake as a "career offender" based on a prior marijuana conviction, resulting in a 200-month prison sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio determined that Drake's prior marijuana conviction qualified as a predicate offense for the career-offender enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. This classification led to a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months, and the court imposed a 200-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Drake argued that his prior marijuana conviction should not have triggered the career-offender enhancement and that his sentence was unreasonable. The court held that binding precedent required the use of a time-of-conviction approach to determine whether a prior offense qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines. Since hemp was included in the drug schedules at the time of Drake's 2016 conviction, his marijuana offense qualified as a controlled substance offense. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 200-month sentence, considering Drake's extensive criminal history and the need for deterrence and public protection.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding both the career-offender enhancement and the 200-month sentence. View "United States v. Drake" on Justia Law

In 2006, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(1)(F)(i), which permits individuals and married couples to dispose of their assets (to qualify for Medicaid) by purchasing an annuity, under which the state is named as the remainder beneficiary in the first position for the amount of medical assistance paid. The federal law initially contained a drafting error. It was subsequently amended. A corresponding Kentucky regulation, promulgated four months later, mistakenly included the pre-amendment language, stating that the state had to be the beneficiary for the amount of assistance paid on behalf of the annuitant, rather than the institutionalized spouse. The state agency enforced the corrected federal statute. The Singletons sought Medicaid benefits to support Claude’s full-time nursing home care; in purchasing an annuity, Mary wanted to name the state as a beneficiary for the value of care provided to her, rather than Claude, as the Kentucky regulation seemed to permit. Claude obtained Medicaid eligibility after the purchase of an annuity that complied with the federal regulation. The government paid $98,729.01 in medical expenses before Claude's death. Mary later died, leaving $118,238.41 in the annuity. In compliance with the federal rule, the government’s claim left $19,509.40 for the secondary beneficiaries. The Singleton children sued. The Sixth Circuit rejected their argument that the Medicaid statute gave the state discretion to be more generous concerning annuities and the general spend-down rules. The Kentucky regulation departed from the Medicaid statute’s clear instructions and was preempted. View "Singleton v. Commonwealth of Kentucky" on Justia Law

During 2012-2013, three undercover DEA agents posed as patients during an investigation into Dr. Zaidi’s controlled substances prescription practices. As a result, the DEA Deputy Administrator suspended Zaidi’s controlled substances prescription privileges, finding that his continued registration posed an imminent danger to the public health and safety, 21 U.S.C. 824(d). DEA agents also seized controlled substances from Zaidi’s offices. Following a hearing, an ALJ recommended that the suspension and seizure be affirmed and that Zaidi's registration be revoked. The Administrator affirmed the suspension and seizure, but found the registration issue was moot due to the expiration of Zaidi’s registration and his decision not to seek renewal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ALJ arbitrarily and capriciously denied Zaidi the opportunity to present testimony from an expert, employees, and former patients; there was insufficient evidence to support the suspension; the government failed to make a prima facie showing that Zaidi’s continued registration was inconsistent with the public interest; Zaidi’ prescriptions to the three undercover officers were not outside the usual course of professional practice and did not lack a legitimate medical purpose; Zaidi did not falsify medical records; and the sanction imposed was disproportionately harsh. View "Akhtar-Zaidi v. Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

Brookdale Senior Living hired Prather to review documentation related to thousands of Brookdale residents who had received home-health services from Brookdale. Medicare claims regarding those patients were on hold and Brookdale faced possible recoupment of payments it had received if it did not review and submit final Medicare claims. Prather noticed that the required certifications stating that the doctor had decided that the patient needed home-health services, established a plan of care, and met with the patient, were signed long after care was provided. Prather repeatedly raised this issue, but was rebuffed. Brookdale, facing financial disaster, began paying doctors to complete the paperwork months after treatment was provided. Prather thought that Brookdale was not just asking treating physicians to complete forgotten paperwork, but had provided the services without physician involvement and then found doctors willing to validate the care after-the-fact. Prather's suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to unlawful retention of payments. Completing certifications months after the fact was not “as soon as possible” after the plan was established, as required by regulations. Prather provided a detailed description of the alleged fraudulent scheme and her personal knowledge. Affirming dismissal of her false-records claim, the court concluded that Prather failed to plead with particularity the use of government forms to certify falsely that care had been provided under a doctor’s orders, or that unnecessary care had been provided. View "Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

Means, 18 weeks pregnant, went into labor. She went to Mercy Health, the only hospital within 30 minutes of her residence. Doctors diagnosed preterm premature rupture of the membrane, which usually results in a stillbirth or the baby's death. Means’s unborn baby still had a heartbeat. Mercy sent her home with pain medication without telling Means that the baby would likely not survive or that continuing her pregnancy could endanger her health. The next morning, Means returned with a fever, excruciating pain, and bleeding. Mercy did not give her additional treatment or options, although Means’s physician suspected she had a serious bacterial infection. Mercy sent her home. Means returned that night with contractions. The baby was delivered and died. The pathology report confirmed that Means had acute bacterial infections. Two years later, a public health educator discovered and inquired into Means’s case. Mercy explained that its Directives (ethical guidelines dictated by Catholic doctrine) prohibited inducing labor or similar action. The limitations period had run out on medical malpractice claims. Means sued the Conference of Catholic Bishops, alleging negligence for promulgating and enforcing the Directives. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. The only link to the Eastern District, where the case was filed, was the decision of Catholic Health Ministries to adopt the Directives. Each individual defendant lives out of state. Means lives in and Mercy is located in the Western District. Means did not allege that the defendants, by adopting the Directives, caused her any cognizable injury.. View "Means v. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops" on Justia Law

The amount of additional Medicare reimbursements that a hospital is entitled to receive for serving a disproportionate share of low-income patients depends, in part, on the number of days that the hospital served patients who were “eligible for medical assistance under a State plan approved under [the Medicaid statute].” 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(II). Kentucky hospitals contend that because Kentucky has chosen in its Medicaid plan to award additional Medicaid funds to hospitals based on how many days they treat patients who are eligible for the Kentucky Hospital Care Program (KHCP), a state program that provides medical coverage to low-income individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid, KHCP patient days should be counted in the calculation of the additional Medicare reimbursements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of the state’s argument on summary judgment, stating that the statutory term “eligible for medical assistance under a State plan approved under [the Medicaid statute]” is synonymous with “eligible for Medicaid” and KHCP patients are, by definition, not eligible for Medicaid. View "Owensboro Health, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Blue Cross controls more than 60% of the Michigan commercial health insurance market; its patients are more profitable for hospitals than are patients insured by Medicare or Medicaid. BC enjoys “extraordinary market power.” The Justice Department (DOJ) claimed that BC used that power to require MFN agreements: BC would raise its reimbursement rates for services, if a hospital agreed to charge other commercial insurers rates at least as high as charged to BC. BC obtained MFN agreements with 40 hospitals and MFN-plus agreements with 22 hospital systems. Under MFN-plus, the greater the spread between BC's rates and the minimum rates for other insurers, the higher the rates that BC would pay. Class actions, (consolidated) followed the government’s complaint, alleging damages of more than $13.7 billion, and seeking treble damages under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C 15. In 2013, Michigan banned MFN clauses; DOJ dismissed its suit. During discovery in the private actions, plaintiffs hired an antitrust expert, Leitzinger. BC moved to exclude Leitzinger’s report and testimony. Materials relating to that motion and to class certification were filed under seal, although the report does not discuss patient information. BC agreed to pay $30 million, about one-quarter of Leitzinger's estimate, into a settlement fund and not to oppose requests for fees, costs, and named-plaintiff “incentive awards,” within specified limits. After these deductions, $14,661,560 would be allocated among three-to-seven-million class members. Class members who sought to examine the court record or the bases for the settlement found that most key documents were heavily redacted or sealed. The court approved the settlement and denied the objecting class members’ motion to intervene. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that the court compounded its error in sealing the documents when it approved the settlement without meaningful scrutiny of its fairness to unnamed class members . View "Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich." on Justia Law

A class of Tennessee residents who applied for Medicaid sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the delays they have experienced in receiving eligibility determinations on their applications violate 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid statute, and that the state’s failure to provide a fair hearing on their delayed applications violates that statute and the Due Process Clause. Regulations implementing the statute provide that “the determination of eligibility for any applicant may not exceed” 90 days for those “who apply for Medicaid on the basis of disability” and 45 days for all other applicants. The district court certified a class and granted a preliminary injunction, which requires the state to grant a fair hearing on delayed applications to class members who request one. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, holding that the matter is not moot and that the federal government is not a required party. The court noted that the federal government submitted an amicus brief, supporting plaintiffs’ position. Despite the passage of the Affordable Care Act, states remain ultimately responsible for ensuring their Medicaid programs comply with federal law. View "Wilson v.Gordon" on Justia Law