Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Poffenbarger, a First Lieutenant in the Air Force Reserve, filed a lawsuit challenging the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, claiming it violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment. He sought a religious exemption, which was denied, and subsequently refused the vaccine. As a result, he received a letter of reprimand and was placed on inactive status, losing pay and retirement points. Poffenbarger sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including restoration of lost pay and points.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio initially granted a preliminary injunction preventing the Air Force from taking further punitive action against Poffenbarger. In a related case, Doster v. Kendall, the same court certified a class of affected service members and issued similar injunctions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed these injunctions, but the Supreme Court later vacated the decision on mootness grounds after Congress directed the rescission of the vaccine mandate. The district court then dismissed Poffenbarger's case as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that Poffenbarger’s claim for lost drill pay and retirement points was barred by federal sovereign immunity. The court explained that RFRA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not unequivocally include claims for money damages against the federal government. Since Poffenbarger’s claim sought retrospective compensation for a previous legal wrong, it constituted money damages, which are not covered by RFRA’s waiver. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Poffenbarger v. Kendall" on Justia Law

Zackaria Dahir Mohamed, a native of Somalia, entered the United States as a child refugee in 1998. He was later convicted of several offenses, including theft and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him due to these convictions. An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered his removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. Mohamed then petitioned for review.The IJ initially found Mohamed removable for aggravated felony theft and crimes of violence. In 2020, the IJ ordered his removal to Somalia. Mohamed appealed to the BIA, which remanded the case to the IJ to assess Mohamed’s competency. On remand, Mohamed presented evidence of his mental health history, including a psychological evaluation by Dr. Jerry Kroll. The IJ ruled in 2021 that Mohamed was competent during the 2020 merits hearing, based on Dr. Kroll’s testimony and the IJ’s observations. The BIA dismissed Mohamed’s appeal on de novo review, leading to the current petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Mohamed argued that the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s competency finding was unsupported by the record. The court noted that it has jurisdiction to review final agency removal orders but not factual findings related to criminal offenses. The court found that Mohamed’s competency determination was a factual finding, which is generally affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Mohamed’s claims were barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).Even if Mohamed presented a legal or constitutional claim, the court found no fundamental procedural error or resulting prejudice. The IJ had considered all appropriate evidence, including Dr. Kroll’s testimony and Mohamed’s behavior during proceedings. The court concluded that there was no procedural error in holding a retroactive competency hearing. The petition for review was denied. View "Mohamed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

James and Kim McCormick own a 128.75-acre tract in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, accessed by a private driveway from Modica Lott Road. The property was part of a larger tract subdivided without adhering to the Bossier Parish Subdivision Code, which requires a plat description for split-out tracts. The McCormicks' deed, recorded in 2014, did not comply with these regulations. After a fire damaged their home in 2018, they applied for a building permit in 2020, which was denied by the Bossier Parish Police Jury (BPPJ) due to non-compliance with subdivision regulations.The McCormicks filed a mandamus action against Joe E. Ford, the Parish Engineer, seeking a court order for the permit. The trial court ruled in favor of the McCormicks, requiring the BPPJ to issue the permit, subject to certain conditions regarding the driveway. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to issue the permit but removed the conditions, stating that the five-year prescriptive period for enforcing subdivision regulations had expired, making the property non-conforming.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case to determine if the McCormick Tract enjoyed non-conforming status under La. R.S. 9:5625, which provides a five-year prescriptive period for enforcement actions. The Court held that the prescriptive period began when the deed was recorded in 2014, and since no action was taken within five years, the property attained non-conforming status. Consequently, the McCormicks were entitled to the building permit without additional conditions. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, confirming that the McCormick Tract complied with relevant statutes and regulations. View "MCCORMICK VS. FORD" on Justia Law

Two environmental groups, WildEarth Guardians and Western Watersheds Project, challenged a decision by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) to open new domestic sheep grazing allotments, known as the Wishbone Allotments, in the Rio Grande National Forest, Colorado. The groups argued that the allotments posed a high risk of disease transmission to local populations of Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep, which are vulnerable to diseases from domestic sheep.The USFS had previously vacated larger grazing allotments in 2013 and 2015 due to high risks to bighorn sheep, based on a "risk of contact model" (RCM). However, in 2017, the USFS decided to open the Wishbone Allotments despite the RCM predicting a high risk of contact. The USFS justified this decision by considering additional local factors, such as geography and herding practices, which they claimed would mitigate the risk. The environmental groups objected, arguing that these local factors were unsupported by scientific data.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the groups' petition, finding that the USFS did not violate the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The groups then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.The Tenth Circuit found that the USFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the Wishbone Allotments. The court held that the USFS failed to provide a reasoned explanation for downgrading the RCM's high-risk rating based on local factors, which lacked scientific support. The court also found that the USFS did not adequately consider the cumulative impacts on neighboring bighorn sheep herds. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy. View "WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

A suspected shoplifter with an outstanding arrest warrant shot two police officers at a retail store, killing one and injuring the other. The officers were attempting to arrest the suspect at the request of an off-duty officer working as a security guard for the retailer. The deceased officer's parents and the injured officer sued the security guard, the retailer, and the security company.The trial court dismissed the claims against the security guard under the Tort Claims Act, finding his actions were within the scope of his employment as a police officer. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the retailer and the security company. The plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed in part, holding that a jury could find the security guard's conduct before the warrant check was outside the scope of his police duties. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims based on the warrant check and subsequent conduct but found fact issues precluded summary judgment on other claims against the retailer.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the security guard's conduct was within the scope of his employment as a police officer, entitling him to dismissal under the Tort Claims Act. The court also adopted the public-safety officer's rule, limiting the duties owed to officers injured by the negligence that necessitated their response. Applying this rule, the court found no evidence that the retailer breached its duty to warn the officers of a known, dangerous condition. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment dismissing the claims against the security guard and granting summary judgment for the other defendants. View "SEWARD v. SANTANDER" on Justia Law

Teresa Williams and Barney's Childcare and Learning Center, Inc., doing business as Pooh Bear Academy, filed a complaint against various officials and employees of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (ADHR) and the Elmore County Department of Human Resources (EDHR). The complaint included tort claims related to the suspension and revocation of the day-care provider's operating license and the denial of its license renewal application.The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed the complaint on April 25, 2024. Williams and the day-care provider filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment on May 23, 2024. The court set a hearing for July 1, 2024, but it did not occur. A hearing was eventually held on September 5, 2024, where both parties' counsel stated on record that they had agreed to extend the time for the court to rule on the postjudgment motion beyond the 90-day limit. However, the court did not enter an order denying the postjudgment motion until September 12, 2024.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was untimely. The court noted that under Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the trial court had 90 days to rule on the postjudgment motion, which expired on August 21, 2024. Since the parties' consent to extend the time was not placed on the record before the 90-day period expired, the postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on August 21, 2024. Consequently, Williams and the day-care provider had until October 2, 2024, to file their notice of appeal, but they did not do so until October 17, 2024. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Williams v. Dodd" on Justia Law

In June 2020, the North Dakota Department of Health inspected ND Indoor RV Park, LLC and found several health, safety, and fire code violations. The Park was informed that its 2020 operating license would be revoked unless the violations were corrected. The Park did not address the violations, leading to the initiation of the license revocation process. The Park also requested a renewal of its license for 2021, which was denied due to the existing violations. The Park was allowed to operate until the hearing proceedings were final. The Park later withdrew its request for a hearing, and the Department of Health dismissed the renewal application and closed the case. Subsequently, the Park sold its property.The Park filed a complaint against the State of North Dakota, alleging regulatory taking, deprivation of substantive and procedural due process, inverse condemnation, unlawful interference with business relationships, systemic violation of due process, and estoppel. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming qualified immunity for individual defendants and lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the takings claims. The district court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment on the takings and due process claims but granted summary judgment on the unlawful interference claim. The remaining claims were dismissed by stipulation.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court granted a writ of supervision, directing the district court to dismiss counts II and III because the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also directed the dismissal of counts I and IV for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Park failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that the Park could not prevail on its substantive and procedural due process claims and that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the takings claims. View "ND Indoor RV Park v. State" on Justia Law

AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP and AstraZeneca AB challenged the Drug Price Negotiation Program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to negotiate prices for certain high-expenditure drugs. CMS issued guidance on selecting qualifying drugs for 2026, including Farxiga, manufactured by AstraZeneca. AstraZeneca sued the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the CMS Administrator, claiming the Negotiation Program violated procedural due process and that parts of CMS’s guidance violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Delaware ruled that AstraZeneca failed to state a due process violation and lacked standing to pursue its APA claims. The court entered judgment in favor of the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that AstraZeneca lacked Article III standing to challenge the CMS guidance under the APA because the company did not demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury. AstraZeneca's claims about the impact on its business decision-making and difficulty valuing Farxiga in negotiations were deemed hypothetical and conjectural.Regarding the due process claim, the court held that AstraZeneca did not have a protected property interest in selling its drugs at a market rate. The court noted that federal patent laws do not confer a right to sell at a particular price, and the Negotiation Program only sets prices for drugs reimbursed by CMS, not private market transactions. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of the government on both the APA and due process claims. View "AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v. Secretary United States Department of Health and H" on Justia Law

John T. McFarland, a Program Support Specialist with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA), requested a reclassification of his Grade 9 position to Grade 11 in 2011. The desk audit for this request was delayed, and the initial reviewer, Peter Delate, was replaced by Lewis Norman, who completed the audit in 2013 and concluded that the Grade 9 classification was correct. McFarland appealed this decision, but the Director of the District of Columbia’s Department of Human Resources (DCHR) upheld it. McFarland then petitioned for review in Superior Court, which affirmed DCHR’s decision. McFarland appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the decision.In 2017, McFarland filed another petition in Superior Court, presenting new documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request that suggested Delate had initially supported a Grade 11 classification. The Superior Court vacated DCHR’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, a new specialist reviewed the entire record and concluded that McFarland’s position was correctly classified as Grade 9. McFarland again petitioned for review in Superior Court, which denied his petition and his motion for sanctions against the District of Columbia.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain McFarland’s petition for review under the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA), as the classification decision did not involve a reduction in grade. The court also found that McFarland had not shown that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for sanctions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of sanctions and remanded the case for dismissal of the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "McFarland v. District of Columbia, Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law