Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

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An inmate incarcerated in Nevada suffered a facial fracture after being struck by a softball in June 2018. He received prompt surgery and continued to be treated by prison medical staff, initially by Dr. Kim Adamson and, after Dr. Adamson’s departure, by Dr. Dana Marks. Over the following years, the inmate reported ongoing symptoms including pain, vertigo, and vision issues, some of which he believed were related to his original injury. While both doctors provided various treatments and medications, and ordered tests, they did not refer him to outside specialists despite persistent complaints. Eventually, after the inmate filed suit and obtained a preliminary injunction, he saw both a neurologist and an ear, nose, and throat specialist, resulting in new diagnoses and a revised treatment plan.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied summary judgment to Drs. Adamson and Marks, holding that they were not entitled to qualified immunity because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether their failure to refer the inmate to outside specialists constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The court relied on earlier Ninth Circuit precedent that generally requires prison doctors to either treat medical problems or refer prisoners to others who can.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity. It held that there was no clearly established law, under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, specifying when a delay in making an outside referral by prison doctors rises to the level of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Because existing precedent did not provide the required specificity to put the doctors on notice that their conduct was unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to Drs. Adamson and Marks. View "BROWN V. ADAMSON" on Justia Law

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An individual suffering from chronic illness and mental impairment was admitted to a nursing facility, where his primary physician later determined that he lacked capacity to make healthcare decisions. The facility required appointment of a surrogate, and the patient’s brother assumed the role by signing the relevant forms and an arbitration agreement on the patient’s behalf. The surrogate-appointment paperwork erroneously identified the brother as an “adult child” rather than a sibling. Years later, the patient was severely burned in an incident involving a cigarette lighter and an oxygen tank, prompting a lawsuit alleging inadequate care by the facility.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Northern Division, was presented with the facility’s motion to compel arbitration based on the agreement signed by the brother. The patient, through his guardian, opposed this, arguing that under Mississippi law, the patient’s adult son had higher statutory priority to serve as surrogate and was reasonably available, so the brother lacked authority to bind the patient to arbitration. The district court agreed, finding that the statute required healthcare providers to confirm the unavailability of higher-priority family members before accepting decisions from those with lower priority, and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The facility appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Mississippi the question of whether the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act requires providers, in the absence of a designated surrogate, to identify and ensure that no higher-priority family member is reasonably available before relying on a lower-priority member’s healthcare decision. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the statute does impose this requirement, thus obligating healthcare providers to confirm the unavailability of higher-priority surrogates before accepting healthcare decisions from lower-priority family members. The court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Stanford v. Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, L.L.C." on Justia Law

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A woman experiencing persistent medical symptoms visited a state-run hospital complaining of chest pain, weakness, nausea, headaches, and jaw pain. After psychiatric evaluation, a psychiatrist determined she posed a substantial suicide risk and arranged for her involuntary transfer to a private psychiatric hospital. Two staff psychiatrists at the private hospital also assessed her suicide risk and ordered her continued commitment. The woman later disputed the accuracy of the medical notes regarding her statements and the thoroughness of the evaluations, asserting that the doctors performed only brief assessments and did not sufficiently investigate mitigating factors such as her religious beliefs and supportive family.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal claims, declining jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The court excluded the plaintiff’s affidavit and supplemental expert report, finding the affidavit to be a “sham” that contradicted her deposition testimony. It held that no reasonable jury could find the evaluations unreasonable or that the private hospital doctors acted under color of state law for purposes of federal liability. The court also ruled that a Section 1983 claim could not be predicated solely on violations of state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in applying the sham affidavit doctrine to exclude the plaintiff’s affidavit and expert report, concluding that disputes of fact preclude summary judgment for the psychiatrist at the state hospital regarding the Fourth Amendment claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment as to the private hospital doctors, finding insufficient evidence that they acted under color of state law. The court reversed the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against the state hospital psychiatrist and reinstated the state-law claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Rene v. Mustafa" on Justia Law

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After being injured in a car accident in June 2020, the plaintiff received medical care at a hospital and presented her Medi-Cal card, establishing her eligibility for California’s Medicaid program. The hospital billed Medi-Cal for some of the services provided but did not submit charges totaling $7,683, which remained unpaid. The hospital, through its attorneys, notified the tortfeasor’s insurance company that it was asserting a statutory hospital lien under California’s Hospital Lien Act (HLA) for the unpaid charges. As a result, the insurance company withheld settlement funds from the plaintiff, who had reached a settlement with the tortfeasor.The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging, among other claims, that the hospital’s use of the HLA to assert a lien against her settlement violated the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL) because it conflicted with the Medi-Cal Act. The case was removed to federal court, where the federal debt collection claim was dismissed, and the remaining claims were remanded to state court. The defendants then demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, reasoning that the hospital was authorized under the HLA to assert the lien, even against a Medi-Cal beneficiary, and thus no UCL violation was stated.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the judgment. It held that the Medi-Cal Act prohibits providers from seeking reimbursement from Medi-Cal beneficiaries or third-party tortfeasors for covered services, assigning recovery rights instead to the state agency. Consequently, the hospital’s lien was invalid in this context, and the plaintiff had stated a viable UCL claim. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the UCL claim to proceed. View "Reneau v. Yoshida & Garcia, Inc." on Justia Law

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A regional clinical-trial director employed by a research group contracted to conduct clinical trials for a major COVID-19 vaccine manufacturer raised concerns about protocol deviations and regulatory violations at the trial sites. She repeatedly reported these concerns to her supervisors and ultimately informed the FDA. The day she contacted the FDA, her employer terminated her, citing poor fit. Her tenure at the company lasted approximately two weeks, during which she advocated for pausing trial enrollment to address her concerns. After her termination, the trial enrollment resumed and the vaccine manufacturer later announced favorable trial results.The plaintiff filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging fraudulent claims against the vaccine manufacturer, the research group, and another contractor. She also asserted a retaliation claim against her employer. The government initially declined to intervene during the statutory seal period but reserved the right to do so later. The district court unsealed the complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The government, while not intervening, filed a statement supporting dismissal. The district court granted the motions. The plaintiff requested reconsideration and filed an amended complaint, adding a fraud-in-the-inducement theory. Defendants again moved to dismiss. The government then moved to intervene and dismiss, citing lack of merit, public-health concerns, and anticipated litigation burdens. The district court granted the government’s motion, dismissing the FCA claims with prejudice as to the plaintiff and without prejudice as to the government, and dismissed the retaliation claim for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. The court held that the FCA’s “good cause” standard for government intervention is flexible and satisfied by articulated governmental interests, without the need for Rule 24(b) requirements. The government’s motion to dismiss was proper under Rule 41, and the plaintiff received adequate notice and hearing. The retaliation claim failed because the plaintiff did not plausibly allege protected activity or employer knowledge. View "Jackson v. Ventavia Research Group" on Justia Law

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A patient was admitted to a hospital operated by a major health system after sustaining an injury. Upon admission, the patient chose to opt out of the hospital’s public directory, meaning his presence and room number were to remain confidential. Despite this, an employee of the hospital disclosed to the patient’s former spouse that he was admitted and provided his room number after she inquired by phone. The patient had not given consent for this disclosure and subsequently expressed concern to the hospital about the release of his information.The patient filed a lawsuit in the Minnesota District Court, alleging that the hospital’s disclosure of his admission and room number violated the Minnesota Health Records Act, which defines “health record” to include information related to the provision of health care. The hospital moved for summary judgment, contending that admission status and room number did not constitute a “health record” under the Act. The district court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of the hospital by reasoning that such information did not pertain to the nature of the patient’s care or condition. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the disclosed information did meet the statutory definition of a health record.The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case to determine whether a patient’s admission and room number at a hospital are “health records” under the Minnesota Health Records Act. The court held that such information qualifies as a health record because it is information that “relates to the provision of health care to a patient.” The court concluded that the hospital’s disclosure without the patient’s consent violated the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Holtzbauer vs. Allina Health System" on Justia Law

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A man serving a life sentence for terrorism-related convictions at a federal prison in Colorado, who is severely disabled with both arms amputated above the elbow and vision loss in one eye, filed suit against several federal officials. He alleged violations of his federal constitutional and statutory rights stemming from his conditions of confinement and medical care while incarcerated. His claims included inadequate dental and medical care, denial of a medical diet, lack of proper prosthetics, and insufficient accommodation for his disabilities.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed most claims on the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Some claims were dismissed as moot or for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, while others, including his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, were dismissed for failure to state a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court also found his Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim challenging his placement at the prison was time-barred. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims with prejudice and then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff could not pursue his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim under the APA because he failed to allege a final agency action and sued individual officers rather than the agency or officials in their official capacities. The court also held that his Bivens claim for deliberate indifference arose in a new context and was foreclosed due to the existence of the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative remedies. The appellate court further found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint and ruled that the plaintiff had waived his challenge to deposition transcript fees by failing to object before the magistrate judge. View "Mostafa v. Blanche" on Justia Law

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The defendant was charged in connection with a large-scale health care fraud scheme involving Arbor Homecare Services LLC, a company she controlled. Over several years, Arbor fraudulently billed Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, MassHealth, for more than $99 million. The government alleged that the defendant orchestrated the scheme, laundered proceeds through domestic and Kenyan financial accounts, and used the funds to acquire properties and businesses. After an initial mistrial, the defendant was retried and convicted by a jury on charges of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, health care fraud, and money laundering. She was sentenced to 144 months in prison, fined $250,000, and ordered to pay restitution.Prior to the retrial, the defendant cycled through numerous attorneys, at times expressing a desire to proceed without counsel and at other times seeking to hire new counsel if her assets were released from civil forfeiture. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted multiple Faretta colloquies, warning her of the risks of self-representation. Ultimately, the court found her waiver of counsel to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and permitted her to proceed pro se with standby counsel. The court also denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained from her cell phone during a border search, finding the search supported by reasonable suspicion.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant argued that her conviction should be reversed due to alleged violations of her right to counsel and due process, and that the cell phone evidence should have been suppressed. She also challenged the calculation of her sentence, disputing the loss amount and the application of a sophisticated-means enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that her waiver of counsel was constitutionally valid, her suppression argument was waived, and her sentencing challenges were either waived or without merit. View "US v. Newton" on Justia Law

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The defendant was stopped by Columbus police for driving with a broken headlight and found to be driving on a suspended license related to a prior OVI offense. After arresting him, police conducted an inventory search of his car, which revealed heroin, cocaine, and ammunition. Subsequent searches of his residence and his grandmother’s home, both conducted pursuant to warrants, uncovered additional drugs, cash, and firearms. The defendant was implicated in a long-running drug-trafficking organization operated by his uncle and another individual, and was charged in a federal indictment with conspiracy and various drug and firearm offenses.Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from all three searches, arguing, among other things, that the impoundment and search of his car were improper and that the warrants for the residences lacked probable cause. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied all suppression motions. During trial, the government discovered that most of the cocaine from the car was powder, not crack, and successfully moved to amend Count Two of the indictment to reflect this. The jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy and several drug offenses, acquitting him on firearm counts. The district court denied post-verdict motions and sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It affirmed the denial of all suppression motions, finding the searches lawful and either properly supported by probable cause or covered by the good-faith exception. The appellate court also affirmed the admission of alleged hearsay, ruling it fell within the co-conspirator exception. The court upheld the conviction for conspiracy, determining that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. However, the court held that the mid-trial amendment to Count Two of the indictment constituted an actual amendment in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Presentment Clause and vacated the conviction on that count, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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A group of Facebook users who interacted with an optical retailer’s website alleged that the company installed a Meta Pixel tracking tool on its site, which collected and transmitted users’ sensitive health-related information—such as browsing for prescription eyewear, entering prescription details, and scheduling eye exams—to Meta Platforms, Inc. without their consent. The users claimed this information qualified as individually identifiable health information under federal law and should not have been shared without authorization. The plaintiffs divided themselves into two groups: those who browsed or scheduled appointments (“Search Plaintiffs”) and those who entered prescription information to purchase eyewear (“Prescription Plaintiffs”).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially found that the plaintiffs had standing but dismissed their first complaint for failure to state a claim, allowing them to amend. After the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, the district court again dismissed the case with prejudice. It held that the Search Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged they shared any protected health information with the defendant, and that the Prescription Plaintiffs had failed to show any such information was actually disclosed to Meta through the Pixel.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the unauthorized disclosure of the plaintiffs’ health information to Meta constituted a concrete and particularized injury, affirming that the plaintiffs had standing. The court held that both groups of plaintiffs adequately alleged that their individually identifiable health information was transmitted to Meta without their consent. The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rand v. Eyemart Express" on Justia Law