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The Medical Board of California sought the medical records of three minors for whom Dr. Kennedy provided vaccination exemptions. After Kennedy refused to produce the records, the Director superior court granted a petition under Government Code section 11187 and ordered Kennedy to produce the records. The court denied Kennedy’s request to stay the order while he pursued appellate review. The court of appeal denied Kennedy’s petition for a writ of supersedeas, rejecting Kennedy’s argument under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.2, which operates automatically to stay an order directing “the assignment or delivery of personal property, including documents,” if the appellant posts an undertaking. The automatic stay provisions apply to civil actions but do not ordinarily apply to a special proceeding. The underlying petition to enforce an administrative subpoena is a special proceeding because it is “established by statute” and commenced independently of a pending action by petition. The court noted that its interpretation is consistent with federal law. An automatic stay would impede the Board’s discharge of its duty to “protect the public against incompetent, impaired, or negligent physicians.” Kennedy has not shown a discretionary stay is warranted; it is likely that the court acted within its discretion in finding the Board’s interest in obtaining records of vaccination exemptions outweighed the patients’ privacy rights, given that the Board must keep the records confidential during its investigation. View "Kennedy v. Super. Court" on Justia Law

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In this case concerning civil liability based on insurer conduct affecting chiropractic services, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing all claims in this case, relying on and incorporating its reasoning in a companion case, Sykes v. Health Network Solutions, Inc., __ S.E.2d __ (N.C. 2019)(Sykes I), in holding that the decision in Sykes I met the criteria for collateral estoppel. This case was one of two putative class actions alleging that defendant insurers contracted with Health Network Solutions, Inc. (HNS) to provide or restrict insured chiropractic services in violation of state insurance and antitrust laws. Plaintiffs chose to bring this action against insurers separately from their claims against against HNS and its individual owners in Sykes I, but both actions presented essentially the same claims and relied on the same theories. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that collateral estoppel barred Plaintiffs from litigating these matters given the Court's resolution of the issues in Sykes I. View "Sykes v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of North Carolina" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the Business Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Health Network Solutions, Inc. (HNS) and HNS's individual owners alleging that HNS committed antitrust and other violations in its role as intermediary between individual chiropractors and several insurance companies and third-party administrators, holding that the Business Court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs' entire complaint. Plaintiffs were licensed chiropractic providers in North Carolina who alleged that Defendants engaged in unlawful price fixing resulting in a reduction of output of chiropractic services in North Carolina. The Business Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss and for partial summary judgment and then dismissed Plaintiffs' remaining claims under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Business Court did not err in dismissing each of Plaintiffs' substantive claims and their derivative claims. The Business Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' antitrust claims, including the derivative claim of civil conspiracy, stands without presidential value because the members of the Court were equally divided as to these claims. View "Sykes v. Health Network Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court insofar as it rendered judgment in Defendant's favor on counts alleging fraudulent transfer under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-552a through 52-552l, and unjust enrichment, holding that the trial court erred in rejecting Plaintiff's CUFTA claim but did not err in rejecting Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. Defendant Stephen McGee used a power of attorney granted to him by his elderly mother, Helen McGee, to transfer to himself funds from Helen's checking account. As a consequence of the transfers, Helen had insufficient assets to pay her debt to Plaintiff Geriatrics, Inc. Plaintiff brought this action, and the trial court rendered judgment in Defendant's favor on Plaintiff's CUFTA and unjust enrichment claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) in rejecting the CUFTA claim the trial court improperly failed to consider and apply agency principles; and (2) in light of the unrequited evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. View "Geriatrics, Inc. v. McGee" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court finding attorney Jonathan Streit in contempt of court and assessing a $100 fine, holding that substantial evidence supported the court's decision that Streit's actions displayed a lack of regard for the court's integrity and demonstrated disrespect. Streit appeared before the circuit court on a petition for permanent guardianship. At the hearing, the circuit court noted several deficiencies in the case file. The circuit court was unwilling to let the matter to proceed without compliance with the statutory requirements, and Streit argued that the circuit court took issue with him because he successfully reversed the circuit court in a separate case. The circuit court then found Streit in contempt of court and assessed a fine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the court's decision to hold Streit in contempt. View "Streit v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's petition for a supervisory writ in which Defendant argued that an automatic stay in his case began upon the circuit court's entry of a involuntary medication order rather than upon filing a notice of appeal but vacated the circuit court's order for involuntary medication, holding that the order was constitutionally insufficient. The circuit court ordered Defendant to be involuntarily medicated to restore his competency to stand trial on a felony charge. After the Supreme Court released its decision in State v. Scott, 914 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 2018), subjecting involuntary medication orders to an automatic stay pending appeal, the circuit court stayed its involuntary medication order. Defendant petitioned the court of appeals for a supervisory writ and challenged the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 971.14 based on its incompatibility with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeals did not err in denying Defendant's petition for a supervisory writ; and (2) the standard for ordering involuntary medication set forth in section 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) is unconstitutional to the extent it requires circuit courts to order involuntary medication based on a standard that does not comport with Sell. View "State v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals granting Waukesha County's motion to dismiss the appeal brought by Ms. L. challenging the circuit court's judgment extending Ms. L's commitment, holding that all three issues brought by Ms. L. on appeal were moot but that the Court would address two of those three issues. Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court still had personal jurisdiction over Ms. L. when it conducted the extension hearing and entered the extension order, and the County's notice did not fail any due process requirements; (2) the circuit court properly entered default against Ms. L. for failing to appear at an extension hearing; and (3) Ms. L.'s issue that there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court's entry of the extension order was moot. View "Waukesha County v. S.L.L." on Justia Law

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In this insurance dispute involving an insurer withholding payments to a medical service corporation improperly controlled by nonphysicans the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in declining to give a charge requiring the jury to find fraudulent intent or conduct "tantamount to fraud" in order to reach a verdict in favor of the insurers. Plaintiff Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C., a professional service corporation, filed multiple collection actions against insurance carriers seeking to recover unpaid claims of assigned first-party no-fault insurance benefits. The jury found that Defendants had proved that Plaintiff was "fraudulently incorporated" and that Carothers did not engage in the practice of medicine. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to give a jury instruction on "the traditional elements of common-law fraud and fraudulent intent. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court's instructions to the jury were proper. View "Carothers v. Progressive Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Two Mississippi hospitals filed suit alleging that the government miscalculated their Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments. In this case, the district court gave substantial deference to the interpretation of HHS, which read that the relevant statute and regulation to exclude from the numerator Mississippi's uncompensated care pool (UCCP) patient days. However, the Fifth Circuit held that HHS's position was foreclosed by the text and structure of the relevant provisions. Therefore, HHS's decision to exclude UCCP patient days from the Medicaid fraction's numerator was not in accordance with law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Forrest General Hospital v. Azar" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of a final order affirming a citation that Bergelectric violated OSHA's fall protection standards in 29 C.F.R. 1926.501(b)(1). The panel held that Bergelectric was not performing roofing work and that substantial evidence supported the finding that it did not comply with the stricter safety standards governing work on unprotected sides and edges. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that Bergelectric employees were subject to the danger of falling prior to proper use of the personal fall arrest systems, and thus the ALJ did not err in finding Bergelectric liable for violation of section 1926.501(b)(1). View "Bergelectric Corp. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law