The Medical Board of California sought the medical records of three minors for whom Dr. Kennedy provided vaccination exemptions. After Kennedy refused to produce the records, the Director superior court granted a petition under Government Code section 11187 and ordered Kennedy to produce the records. The court denied Kennedy’s request to stay the order while he pursued appellate review. The court of appeal denied Kennedy’s petition for a writ of supersedeas, rejecting Kennedy’s argument under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.2, which operates automatically to stay an order directing “the assignment or delivery of personal property, including documents,” if the appellant posts an undertaking. The automatic stay provisions apply to civil actions but do not ordinarily apply to a special proceeding. The underlying petition to enforce an administrative subpoena is a special proceeding because it is “established by statute” and commenced independently of a pending action by petition. The court noted that its interpretation is consistent with federal law. An automatic stay would impede the Board’s discharge of its duty to “protect the public against incompetent, impaired, or negligent physicians.” Kennedy has not shown a discretionary stay is warranted; it is likely that the court acted within its discretion in finding the Board’s interest in obtaining records of vaccination exemptions outweighed the patients’ privacy rights, given that the Board must keep the records confidential during its investigation. View "Kennedy v. Super. Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court finding attorney Jonathan Streit in contempt of court and assessing a $100 fine, holding that substantial evidence supported the court's decision that Streit's actions displayed a lack of regard for the court's integrity and demonstrated disrespect. Streit appeared before the circuit court on a petition for permanent guardianship. At the hearing, the circuit court noted several deficiencies in the case file. The circuit court was unwilling to let the matter to proceed without compliance with the statutory requirements, and Streit argued that the circuit court took issue with him because he successfully reversed the circuit court in a separate case. The circuit court then found Streit in contempt of court and assessed a fine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the court's decision to hold Streit in contempt. View "Streit v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's petition for a supervisory writ in which Defendant argued that an automatic stay in his case began upon the circuit court's entry of a involuntary medication order rather than upon filing a notice of appeal but vacated the circuit court's order for involuntary medication, holding that the order was constitutionally insufficient. The circuit court ordered Defendant to be involuntarily medicated to restore his competency to stand trial on a felony charge. After the Supreme Court released its decision in State v. Scott, 914 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 2018), subjecting involuntary medication orders to an automatic stay pending appeal, the circuit court stayed its involuntary medication order. Defendant petitioned the court of appeals for a supervisory writ and challenged the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 971.14 based on its incompatibility with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeals did not err in denying Defendant's petition for a supervisory writ; and (2) the standard for ordering involuntary medication set forth in section 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) is unconstitutional to the extent it requires circuit courts to order involuntary medication based on a standard that does not comport with Sell. View "State v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals granting Waukesha County's motion to dismiss the appeal brought by Ms. L. challenging the circuit court's judgment extending Ms. L's commitment, holding that all three issues brought by Ms. L. on appeal were moot but that the Court would address two of those three issues. Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court still had personal jurisdiction over Ms. L. when it conducted the extension hearing and entered the extension order, and the County's notice did not fail any due process requirements; (2) the circuit court properly entered default against Ms. L. for failing to appear at an extension hearing; and (3) Ms. L.'s issue that there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court's entry of the extension order was moot. View "Waukesha County v. S.L.L." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute involving an insurer withholding payments to a medical service corporation improperly controlled by nonphysicans the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in declining to give a charge requiring the jury to find fraudulent intent or conduct "tantamount to fraud" in order to reach a verdict in favor of the insurers. Plaintiff Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C., a professional service corporation, filed multiple collection actions against insurance carriers seeking to recover unpaid claims of assigned first-party no-fault insurance benefits. The jury found that Defendants had proved that Plaintiff was "fraudulently incorporated" and that Carothers did not engage in the practice of medicine. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to give a jury instruction on "the traditional elements of common-law fraud and fraudulent intent. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court's instructions to the jury were proper. View "Carothers v. Progressive Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Two Mississippi hospitals filed suit alleging that the government miscalculated their Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments. In this case, the district court gave substantial deference to the interpretation of HHS, which read that the relevant statute and regulation to exclude from the numerator Mississippi's uncompensated care pool (UCCP) patient days. However, the Fifth Circuit held that HHS's position was foreclosed by the text and structure of the relevant provisions. Therefore, HHS's decision to exclude UCCP patient days from the Medicaid fraction's numerator was not in accordance with law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Forrest General Hospital v. Azar" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of a final order affirming a citation that Bergelectric violated OSHA's fall protection standards in 29 C.F.R. 1926.501(b)(1). The panel held that Bergelectric was not performing roofing work and that substantial evidence supported the finding that it did not comply with the stricter safety standards governing work on unprotected sides and edges. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that Bergelectric employees were subject to the danger of falling prior to proper use of the personal fall arrest systems, and thus the ALJ did not err in finding Bergelectric liable for violation of section 1926.501(b)(1). View "Bergelectric Corp. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

An employer's decision to deny or modify a physician's request for specific medical services for an injured employee is subject to review under the "utilization review" process; utilization review is handled by medical experts. Petitioners sought issuance of a writ of review following a decision by the appeals board concerning an employee and her request for heavy housework assistance. The Court of Appeal granted the employer's petition for review because the appeals board acted in excess of its jurisdiction in addressing, on the merits, the issue of home assessment for housekeeping services. The court explained that the Legislature has expressly stated that it was its intent to have medical professionals ultimately determine the necessity of requested treatment. Therefore, the court annulled the decision of the appeals board and remanded with directions for further proceedings. View "Allied Signal Aerospace v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Doe is HIV-positive and takes Genvoya to control his condition. Doe's BlueCross health insurance covers Genvoya. After February 2017, BlueCross required Doe to fill the HIV prescription through mail order or by picking it up at certain brick-and-mortar pharmacies. If Doe used BlueCross's specialty pharmacy network, his co-pay for each monthly batch of Genvoya would be $120. If Doe continued to get the medicine at his local pharmacy, he would have to pay the full cost, thousands of dollars per batch. Doe preferred interacting with his regular pharmacists, who knew his medical history and could spot the effects of harmful drug interactions. He also worried that deliveries to his house might compromise his privacy or risk heat damage to the medicine. Doe filed a putative class action, alleging that BlueCross discriminated against HIV-positive beneficiaries in violation of the Affordable Care Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which breached their insurance contract. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Affordable Care Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the provision of federally supported health programs under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. BlueCross did not violate the Rehabilitation Act; it did not exclude Doe from participating in the plan or deny him benefits covered by it. Section 504 does not prohibit disparate-impact discrimination. The ADA claim failed because Doe targets BlueCross’s operation of his health care plan, not its control over his pharmacy (a public accommodation). View "Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc." on Justia Law

The Medicare statute precludes judicial review of estimates used to make certain payments to hospitals for treating low-income patients. At issue was whether this preclusion provision barred challenges to the methodology used to make the estimates. The DC Circuit held that it could not review the Secretary's method of estimation without also reviewing the estimate. Therefore, the two were inextricably intertwined and 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(r)(3)(A) precludes review of both. The court held that Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc. v. Secretary of HHS, 830 F.3d 515 (D.C. Cir. 2016), -- not ParkView Medical Associates v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1998) -- was controlling in this case. In Florida Health, the court held that section 1395ww(r)(3) barred review because the plaintiff was simply trying to undo the Secretary's estimate of the hospital's uncompensated care by recasting its challenge to the Secretary's choice of data as an attack on the general rules leading to her estimate. Here, DCH was simply trying to undo the Secretary's estimate of its uncompensated care by recasting its challenge to that estimate as an attack on the underlying methodology. View "DCH Regional Medical Center v. Azar" on Justia Law