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In August 2014, Dianne and Reggie Harkins alleged the direct and proximate negligence of multiple healthcare providers located in Leake County and Hinds County resulted in, among other problems, the amputation of Dianne Harkins’s hands and feet. In January 2015, Madden Medical Clinic, PLLC (Madden Medical) and David Moody, M.D. (Dr. Moody) filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for severance and transfer of venue to the Circuit Court of Leake County. Shortly thereafter, Baptist Medical Center-Leake, Inc. (BMC-Leake) and Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. (Baptist Health) filed a motion also to dismiss or transfer venue to the Circuit Court of Leake County. On February 26, 2016, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County entered an order denying the motions of Dr. Moody, Madden Medical, BMC-Leake, and Baptist Health to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer venue. The parties appealed, collectively filing two interlocutory appeals, and both appeals were granted and consolidated. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that under the plain language of Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(3), venue was proper for the properly joined defendants in Hinds County or Leake County, and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. v. Harkins" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Kerry and Scott Tomlinson (parents) and their son, T, brought separate negligence claims against defendants Mary K. Wagner, MD., Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC, and Legacy Emanuel Hospital & Health Center. In their respective claims, plaintiffs alleged that defendants provided medical services to the parents’ older son, M, failed to timely diagnose M’s genetic disorder, and failed to inform the parents of that disorder. They further alleged that, “[h]ad defendants, and each of them, timely diagnosed [M’s] DMD, [the parents] would not have produced another child suffering from [DMD].” The trial court entered a judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that neither the parents nor T were patients of defendants and, therefore, the court reasoned, defendants owed no obligation of professional care toward them. The Court of Appeals reversed that judgment as to the parents but affirmed as to T. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court judgment dismissing this action. Under the parents’ theory of relief, the relevant injury was not the resulting life, but the negligent deprivation of information that was important to the parents’ protected interest in making informed reproductive choices. T’s claim necessarily depended on the premise that T had a legally protected interest in not being born, rather than risk being born with DMD. "[T]he doctrinal implications of recognizing T’s right to recover such damages would be significant." The Court concluded the factual allegations were sufficient as to the parents' claim. With respect to T's claims, however, the Court determined the "threshold difficulty with T’s argument is that it puts the damages cart before the liability horse; that is, T’s argument blurs the line between the identification of a cognizable injury and the determination of damages resulting from the injury. . . based on the facts that T alleges, defendants could not have caused T a physical harm." View "Tomlinson v. Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC" on Justia Law

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The trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff’s expert report did not represent a good-faith effort to meet the requirements of the Texas Medical Liability Act and in dismissing Plaintiff’s health care liability claims. Plaintiff sued Defendants, a certified registered nurse anesthetist and his employer, asserting medical malpractice claims relating to the nurse’s administration before cataract surgery. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff’s expert report was deficient with respect to the elements of standards of care, breach of standards of care, and causation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the report satisfied the good faith effort the Act requires. View "Baty v. Futrell" on Justia Law

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St. Alexius Medical Center, doing business as Great Plains Rehabilitation ("Great Plains"), appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Human Services ("the Department") determination that the Department was entitled to recoup overpayments made to Great Plains. Great Plains argued the Department's decision had to be reversed because the Department did not issue the decision within the statutory time limit, the Department did not provide a fair process for disputing the Department's position, and the Department's findings of fact are not supported by the evidence. Finding no reversible error in the district court or the Department's decisions, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "St. Alexius Medical Center v. N.D. Dep't of Human Services" on Justia Law

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Legacy, a Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC), filed suit against the Commission, alleging that Texas's reimbursement scheme violated the Medicaid Act. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Legacy, holding that the Commission's requirement that Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) fully reimburse FQHCs did not violate the Medicaid Act; Legacy lacked standing to challenge the Commission's lack of a policy that the state directly reimburse an FQHC if it is not fully reimbursed by the MCO; and Legacy was not entitled to reimbursement for the non-emergency, out-of-network services about which it complained. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions. View "Legacy Community Health Services, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-appellant Elizabeth Cates was a former patient of defendant-appellee Integris Health, Inc.’s medical facility and claimed defendant wrongfully billed her, and others like her, for services. She filed this action in state court, alleging state-law claims for breach of contract, violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, and deceit. Defendant successfully moved to dismiss these claims on the ground that they were expressly preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and held that plaintiff’s claims were not preempted. The case was returned to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cates v. Integris Health, Inc." on Justia Law

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At issue was whether a guardian’s attorney fees should be paid from a protected person’s estate when the fees were incurred in responding to pleadings to remove the guardian and to move the protected person to an assisted living facility. Beverly Sears, the guardian in this case, moved for her attorney fees incurred in a dispute seeking to remove her as guardian and to move the protected person to a facility. The parties settled, with Sears agreeing to step down as guardian but the parties deciding that the protected person would not be moved to a facility. Sears moved for her attorney fees paid from the estate. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that without a resolution of factual matters relating to the necessity of the services in administering the guardianship or the reasonableness of the fee amount, the court was unable to meaningfully review the circuit court’s decision. View "In re Conservatorship of Bachand" on Justia Law

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After complaints about his professionalism, Indiana University Hospital required Dr. Hamdan, a U.S. citizen of Palestinian descent, to participate in a peer-review process, which resulted in disciplinary letters. Hamdan successfully appealed. The hospital ultimately voided the letters. Nonetheless, Hamdan resigned and relinquished his hospital privileges. Hamdan sued the hospital for discriminating against him based on race. Hamdan was not a hospital employee and could not sue under Title VII, so he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1981, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, intended to protect the ability of newly-freed slaves to enter and enforce contracts. Hamdan alleged discrimination in his contractual relationship with the hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict for the hospital, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing the hospital to ask Hamdan impeachment questions relating to his prior work at other hospitals. The court noted Hamdan’s testimony that his reputation was “untarnished” before he received the disciplinary letters. The Seventh Circuit also rejected an argument that the court erred in permitting the hospital to try to impeach him with questions about matters that were confidential under the peer-review statutes of Indiana, Louisiana, and Michigan. Even if the state laws applied, the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing impeachment questions about incident reports. View "Hamdan v. Indiana University Health North Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

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After complaints about his professionalism, Indiana University Hospital required Dr. Hamdan, a U.S. citizen of Palestinian descent, to participate in a peer-review process, which resulted in disciplinary letters. Hamdan successfully appealed. The hospital ultimately voided the letters. Nonetheless, Hamdan resigned and relinquished his hospital privileges. Hamdan sued the hospital for discriminating against him based on race. Hamdan was not a hospital employee and could not sue under Title VII, so he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1981, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, intended to protect the ability of newly-freed slaves to enter and enforce contracts. Hamdan alleged discrimination in his contractual relationship with the hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict for the hospital, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing the hospital to ask Hamdan impeachment questions relating to his prior work at other hospitals. The court noted Hamdan’s testimony that his reputation was “untarnished” before he received the disciplinary letters. The Seventh Circuit also rejected an argument that the court erred in permitting the hospital to try to impeach him with questions about matters that were confidential under the peer-review statutes of Indiana, Louisiana, and Michigan. Even if the state laws applied, the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing impeachment questions about incident reports. View "Hamdan v. Indiana University Health North Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

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The trial court properly dismissed two of Petitioners’ counts against Respondent seeking damages for injuries one of the petitioners allegedly sustained while staying at one of Respondent’s facilities because these two counts alleged medical injuries within the Health Claims Act (HCA). Therefore, Petitioners were required to file those claims in the Health Care Alternative Dispute Resolute Office (ADR Office) as a condition precedent to their circuit court action. Petitioners’ remaining negligence count should survive because it did not allege a breach of professional standard of care such that it must be filed in the ADR Office. Petitioners’ counts sounding in contract, consumer protection, and loss of consortium also survived dismissal. View "Davis v. Frostburg Facility Operations, LLC" on Justia Law