Plaintiff Elizabeth Lawson alleged she incurred damages as the result of an emergency room nurse informing a police officer that she was intoxicated, had driven to the hospital, and was intending to drive home. The trial court granted defendant Central Vermont Medical Center (CVMC) summary judgment based on its determination that nothing in the record supported an inference that the nurse’s disclosure of the information was for any reason other than her good-faith concern for plaintiff’s and the public’s safety. In this opinion, the Vermont Supreme Court recognized a common-law private right of action for damages based on a medical provider’s unjustified disclosure to third persons of information obtained during treatment. Like the trial court, however, the Supreme Court concluded CVMC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, viewing the material facts most favorably to plaintiff and applying the relevant law adopted here, no reasonable factfinder could have determined the disclosure was for any purpose other than to mitigate the threat of imminent and serious harm to plaintiff and the public. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Lawson v. Central Vermont Medical Center" on Justia Law

Greenway Health, LLC, and Greenway EHS, Inc. (formerly EHS, Inc.) (collectively, "the Greenway defendants"), and Sunrise Technology Consultants, LLC, and Lee Investment Consultants, LLC (collectively, "the Sunrise defendants"), appealed separately a circuit court order denying their motion to compel the arbitration of certain claims asserted against them by Southeast Alabama Rural Health Associates ("SARHA"). Because the Alabama Supreme Court determined the Greenway defendants failed to establish the existence of a contract containing an arbitration provision, the Sunrise defendants' argument based on an intertwining-claims theory also failed. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the Greenway defendants' and the Sunrise defendants' motions to stay proceedings and to compel arbitration. View "Greenway Health, LLC, and Greenway EHS, Inc. v. Southeast Alabama Rural Health Associates" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that N.C. Gen. Stat. 122C-266(a) imposes a statutory mandate that automatically preserves violation of that subsection for appellate review regardless of a failure to object in the trial court and that Respondent was automatically entitled to relief without having to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the violation of section 122C-266(a), holding that Respondent's issue was not preserved for appellate review. Here, Respondent, who was involuntarily committed to a state health facility, did not receive an examination by a second physician, as mandated by section 122C-266(a). The court of appeals held that Respondent was not required to make a showing of prejudice resulting from the violation of the statue in order to have vacated the trial court's order authorizing her continued commitment. The Supreme Court reversed without deciding whether prejudice must be shown to obtain relief on appeal, holding (1) the alleged violation of section 122C-266(a) was not automatically preserved; and (2) Respondent failed to preserve the issue when she did not raise it during the district court hearing on her involuntary commitment. View "In re E.D." on Justia Law

Putnam County Memorial Hospital ("Putnam") appealed a circuit court denial of its motion to set aside a default judgment entered in favor of TruBridge, LLC ("TruBridge"), and Evident, LLC ("Evident"). In September 2015, Putnam entered into a "Master Services Agreement" with TruBridge ("the MSA agreement") and a license and support agreement with Evident ("the LSA agreement"). In the MSA agreement, TruBridge agreed to provide accounts-receivable management services for Putnam for five years. The MSA agreement provided that TruBridge would receive 5.65 percent of the "cash collections," as that term is defined in the MSA agreement, to be paid monthly, for its account and billing services. In the LSA agreement, Evident agreed to provide Putnam with Evident's electronic health-records system as well as maintenance and support for that system. According to Putnam, starting in 2016, Putnam entered into a series of agreements with Hospital Partners, Inc. ("HPI"), in which HPI agreed to manage and control the operations of the hospital and its facilities. TruBridge and Evident alleged that at that time, Putnam began entering patient information and billing services through a different computer system than the one provided by Evident pursuant to the LSA agreement and used by TruBridge for accounts receivable pursuant to the MSA agreement. When a TruBridge manager contacted Putnam to inquire about this drop in new-patient admissions into their system, Putnam claimed to have almost no new patients and that it was barely surviving. TruBridge and Evident alleged Putnam was deliberately false and that Putnam was, in fact, simply entering new patients into a different system. Putnam did not enter an appearance in the lawsuit brought by TruBridge and Evident for breach of contract. The circuit court entered a default judgment. Putnam's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Putnam met its evidentiary threshold to trigger the statutory requirement the circuit court reconsider its motion to set aside and for reconsideration relating to the default judgment. Therefore, the Court reversed the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Putnam County Memorial Hospital v. TruBridge, LLC, and Evident, LLC" on Justia Law

In this dispute over who was the first-to-file relator in a case brought under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., the First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court ruling that the first-to-file rule was jurisdictional, holding, for the first time in this circuit, that the first-to-file rule is not jurisdictional and that the Court had jurisdiction over Mark McGuire's crossclaim. The FCA's first-to-file rule prohibits relators other than the first to file from bringing a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action. In this case, the government successfully intervened in several qui tam suits against Millennium Health. Millennium settled with the government, setting aside fifteen percent of the settlement proceeds as a relator's share. McGuire brought a crossclaim for declaratory judgment that he was the first to file and was thus entitled to the fifteen-percent share. The district court dismissed the crossclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the first-to-file rule was jurisdictional. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the first-to-file rule is not jurisdictional, and therefore, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over McGuire's crossclaim; and (2) McGuire was the first-to-file relator and has stated a claim that he is entitled to the relator's share of the settlement. View "McGuire v. Estate of Robert Cunningham" on Justia Law

A.M. received a human papillomavirus vaccine in 2007. Shortly thereafter, she developed autoimmune limbic encephalitis and an intractable seizure disorder, resulting in cognitive impairment. Her mother (McCulloch) sought compensation under the Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. 300aa. A special master awarded compensation for A.M.’s injury and accepted the parties' agreement on the amounts and mechanisms of compensation. Neither party sought review. Months later McCulloch sought an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under section 300aa15(e)(1). A special master awarded fees and costs and included amounts to cover the expenses, under Florida guardianship law, of maintaining the guardianship for A.M,-- a required condition for receiving the full payments under the merits judgment. The Claims Court upheld inclusion of those amounts, but cited section 300aa-15(a), the provision governing merits awards of compensation, instead of 300aa-15(e), the fees/costs provision on which the special master relied. The Federal Circuit affirmed while acknowledging that the Claims Court improperly reopened a final merits judgment by awarding money under section 300aa-15(a). Nonetheless, it was appropriate for the special master to award guardianship-maintenance expenses under that section because McCulloch incurred a continuing liability to pay such expenses as a condition of receiving, for her daughter, the compensation awarded on the merits in this proceeding. View "McCulloch v. Secretary of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court affirming the decision of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) terminating Appellant's status as a Medicaid service provider, holding that the district court's affirmance of the sanction imposed by DHHS was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Based on Appellant's failures to adhere to the standards for participation in Medicaid, DHHS terminated Appellant's provider agreements for good cause and then informed Appellant of her permanent exclusion from the Medicaid program. The DHHS director of the Division of Medicaid and Long-Term Care ruled that DHHS' decision to terminate Appellant as a Medicaid service provider was proper. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court's finding that Appellant billed for overlapping services was based on competent evidence; and (2) DHHS' sanction to permanently exclude Appellant from the Medicaid program was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Tran v. State" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction compelling Defendants to provide Plaintiff with medication while she is incarcerated, holding that the district court properly found that a preliminary injunction was warranted under the circumstances of this case. Plaintiff, who was due to be incarcerated for forty days in the county jail, was informed that she was not to receive her twice daily dose of buprenorphine prescribed for an "opioid use disorder" while incarcerated. Plaintiff brought this suit seeking injunctive relief compelling Defendants to provide her medication while she was incarcerated. The district court found a sufficient likelihood of success combined with both a strong balance of harms and a public interest in favor of Plaintiff so as to warrant a preliminary injunction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its preliminary assessment of the issues that must be balanced in deciding a request for preliminary injunctive relief. View "Smith v. Aroostook County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from ordering Relator to submit to a mental evaluation pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 552, holding that chapter 552 did not authorize the circuit court to order the department of mental health to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of Relator. Relator was charged with first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and other offenses. Relator asserted that he was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The State sought an order for a mental evaluation pursuant to chapter 552. The circuit court granted the motion. Relator then petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition, and the court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court granted transfer and made permanent a writ of probation, holding that the circuit court exceeded its authority by ordering Relator to undergo a mental evaluation pursuant to chapter 552 when Relator intended to rely only on the diminished capacity defense because the circuit court lacked reasonable cause to question his competence to stand trial. View "Caruthers v. Honorable Wendy Wexler-Horn" on Justia Law

In these two mental health cases, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of the temporary commitment orders of two individuals, holding that the Probate Commissioner lacked authority to enter the commitment orders. Although the appeals were moot, the Supreme Court addressed an issue of great public importance likely to recur, that issue being whether the Commissioners lacked authority to enter the orders of civil commitment. On appeal, Appellants argued that, rather than issuing a commitment order, the Commissioner approved each order via an "approval order" that did not constitute valid commitment orders for these two mental health cases. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the approval orders provided inadequate assurance that the Commissioner was presented with, reviewed, and approved the temporary commitment orders in the cases of the two individuals at issue here. View "In re Civil Commitment of T.W. v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc." on Justia Law