Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Sekhar Rao was involved in a scheme to defraud TRICARE, a federal health benefit plan, by ordering medically unnecessary toxicology and DNA cancer screening tests. These tests were billed to TRICARE through a shell company, ADAR Group, LLC, which set up fraudulent testing sites. Rao, a physician, was hired to sign off on these tests without reviewing patient medical information or meeting the patients. He was paid per test ordered. The scheme involved using a signature stamp of Rao’s signature to sign requisition forms, which Rao allegedly knew about and consented to.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Rao was acquitted of conspiracy to commit health care fraud but was convicted of two counts of substantive health care fraud related to specific fraudulent claims submitted to TRICARE. The district court sentenced him to 48 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and calculated the loss amount under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the intended loss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Rao raised three issues on appeal: the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, the exclusion of testimony regarding statements made to him by the scheme’s leader about legal vetting, and the calculation of the loss amount under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Fifth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court’s decisions. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Rao caused the submission of the fraudulent claims and that he knew about and authorized the use of his signature stamp. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err in excluding the testimony about legal vetting and did not err in calculating the intended loss amount. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Rao’s convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Rao" on Justia Law

Galderma Laboratories, L.P. and TCD Royalty Sub LP (collectively, Galderma) own and market Oracea®, a doxycycline-based treatment for rosacea. They hold U.S. Patent Nos. 7,749,532 and 8,206,740 (the Asserted Patents), which cover a specific formulation of doxycycline. Lupin Inc. and Lupin Ltd. (collectively, Lupin) filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) to market a generic version of Oracea®, claiming bioequivalence. Galderma sued Lupin for patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act, asserting that Lupin’s product infringed the Asserted Patents.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware held a three-day bench trial and found that Lupin’s ANDA product did not infringe the Asserted Patents. The court concluded that Galderma failed to prove that Lupin’s product met the specific formulation requirements of the Asserted Patents, particularly the immediate release (IR) and delayed release (DR) portions of doxycycline. The court also found that Galderma did not demonstrate infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Galderma argued that the district court erred in disregarding dissolution test data from Lupin’s ANDA, admitting evidence from a rebuttal batch, imposing additional claim limitations, and not finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s findings. It held that the district court correctly determined that the two-stage dissolution test did not represent in vivo behavior and that Galderma did not prove its theory of infringement. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting the rebuttal batch evidence and no imposition of additional claim limitations. Finally, the court upheld the district court’s finding that Galderma did not prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that Lupin’s ANDA product did not infringe the Asserted Patents. View "Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Lupin, Inc." on Justia Law

Kathan Daniel Wiley was convicted of conspiracy to distribute fentanyl and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl resulting in serious bodily injury. On October 30, 2021, Wiley's 18-month-old child ingested fentanyl pills, leading to severe health issues but ultimately surviving. Wiley had been distributing fentanyl pills for months, and evidence showed he obtained the pills shortly before the incident. The jury found him guilty on both counts, and the district court sentenced him to 240 months for the conspiracy charge and 324 months for possession with intent to distribute, to be served concurrently.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Wiley's motion for judgment of acquittal. Wiley appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the conspiracy charge, claiming his possession was to support his addiction rather than for distribution. He also contended that the evidence did not support the conviction for possession with intent to distribute resulting in serious bodily injury, asserting the fentanyl ingested by his child was intended for personal use.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, affirming the district court's decision. The court held that the evidence, including Facebook messages and testimony, supported the jury's finding of a conspiracy and intent to distribute. The court also upheld the district court's application of a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(13) for misrepresenting the substance as another drug. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, affirming the 324-month sentence as substantively reasonable. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Wiley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Luther C. Parente and Eric L. Stewart sued the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC) and its staff for failing to properly treat their preexisting medical conditions. They alleged various federal and state constitutional, statutory, and common law bases for relief, including a claim under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA). The plaintiffs claimed that RIDOC's medical and correctional staff failed to meet their medical needs, resulting in harm and discrimination.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied RIDOC's motion for summary judgment on Eleventh Amendment grounds as to the RICRA claim. The district court held that Rhode Island's general waiver of sovereign immunity under the State Tort Claims Act applied to RICRA claims, reasoning that discrimination actions under RICRA sounded in tort. RIDOC appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred in holding that violations of civil rights under RICRA were subject to the general waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and determined that there was a "special reason" to certify the underlying state-law issue to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The appellate court noted that the question of whether RICRA claims are "actions of tort" under the State Tort Claims Act is a matter of state law that has not been definitively resolved by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Therefore, the First Circuit certified the question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court to determine whether discrimination claims under RICRA are covered by the general waiver of sovereign immunity under the State Tort Claims Act. The First Circuit retained jurisdiction over the issue pending resolution of the certified question. View "Parente v. Lefebvre" on Justia Law

James Lowe appealed a decision by Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) regarding the denial of his request for continued opioid medication exceeding 90 Morphine Milligram Equivalents (MME) daily. Lowe argued that WSI abused its discretion in denying his request for approval of the medication.The District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, reviewed the case and affirmed WSI's decision. The court found that WSI had not acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously in its decision-making process. The court also noted that Lowe's medical provider had not provided sufficient documentation to support the medical necessity for exceeding the 90 MME limit, as required by the new law effective July 1, 2022.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court found that WSI had conducted a full review of Lowe's request and had properly applied the guidelines governing long-term opioid pain management. The court concluded that WSI did not abuse its discretion in denying Lowe's request for continued opioid medication in excess of 90 MME daily. The court affirmed the district court judgment affirming the managed care binding dispute resolution decision by WSI. View "Lowe v. Workforce Safety and Insurance" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by transgender women prisoners in Illinois, who allege that the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) has been deliberately indifferent to their gender dysphoria, a serious medical condition. The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to ensure timely evaluations and treatments, including hormone therapy, gender-affirming surgery, and appropriate support for social transitioning.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois initially issued a preliminary injunction on February 7, 2022, which was intended to address the plaintiffs' claims. The court later issued further injunctions to supplement and modify the terms. However, more than a year and a half after the preliminary injunction was issued, the district court retroactively labeled it as a permanent injunction and issued a final judgment consistent with the February 7, 2022 decision. The defendants appealed several injunctions and a finding of civil contempt by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court's attempt to retroactively transform the preliminary injunction into a permanent one was not authorized. The appellate court held that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the preliminary injunction issued on February 7, 2022, expired 90 days later, on May 8, 2022. Consequently, the appellate court vacated all existing injunctions and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also dismissed the portion of the appeal challenging the finding of contempt, as the district court had not yet imposed any sanctions, which are necessary to establish appellate jurisdiction. View "Monroe v. Bowman" on Justia Law

The case involves Planned Parenthood and two physicians challenging the Idaho Attorney General's interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-622(1), which criminalizes performing or attempting to perform an abortion and imposes professional licensing penalties on healthcare providers who assist in performing or attempting to perform an abortion. The Attorney General issued an opinion letter stating that the statute prohibits medical providers from referring patients to out-of-state abortion providers. Plaintiffs argued that this interpretation violates their First Amendment rights by preventing them from providing information about abortion services in other states.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the Attorney General from enforcing his interpretation of the statute. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, the case was ripe and not moot, and the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had established Article III standing, as they demonstrated a credible threat of prosecution under the Attorney General's interpretation. The case was deemed ripe and not moot despite the Attorney General's withdrawal of the opinion letter, as the withdrawal did not disavow the interpretation. The court also held that the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young due to his authority to assist in the enforcement of the statute. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and affirmed the preliminary injunction. The request for reassignment to a different district judge was denied. View "PLANNED PARENTHOOD GREAT NORTHWEST, HAWAII, ALASKA V. LABRADOR" on Justia Law

Dr. Fares Jeries Rabadi, a licensed physician in California, had his certificate of registration to dispense controlled substances revoked by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA initiated an investigation into Rabadi in April 2018 due to his high-risk prescribing practices. In March 2020, the DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration, alleging that Rabadi issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose to seven individuals. Rabadi requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place in September 2020. The ALJ found Rabadi's testimony not credible and recommended revoking his registration. The DEA Administrator adopted the ALJ's recommendations with minor modifications and revoked Rabadi's registration.Rabadi petitioned for review, arguing that the DEA's revocation was invalid because DEA ALJs are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by two layers of "for-cause" protections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rabadi's argument failed under Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, which found similar ALJ removal protections constitutional. The court noted that DEA ALJs perform purely adjudicatory functions, Congress does not mandate the use of ALJs for DEA hearings, and DEA ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo by the DEA Administrator, who is removable at will by the President.Rabadi also argued that the DEA Administrator's order was arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected this argument, finding that the Administrator properly ignored Rabadi's unsupported defense regarding high dosages of prescribed drugs and appropriately analyzed the public interest factors, including Rabadi's lack of a conviction record. The Ninth Circuit denied Rabadi's petition for review, upholding the DEA Administrator's order. View "RABADI V. USDEA" on Justia Law

Charles Leonhardt, a pretrial detainee at the Big Horn County Jail, suffered from back pain and was eventually diagnosed with two lower back infections after being transported to a hospital. He sued Big Horn County Sheriff Ken Blackburn, Jail Captain Debbie Cook, unnamed detention officers, the Big Horn County Sheriff’s Office, and the Jail, alleging negligence and deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment.The District Court of Big Horn County granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. The court found that Sheriff Blackburn had fulfilled his duty to arrange for medical care by contracting with Midway Medical Clinic, which provided medical services to inmates. The court also determined that the actions of Sheriff Blackburn, Captain Cook, and the detention officers were reasonable and did not proximately cause Mr. Leonhardt’s injuries. Additionally, the court found no evidence of deliberate indifference to Mr. Leonhardt’s medical needs, as the defendants ensured he received timely medical care.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the negligence claim, as the defendants acted reasonably and provided Mr. Leonhardt with access to medical care. The court also found no evidence that the defendants were aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to Mr. Leonhardt’s health, thus failing to meet the subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both the negligence and Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims. View "Leonhardt v. Big Horn County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The case involves the Hawai‘i Disability Rights Center (HDRC), which represents individuals with developmental disabilities, including children with autism. HDRC alleges that the Hawai‘i Departments of Education (DOE) and Human Services (DHS) unlawfully deny students with autism access to Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) therapy during school hours, even when medically necessary. DOE provides ABA services only if deemed educationally relevant, and DHS does not provide ABA services during school hours, even if medically necessary and covered by Medicaid or private insurance.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment in favor of DOE and DHS, holding that HDRC's failure to exhaust administrative procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was fatal to all its claims, including those under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Act. The court concluded that HDRC, as a protection and advocacy organization, must ensure that parents of its constituents exhaust the IDEA’s administrative process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that HDRC, as Hawai‘i’s designated protection and advocacy system, can pursue administrative remedies under the IDEA and is therefore bound by the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement for its own claim. However, HDRC need not ensure that parents of individual children with autism exhaust their individual IDEA claims. The court found that HDRC did not exhaust its administrative remedies, and no exceptions to IDEA exhaustion applied.The Ninth Circuit also held that HDRC was not required to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures before bringing its claims under the ADA, Section 504, and the Medicaid Act. The court concluded that HDRC’s non-IDEA claims do not allege the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and therefore do not require exhaustion under the IDEA. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. View "HAWAI'I DISABILITY RIGHTS CRT. V. KISHIMOTO" on Justia Law