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The Medical Board of California did not violate patients’ right to privacy under Cal. Const. art. I, 1 when it obtained data from the Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES), California’s prescription drug monitoring program, without a warrant or subpoena supported by good cause during the course of investigating the patients’ physician, Dr. Alwin Carl Lewis. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal, which determined that the Board’s actions did not involve a significant intrusion on a privacy interest protected by the state Constitution’s privacy provision and, even if there was an invasion of privacy, it was justified. The Supreme Court held that even assuming the Board’s actions constituted a serious intrusion on a legally protected privacy interest, its review of Lewis’s patients’ CURES records was justified by the state’s dual interest in protecting the public from the unlawful use and diversion of a particularly dangerous class of prescription drugs and protecting patients from negligent or incompetent physicians. View "Lewis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

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A patient who qualifies for the medical use of marijuana and has been terminated from her employment because she tested positive for marijuana as a result of her lawful medical use of marijuana may seek a civil remedy against her employer through claims of handicap discrimination in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. The Supreme Judicial Court thus reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for handicap discrimination and related claims under chapter 151B but affirmed the allowance of the motion to dismiss as to the counts claiming an implied private cause of action under the medical marijuana act and wrongful termination in violation of public policy, holding that there is no implied statutory private cause of action under the medical marijuana act and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Marketing, LLC" on Justia Law

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Harold Persaud, M.D., a cardiologist in private practice, was charged with one count of health-care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, 14 counts of making false statements relating to health-care matters, 18 U.S.C. 1035, and one count of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. The grand jury also returned a forfeiture finding, requiring Persaud to forfeit all property linked to the charges, including $343,634.671 seized from bank accounts associated with Persaud and his wife. At trial, the government presented 34 witnesses, including 11 physicians, eight patients, and four nurses. The defense relied on five witnesses, including an expert cardiologist, two referring physicians, and a coding expert. The jury convicted Persaud on all charges, except for one false-statement count. The jury concluded that the $343,634.67 seized from the Persauds’ bank accounts was forfeitable; the $250,188.42 seized from Persaud’s wife’s account was related to his money-laundering conviction; and Persaud’s scheme generated gross proceeds of $2,100,000. The district court sentenced Persaud to 20 years of imprisonment, a $1,500 special assessment, and restitution of $5,486,857.03, which consists of money damages to be paid to Persaud’s patients, their private insurers, and the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The jury was entitled to accept the view of the government’s experts over those of Persaud’s experts. View "United States v. Persaud" on Justia Law

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The indigent care provision of the special law applicable only to Sarasota County does not constitute an unconstitutional privilege because it applies equally to all hospitals in Sarasota County, whether public or private. Certain private hospitals sought a declaration establishing their right to reimbursement from Sarasota County for providing indigent care under the indigent care provision of the special law. The County asserted that such reimbursement would provide an unconstitutional privilege to private corporations in violation of Fla. Const. art. III, section 11(a)(12). The trial court entered summary judgment for the County. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the indigent care provision constitutes an unconstitutional privilege because it provides for reimbursement to the public and private hospitals only in Sarasota County rather than in the entire state. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the indigent care provision of the special law does not grant a privilege to a private corporation within the plain meaning of article III, section 11(a)(12) because it applies to all hospitals in Sarasota County. View "Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County" on Justia Law

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A potential plaintiff who provides pre-suit notice to one potential defendant is not required under Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) to provide the single potential defendant with a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. Plaintiff sent a pre-suit notice of her healthcare liability claim to a single healthcare provider and included a medical authorization. Dr. Radwan Khuri moved to dismiss the case, asserting that Plaintiff had failed to povide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization under section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court granted Dr. Khuri’s motion and dismissed the complaint, concluding that the authorization provided by Plaintiff did not substantially comply with HIPAA or with the requirements of section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) and that Defendant was prejudiced by Plaintiff’s deficient authorization. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization was not required in this case because Plaintiff’s pre-suit notice was sent to a single provider. View "Bray v. Khuri" on Justia Law

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The State of New Hampshire moved to enforce administrative subpoenas served on defendants Actavis Pharma, Inc., Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Purdue Pharma L.P., and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. The State was investigating defendants’ role in allegedly causing health care providers to prescribe opioids to treat chronic pain. Defendants resisted, arguing the Office of the Attorney General’s (OAG) engagement of outside counsel was unlawful. In addition, defendants moved for a protective order, seeking to “bar the Attorney General from engaging contingent fee counsel to: (a) participate in or assume responsibility for any aspect of the State’s investigation of alleged violations of the Consumer Protection Act . . . ; or (b) participate in or assume responsibility for any subsequent enforcement action pertaining to alleged CPA violations.” Defendants argued that the OAG’s fee agreements with the firm Cohen Milstein: (1) violated RSA 21-G:22 and :23 (2012) (amended 2016); (2) violated New Hampshire common law; (3) were ultra vires because the OAG did not comply with RSA 7:12 (2013) (amended 2016) or :6-f (Supp. 2016); (4) violated the doctrine of separation of powers; (5) violated the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct; and (6) violated due process under the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. The State replied that an objection to the Attorney General’s use of outside counsel was not appropriate justification for refusing to comply with lawful subpoenas, and that defendants lacked standing to raise that complaint. The trial court denied the State’s motion to enforce the subpoenas and granted the defendants’ motion for a protective order “to the extent that the OAG and Cohen Milstein’s contingency fee agreement is invalid.” The trial court determined that the defendants had demonstrated standing to bring their claims, that the fee agreement was void, and therefore denied the State’s motion to enforce the subpoenas on that basis. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded defendants lacked standing to challenge the outside counsel agreement. It reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Actavis Pharma, Inc." on Justia Law

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Under Montana law, a debtor may claim an exemption for a health savings account (HSA) within the constraints imposed by Mont. Code Ann. 25-13-608(1)(d) or (f). Debtor in this case filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Debtor claimed his HSA exempt in the amount of $14,319.61 pursuant to section 25-13-608(1)(d) or (f). Debtor’s withdrawal of funds from the HSA was applied exclusively to qualified medical expenses. The trustee filed an objection to the claim of exemption. The bankruptcy court certified a question on the issue to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that a debtor may claim an exemption for an HSA to the extent that it is “used or will be used to pay for the care” described in section 25-13-608(1)(f). View "In re John Charles Giacometto" on Justia Law

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In a workers’ compensation case, the claimant, Darvel Burgess, filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation after his employer, Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans (“S&WB”), refused to pay a $13,110.02 outstanding bill for prescription medications from Injured Workers Pharmacy (“IWP”). The underlying legal issue was whether the injured employee was entitled to his choice of pharmacy, or whether that right belonged to the employer under the Louisiana Workers Compensation Act (“LWCA”). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of this matter to resolve a split in the circuit courts of appeal on this issue. After review, the Supreme Court held the choice of pharmacy in a workers’ compensation case belongs to the employer. View "Burgess v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans" on Justia Law

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Parrino worked as a pharmacist for NRS. He was responsible for preparing medications, mainly inhalers. After leaving NRS, Parrino was contacted by the FDA and FBI, which were investigating reports that NRS was filling prescription medications for Pulmicort, a steroid used for the treatment of asthma, with a sub-potent amount of the active ingredient. Parrino cooperated and pleaded guilty to introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, 21 U.S.C. 331(a), 352(a), and 18 U.S.C. 2, a strict liability misdemeanor. Parrino was sentenced to one year of probation and ordered to pay $14,098.24 in restitution for Medicaid and Medicare payments. The Department of Health and Human Services notified Parrino that it was required to exclude him from participation in any capacity in the Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal healthcare programs for at least five years, under 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(a). Rejecting Parrino’s argument that he lacked any mens rea to commit a crime and was convicted of a strict liability misdemeanor, an ALJ and the Appeals Board upheld HHS’s decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Parrino’s suit, finding that HHS’s action affected no substantive due process right because “health care providers are not the intended beneficiaries of the federal health care programs” and that the decision to exclude Parrino was “not so shocking as to shake the foundations of this country.” View "Parrino v. Price" on Justia Law

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Jeffrey and Carol Haksluoto filed a medical malpractice claim against Mt. Clemens Regional Medical Center, General Radiology Associates, PC, and Eli Shapiro, DO, for injuries Jeffrey sustained after he was misdiagnosed in Mt. Clemens’s emergency room. Plaintiffs mailed a notice of intent (NOI) to file a claim on December 26, 2013, the final day of the two-year statutory period of limitations. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on June 27, 2014, which was 183 days after service of the NOI. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied defendants’ motion. Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that MCR 1.108 (the rule concerning the calculation of time) was best understood to signify that the 182-day notice period began on December 27, 2013 (the day after plaintiffs served the NOI) and expired on June 26, 2014, which meant that the notice period did not commence until one day after the limitations period had expired, and therefore filing the NOI on the last day of the limitations period failed to toll the statute of limitations. The Michigan Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ application for review, finding the trial court was correct in its calculation of time. View "Haksluoto v. Mt. Clemens Regional Med. Ctr." on Justia Law