Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

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Petitioners filed this original proceeding objecting to two pieces of legislation passed by the Oklahoma legislature during the 2022 legislative session: S.B. 1503 and H.B. 4327. Both acts prohibited abortion after certain cutoff points while providing for a civil enforcement mechanism; both acts prohibited enforcement by the State, its subdivisions, and its agents--instead, the bills created a cause-of-action maintainable by any person for performing, or aiding and abetting the performance of, an abortion in violation of the acts. Petitioners challenged the bills on many grounds, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not address them here. The Court held both bills were unconstitutional; the Court found it unnecessary to address the Petitioners' request for injunctive relief and/or writ of prohibition or Respondents' claims that Petitioners did not have a justiciable claim against them. Petitioners' request for injunctive relief and/or a writ of prohibition was denied. View "Oklahoma Call for Reproductive Justice v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

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As four medically comprised inmates who required skilled nursing care were approaching their parole dates, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) unsuccessfully attempted to locate post-parole skilled nursing facilities. When their parole dates arrived, the CDCR paroled them to Kern County and transported them to the emergency department at Kern Medical Center (KMC), a licensed general acute care hospital. Kern County Hospital Authority (Hospital Authority), which operates KMC, sought a peremptory writ of mandate and injunction against the CDCR and its Secretary.The trial court granted the Writ, and the CDCR appealed, arguing it does not have a ministerial duty to obtain Hospital Authority’s express consent before transporting parolees to KMC’s emergency department.The Fifth Appellate District reversed, holding that the Department failed to comply with regulation 79789 when transferring the parolees to KMC, and therefore abused its discretion. However, finding that the injunction was overbroad, the Fifth Appellate District remanded to the trial court for issuance of a new peremptory writ. View "Kern County Hospital Auth. v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court on interlocutory appeal denying Defendants' remand for a jury in this argument over the requirement that civil enforcement actions brought by the attorney general "shall be by equitable proceedings," holding that the requirement was enforceable and did not violate the jury right preserved by Iowa Const. art. I, 9.The attorney general commenced this action alleging that Defendants had violated the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), Iowa Code 714.16, and the Older Iowans Act (OIA), Iowa Code 714.16A, by engaging in false and deceptive conduct and unfair practices in the "sale and advertisement of stem cell and exosome therapy in Iowa." Defendants answered and demanded a jury, but the attorney general moved to strike the jury demand because subsection 714.16(7) requires that civil actions "shall be by equitable proceedings." The district court granted the motion to strike, and Defendants applied for interlocutory review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in striking Defendants' jury demand. View "State ex rel., Attorney General" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that a reimbursement cap imposed by the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration's Division of TennCare, the state agency tasked with administering the federal Medicaid program in Tennessee, was a "rule" within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act that should have been promulgated through the notice-and-comment process.Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C., a corporation compromised of private healthcare professionals who provide emergency-department services to TennCare enrollees, brought this action against TennCare alleging that TennCare's decision to impose a $50 cap on the amount that Emergency Medical and other healthcare professionals could recover from TennCare for certain treatment provided to TennCare enrollees was a rule and that TennCare violated the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures act (UAPA) by implementing the cap without rulemaking. The chancery court granted summary judgment in favor of Emergency Medical. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the $50 cap fell within the so-called "internal-management exception" to the UAPA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the $50 cap was a rule under the UAPA and should have been promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking. View "Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Division of Tenncare" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part in this case brought against three Maine government officials in their official capacities (collectively, the State) and several healthcare providers (the Providers) by Plaintiffs, seven healthcare workers whose employment was vaccinated after they refused to accept COVID-19 vaccination (collectively, the Providers), holding that the court erred in dismissing certain claims.In 2021, under the "Mandate," Maine required certain healthcare facilities to ensure that their non-remote workers were vaccinated against COVID-19. Plaintiffs alleged that their sincerely-held religious beliefs prevented them from receiving any of the available COVID-19 vaccines and requested that their employers, the Providers, exempt them from the vaccination requirement. The Providers refused and terminated Plaintiffs' employment. Plaintiffs brought this suit alleging several claims. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; but (2) erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for relief under the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses. View "Lowe v. Mills" on Justia Law

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Eight South Florida hospitals dutifully provided out-of-network emergency treatment to numerous Cigna customers. When Cigna reimbursed the hospitals just 15% of what they had charged, the hospitals sued, accusing Cigna of paying less than the “community” rate. As proof, the hospitals showed that they normally receive five times as much for the care they provided here. In response, Cigna asserted that the hospitals’ data proved nothing because, it insisted, the relevant “community” necessarily includes more than just the eight plaintiff hospitals. The district court agreed and granted Cigna summary judgment.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that even if the relevant “community” here extends beyond the eight plaintiff hospitals, their receipts alone are enough to create a genuine factual dispute about what the “community” rates are. The court reasoned that to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff needn’t present evidence that compels a single, airtight inference—just evidence that allows a reasonable one. The court explained that the way to rebut an inference allegedly skewed by limited data is to add data. And Cigna can do just that—at trial. If it can show there that most other providers in the “community” charge less than the plaintiff hospitals do, then it may well debunk the hospitals’ estimate. But unless and until that happens, it remains the case that a reasonable jury could conclude that the eight plaintiff hospitals’ rates reflect the prevailing community rate—and thus that Cigna shortchanged them. View "North Shore Medical Center, Inc., et al v. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and, as a condition of employment, was required to get a flu vaccine. Plaintiff sought an exemption based on a medically recognized contraindication, presenting a doctor's note that recommended she avoid the vaccine based on her history of cancer and general allergies. However, neither of these was a medically recognized contraindication, and Defendant terminated her employment.Plaintiff filed suit under the FEHA for disability discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in Defendnat's favor, plaintiff appealed.The Second Appellate District affirmed, finding that Defendant did not engage in disability discrimination and that Defendant's reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment was legitimate and lacked pretext. Further, the court rejected Plaintifff's retaliation claim. View "Hodges v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center" on Justia Law

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The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”) provides that health centers receiving funding under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”) may be deemed Public Health Service (“PHS”) employees. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated their duty to report a court-ordered Lane County Mental Health patient’s refusal to comply with the terms of his probation. Plaintiffs alleged they were injured as a result of Defendants’ failure to report a patient’s repeated failures to comply with his mental health treatment plan. Defendants contended that they were entitled to Section 233 immunity. The district court held that Section 233 immunity did not apply to Defendants and remanded to state court.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order remanding to state court Plaintiffs’ action alleging negligence and wrongful death claims against federally funded community health centers and their employees (“Defendants”), and remanded to the district court to enter an order substituting the United States as the defendant and deeming the action as one brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The panel first addressed whether there was jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. Ordinarily, a remand order is not reviewable on appeal, except for cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1442. The panel agreed with Defendants that Section 233 immunity did not turn on who brings the claim, but rather on whether the conduct giving rose to the claim arose out of the Defendants’ performance of “medical, surgical, dental or related functions.” View "SAM FRIEDENBERG, ET AL V. LANE COUNTY, ET AL" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying the motion for partial summary judgment brought by the Estate of Robert T. Lynch as to its action against Kevin Lynch and entering judgment as a matter of law for Kevin on his counterclaim for conversion, holding that remand was required.The Estate sued Kevin alleging claims for fiduciary fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and elder exploitation. Kevin filed a counterclaim alleging conversion, among other claims. After the circuit court denied the Estate's motion for partial summary judgment on its claims against Kevin the court entered judgment as a matter of law for Kevin on his counterclaim. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to the Estate's claims involving two payable-on-death CDs Kevin deposited in his individual account and directed that, on remand, the circuit court shall enter judgment as a matter of law for compensatory damages plus prejudgment interest on the Estate’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion; (2) ruled that the Estate's claim for punitive damage on the reversed portion of the judgment was an open question on remand; and (3) otherwise affirmed. View "Estate of Lynch v. Lynch" on Justia Law

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The Plan is a nonprofit health care service plan subject to Health & Safety Code 1340, including the Parity Act, under which: “Every health care service plan contract . . . that provides hospital, medical, or surgical coverage shall provide coverage for the diagnosis and medically necessary treatment of severe mental illness of a person of any age, and of serious emotional disturbances of a child . . . under the same terms and conditions applied to other medical conditions.”Plaintiffs alleged that the Plan violates the Parity Act by “deterring members from obtaining one-on-one mental health therapy without making individualized determinations … encouraging ‘group’ therapy, without making individualized determinations" where similar practices are not followed in the treatment of physical health conditions. An Unruh Civil Rights Act claim alleged that the Plan intentionally discriminated against persons with mental disabilities or conditions. The court granted the Plan summary judgment.The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of one plaintiff’s individual claims; the Plan is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary by whom the plaintiff’s coverage was issued. The court otherwise reversed. On an Unfair Competition Law claim, the court failed to consider how the Plan’s conduct undermines its contractual promises of covered treatment in violation of the Parity Act. On the Unruh claim, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the plaintiffs were denied medically necessary treatment as a result of intentional discrimination. View "Futterman v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc." on Justia Law