Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

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In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, Francisco Gutierrez appealed a judgment granting summary judgment to Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, in a personal injury case. Gutierrez was injured when his vehicle was hit by an ambulance driven by Tostado, an emergency medical technician employed by ProTransport-1, during a patient transport. Nearly two years after the accident, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gutierrez's claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act's (MICRA) one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, a decision Gutierrez appealed.In considering Gutierrez's appeal, the appellate court held that because Tostado was providing professional medical services at the time of the incident, MICRA's one-year statute of limitations applied, despite Gutierrez not being the recipient of those services. The court reasoned that the act of driving the ambulance was an integral part of the provision of medical care, and it was foreseeable that third parties could be injured during the provision of such care. The court rejected Gutierrez's argument that MICRA only applied where the defendant owed a professional duty to the plaintiff, holding instead that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services, and their injuries were foreseeable. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law

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In this fifth appeal before the Supreme Court regarding a class action lawsuit stemming from two circuit court orders denying Appellant's motion to enforce arbitration agreements and its motion to compel class members with arbitration agreements to submit their claims to binding arbitration, holding that remand was necessary.After the Supreme Court's ruling in Phillips II, Appellant filed a motion to enforce arbitration agreements and to compel 197 residents with arbitration agreements to submit their claims to binding arbitration. After the ruling in Phillips III, Appellant moved to enforce arbitration agreements and to compel thirty-three residents with arbitration agreements to submit their claims to binding arbitration. The court entered an order with respect to both motions, from which Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions, holding that the circuit court failed to provide the Supreme Court with specific findings with respect to each arbitration agreement and individual resident and that such findings were necessary for the Court to conduct a proper appellate review. View "Robinson Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Phillips" on Justia Law

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The attorneys represented Doe in a medical malpractice action against a hospital and other medical staff. During that litigation, the evidence established that, after Doe was admitted to the emergency room of the hospital, he attempted suicide by stabbing himself multiple times. The hospital sought a qualified protective order under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. 1320d) to gain access to Doe’s protected health information and requested a subpoena pursuant to HIPAA. At trial, Doe testified in detail about his suicide attempt, his injuries therefrom, and his diagnosis., Doe was awarded $4.2 million. Subsequently, the attorneys issued a press release related to the medical malpractice trial describing Doe’s suicide attempt, the resulting injuries, and his diagnoses and commented on the medical malpractice case and Doe’s history for an article published in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin.Doe alleged that the attorneys violated the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1). The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal of his case. Doe waived his claims of confidentiality under the Act by voluntarily and publicly disclosing his private health information in a public trial; the qualified protective order under HIPAA did not preclude such waiver. The evidence and testimony divulged during Doe’s medical malpractice trial were not records or communications made in the course of mental health services; therefore, the Act does not apply. View "Doe v. Burke Wise Morrissey & Kaveny, LLC" on Justia Law

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Mosby, an RN, filed a class-action suit, alleging that she used a medication dispensing system and its finger-scan device, distributed and marketed by BD, to provide patient care, i.e., to authenticate her identity and access controlled and restricted material. Mosby alleged that BD violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b), (d)) by using the scanning device to collect, use, and/or store her finger scan data without complying with the Act’s notice and consent provisions and by disclosing her purported biometric data to third parties without first obtaining her written consent. BD argued that the finger scan data restricted access to protected health information and medication and was used for health care treatment and operations under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. 164.501, specifically excluded from the scope of the Act.On interlocutory appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Act’s exclusion of ‘information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under” HIPAA applies to biometric information of health care workers (as opposed to patients) collected, used or stored for health care treatment, payment or operations under HIPAA. Finger-scan information collected by a health care provider from its employees falls within that exclusion when the employee’s finger-scan information is used for purposes related to ‘health care,’ ‘treatment,’ ‘payment,’ or ‘operations’ as defined by HIPAA. View "Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court directing that while Plaintiff may pursue his claims against Ball State University based on its response to the COVID-19 pandemic on his on behalf, he may not pursue a class action on behalf of other students, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a university student, sued the University for breach of contract and unjust enrichment after the university switched to providing only online instruction for the 2020 spring semester, seeking to recover tuition and fees for in-person instruction and services allegedly promised by the university. Plaintiff sought to litigate his claims as a class action, but after he filed his action, Public Law No. 166-2021 was signed into law, prohibiting class action lawsuits against postsecondary educational institutions for contract and unjust enrichment claims arising from COVID-19. The trial court denied class certification based on this new law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the law was constitutional and precluded a class action in this case. View "Mellowitz v. Ball State University" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant E.W. was a participant in an employer-sponsored health insurance plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). E.W.’s daughter, Plaintiff-Appellant I.W., was a beneficiary of E.W.’s plan. From September 2016 through December 2017, I.W. received treatment in connection with mental health challenges and an eating disorder at Uinta Academy (“Uinta”), an adolescent residential treatment center in Utah. In January 2017, Defendants-Appellees Health Net Insurance Company and Health Net of Arizona, Inc. began covering I.W.’s treatment under E.W.’s ERISA plan (the “Plan”). Effective February 23, 2017, Health Net determined I.W.’s care at Uinta was no longer medically necessary, and it denied coverage from that day forward. In assessing whether to discontinue coverage, Health Net applied the McKesson InterQual Behavioral Health 2016.3 Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Criteria. Health Net determined I.W. did not satisfy the InterQual Criteria within the relevant period and notified Plaintiffs in a letter dated March 1, 2017. Plaintiffs allegedly did not receive Health Net’s March 2017 denial letter, and I.W. remained at Uinta until December 2017, when she was formally discharged. After receiving notice in May 2018 that Health Net had denied coverage effective February 23, 2017, Plaintiffs appealed the decision. Health Net again determined I.W. did not satisfy the InterQual Criteria during the relevant period and upheld its initial denial. Plaintiffs then appealed to an external reviewer, which upheld the decision to deny coverage. Health Net moved to dismiss plaintiffs' legal claims under ERISA and the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPAEA”). The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion and granted summary judgment to Health Net. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to Health Net on Plaintiffs’ ERISA claim; the Court reversed the finding Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under MHPAEA; and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "W., et al. v. Health Net Life Insurance Company, et al." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal of a vacated class certification order and directed the circuit court to remand the case to address motions to compel arbitration, holding that this appeal was moot.Plaintiffs, who represented the estates of former residents of fourteen different nursing homes, alleged breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims against the nursing homes, in violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights act and the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The nursing homes moved to compel arbitration for all but two of the named plaintiffs, after which the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification without ruling on the motions to compel arbitration. The nursing homes brought an interlocutory appeal of the class-certification order and petitioned for writ of prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the writ petition, vacating the order granting class certification, and ordered the circuit court to rule on the motions to compel before ruling on class certification, holding that the interlocutory appeal of the vacated class-certification order was moot. View "Reliance Health Care, Inc. v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

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The appellants in this case filed an action to permanently enjoin enforcement of five Acts of the Oklahoma Legislature. Each Act concerned the termination of a pregnancy. The appellants' challenges were based upon Oklahoma law and not federal law. They argued there was a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy under the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial court denied a temporary injunction on three of the Acts, which was the basis of this appeal. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted a temporary injunction pending appeal, vacated the trial court's order denying temporary injunction, directed it to grant a temporary injunction and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the merits. View "Oklahoma Call for Reproductive Justice v. Drummond" on Justia Law

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Facing a tight deadline from the Ninth Circuit, the Environmental Protection Agency banned the use of chlorpyrifos on food crops. Two environmental groups petitioned the EPA in 2007 to have all tolerances revoked. In denying the petition, the EPA concluded that their objections were “not supported by valid, complete, and reliable evidence.”   The Eighth Circuit granted the petitions, finding that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court explained that in this case, the EPA believed it lacked discretion or at least acted that way. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion had already narrowed its options down to two: revoke the tolerances or modify them. With little time to act, the agency ruled out the second option, leaving only revocation by default. In doing so, however, it misread the statute and misunderstood the “scope of its discretion”. Therefore, the court set aside the decision as arbitrary and capricious. Further, the court explained that a partial ban was a real alternative for the EPA. It could have canceled some registrations and retained others that satisfied the statutory safety margin. View "RRVSG Assoc. v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

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Alicia Sampson ("Alicia"), as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Joshua Sampson ("Josh"), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of HeartWise Health Systems Corporation; HeartWise Clinic, LLC (collectively referred to as "HeartWise"); Isaac Health & Prevention Partners, LLC ("Isaac Health"); William Nixon, M.D.; and Jeffrey Saylor, M.D., in a wrongful-death action. At its HeartWise clinic, Isaac Health administered a battery of up to 31 physical tests that were intended "to assist in the detection of early evidence of vascular and cardiac abnormalities." In 2015, 29-year-old Josh visited the Isaac Health clinic. Months earlier, Josh's father died at age of 56 from "right ventricular dysplasia," which was a "congenital heart defect." Lowell's death led the Sampson family to seek heart evaluations to determine whether they had inherited the heart defect. Josh underwent the full battery of testing provided at the Isaac Health clinic; Josh's data from the left ventricular echocardiogram was within the "normal" range. Josh's mother, who also received the testing, stated that the nurse practitioner did not tell Josh in any way that he "needed to have any further diagnostic work-up or testing relative to his heart." On October 5, 2015, Josh collapsed at home while working on a construction project. He was taken to the Emergency Room, but died that day. The Sampson family procured a private autopsy; the report concluded that Josh died due to an arrhythmia secondary to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a congenital heart condition. Alicia thereafter filed suit against the clinic, HearWise and the doctors, alleging fraud and negligence. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Isaac Health and Drs. Nixon and Saylor with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against them because those allegations were never properly presented to the circuit court for adjudication. The Court also reversed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against HeartWise because Alicia presented substantial evidence of Josh's reasonable reliance upon HeartWise's representations about its program. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Isaac Health with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against Isaac Health because Alicia failed to present substantial evidence that Josh's course of conduct would have changed if he had not seen HeartWise materials in the Isaac Health clinic's waiting room. The Court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against HeartWise for multiple reasons. View "Sampson v. HeartWise Health Systems Corporation, et al." on Justia Law