Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Kansas Supreme Court
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In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court held that when a person requests an electronic copy of a public electronic record under the Kansas Open Records Act (KORA) a public agency must provide that copy in electronic format.Plaintiff filed a petition to enforce her rights under KORA after Defendant - a hospital - refused to produce for Plaintiff requested electronic records in "electronic" format rather than "paper" format. The district court ordered Defendant to provide Plaintiff with electronic copies of the records. The court of appeals reversed, holding that KORA gives an agency discretion over how it provides records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals missed the critical implication that any "accurate reproduction" of a public record must mirror the content of that record, unless specifically exempted; and (2) the only accurate reproduction of an electronic file is a copy of the electronic file. View "Roe v. Phillips County Hospital" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the ruling of the district court that Catherine Roll did not have a statutory right to remain at Parsons State Hospital and Training Center, where she had been a long-term resident, holding that the appeal was moot.Defendants sought to relocate Roll, a person with significant mental and physical disabilities, from the Hospital to a community-based treatment center. Through her guardians, Roll opposed the transfer, arguing that, under the Social Security Act (SSA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, the proposed transfer from the Hospital violated her right to choose which facility would provide her treatment. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Roll appealed. Before the Court reached a decision on the merits, Defendants voluntarily provided Roll with the relief she had been seeking by stating their intention to maintain her residence at the Hospital. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the case was moot. View "Roll v. Howard" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the district court's judgment declaring 2021 Senate Bill 40 invalid and unenforceable based on certain infirmities the court observed, holding that the district court erred by ignoring the constitutional avoidance doctrine and failing to abide by it.This case arose from a dispute regarding public school policies mandating face masks during the COVID-19 pandemic. After the Legislature passed S.B. 40 imposing substantive limits on COVID-19 mitigation measures adopted by other governmental entities Plaintiffs sued the Shawnee Mission School District challenging the district's mask policy. Plaintiffs asserted S.B. 40 as the only legal authority for their lawsuit. The district court dismissed the claims as moot and then ruled that S.B. 40 was unenforceable because it violated both due process and separation of powers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its analytical diversion into S.B. 40's constitutionality. View "Butler v. Shawnee Mission School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Richard Quillen's petition to be placed in transitional release from his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA), holding that the jury instructions given at Quillen's transitional release hearing were constitutionally adequate.After a jury trial, the court found that Quillen's mental abnormality or personality disorder remainder such that he was not safe to be placed in transitional release. On appeal, Quillen argued that the district court erred when it denied his request for an instruction that the jury must find Quillen had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) at a transitional release hearing, substantive due process requirements are satisfied when the jury instructions as a whole require the jury to necessarily and implicitly find the respondent continues to have serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior; and (2) the jury instructions in Quillen's case were constitutionally adequate under this standard. View "In re Care & Treatment of Quillen" on Justia Law

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In this Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA) case, Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a01 et seq., the Supreme Court remanded Thomas Easterberg's action seeking a petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that there was a fact question for the district court to resolve in order to determine whether Easterberg's writ should be granted.Easterberg pled guilty to kidnapping and aggravated battery. On the sentencing guidelines journal entry of judgment for these convictions, the district court indicated that Easterberg's crimes were not sexually motivated for purposes of the Kansas Offender Registration Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4902(c)(14). Thereafter, the Attorney General's Office filed a petition seeking to involuntarily commit Easterberg as a sexually violent predator. Easterberg moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the State had no statutory basis to file the petition for his commitment. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Easterberg then filed this original action. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court for a determination of whether the issue of sexual motivation was litigated in Easterberg's criminal case. If so, the State would be estopped from relegating that point in the KSVPA proceeding and Easterberg would not be eligible for involuntary commitment. If not, the KSVPA proceeding would continue. View "In re Care & Treatment of Easterberg" on Justia Law

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A jury found Cecil Emerson was a sexually violent predator, and the district court ordered him committed. In 2001, Emerson filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed the appeal in 2002 after Emerson’s counsel failed to file a brief. In 2014, Emerson moved the district court to permit an out-of-time appeal of the underlying ruling that he was a sexually violent predator. The district court ruled that it would give Emerson the right to appeal based upon his previous counsel’s lack of action after the notice of appeal was filed and the appeal was dismissed. In 2015, Emerson filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that Emerson was entitled to an out-of-time appeal based on principles of fundamental fairness and then rejected Emerson’s arguments. Emerson petitioned for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court lost jurisdiction to authorize the filing of the out-of-time direct appeal when the initial appeal was docketed in the Court of Appeals, and therefore, the district court could not set aside the order of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the appeal. View "In re Care & Treatment of Emerson" on Justia Law

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The State sought to have Todd Ellison, a convicted sex offender, involuntarily committed under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. Under the Act, Ellison was entitled to a jury trial during which the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellison, however, waited in jail for more than four years without a trial. The district court concluded that the delay violated Ellison’s due process rights, dismissed the action, and ordered Ellison released. A court of appeals panel reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings to more fully address the due process issue. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the order of release, holding (1) the district court did not err when it applied Barker v. Wingo to Ellison’s due process claim; and (2) the court of appeals panel erred when it concluded that the district court failed to render adequate factual findings and incorrectly based its release order solely on the length of delay. View "In re Care & Treatment of Ellison" on Justia Law

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Paul Sykes was convicted of burglary and aggravated sexual battery. Prior to the expiration of his sentence, the State filed a petition seeking to have Sykes adjudicated a sexually violent predator. Although Sykes was found incompetent to assist in his own defense, the district court ultimately ruled Sykes was a sexually violent predator and ordered him committed. The court of appeals affirmed. Sykes appealed, arguing that due process requires that a respondent be mentally competent to assist in his or her own defense in order to be civilly adjudicated a sexually violent predator. The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication, holding that a respondent need not be competent to be adjudicated a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, and therefore, Sykes did not suffer a violation of his due process rights. View "In re Care & Treatment of Sykes" on Justia Law

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On the second anniversary of her husband Curley's death, Plaintiff, individually and as the representative of the estate of Curley, filed a lawsuit against defendants Doctor and Hospital, in which she raised wrongful death and survival claims based on alleged medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by a two-year limitation period. In so concluding, the court found that the causes of action accrued on the last date on which Defendants' negligence could have occurred and the date on which Curley's injuries were first ascertainable. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the basis for Plaintiff's lawsuit did not accrue until Curley's death. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' judgment as to the wrongful death action, holding that a claim for wrongful death accrues on the date of death unless information regarding the fact of death or the wrongful act that causes the death was concealed or misrepresented; and (2) reversed the court of appeals' holding regarding the statute of limitations applicable to the survival action, holding that the survival action in this case was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Martin v. Naik" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued Doctor for medical malpractice arising out of surgeries to treat her tracheal stenosis. Doctor filed a motion in limine to prevent Plaintiff's subsequent treating physician from testifying about the standard of care. The district court granted the motion because Plaintiff's treating physician did not meet the requirements of Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-3412. Under the statute, Plaintiff's treating physician must have spent at least fifty percent of his professional time within the two years before Plaintiff's first surgery in actual clinical practice if Plaintiff wished him to testify as an expert on the applicable standard of care. The court subsequently granted summary judgment for Doctor because, in the absence of expert testimony on the standard of care, Plaintiff could not carry her burden of proof. the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the fifty percent rule for expert witnesses under section 60-3412 is inapplicable to treating physicians; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Doctor. View "Schlaikjer v. Kaplan" on Justia Law