Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Wade T. Hamilton, a pediatric cardiologist, recommended a patient for a cardiac MRI scan but warned her that due to her COVID-19 vaccination, which he claimed included "magnets and heavy metals", it would be unsafe for her to enter an MRI machine. The patient's mother reported Hamilton's statements to the nurse practitioner who had referred the patient to Hamilton, leading to a report being filed against Hamilton with the Board of Licensure in Medicine. The Board, in response, opened a complaint proceeding and demanded that Hamilton undergo a neuropsychological evaluation.Hamilton challenged the Board's order in the Superior Court, arguing that the Board had overstepped its authority and violated his rights to due process and free speech. However, the Superior Court denied his petition and ruled in favor of the Board. Shortly before this decision, Hamilton's medical license in Maine expired and he did not renew it.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Hamilton's appeal as nonjusticiable, stating that there had been no final agency action and that the challenged order was moot because Hamilton had allowed his medical license to lapse. The court also noted that Hamilton's challenge to the order directing the evaluation was fully reviewable at the conclusion of the complaint proceedings, making his petition premature. Furthermore, since Hamilton was no longer licensed in Maine, the Board no longer had authority to pursue his evaluation. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for dismissal of the petition for judicial review as nonjusticiable. View "Hamilton v. Board of Licensure in Medicine" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs, led by Chris Calnan, who challenged a rule implemented by Maine Emergency Medical Services (Maine EMS) requiring emergency medical service (EMS) workers to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and influenza. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Maine EMS lacked statutory authority to implement such a rule.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had named the correct defendants, that it had jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the rulemaking, and that the EMS Board acted within its authority in implementing the immunization rule. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as moot.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the EMS Board did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the immunization rule. The court also concluded that the rule aligns with the purpose of the Maine Emergency Medical Services Act of 1982, which is to ensure optimum patient care and the safe handling and transportation of patients. Lastly, the court determined that the EMS Board followed the applicable rulemaking process for the promulgation of the immunization rule. View "Calnan v. Hurley" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Barni A., appealed against an order from the District Court in Lewiston, Maine, terminating her parental rights to her older child. The child was born prematurely with a genetic abnormality that led to several medical issues, including tumors on his brain, leading to seizures and affecting his executive functioning, vision, and visual processing. The child qualified for 24/7 private nursing care under Maine's Medicaid program, MaineCare, but never received it. Barni A. argued that the State of Maine's failure to provide the child with the required care resulted in the trial court erroneously finding her unfit because she could not address her child's complicated medical needs.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Barni A., stating that the trial court's findings did not address important issues that needed to be answered before determining whether the record supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that she is unfit. The court noted that the child's right to full-time private nursing care under federal and state law had not been provided by the Department of Health and Human Services, and this failure affected the mother's ability to care for the child. The court further explained that while the mother had made significant progress in dealing with her personal challenges, her visitation time with the child was substantially limited, and she was never afforded the assistance necessary to care for her child.The court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court, instructing it to consider whether the mother has an intellectual disability, whether the mother is or would be unfit regardless of the Department's failure to meet its MaineCare obligation regarding skilled nursing care, and whether there is an alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights that meets the best interest of the child. View "In re Child of Barni A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the conviction of Ralph A. Tripp Jr., who was found guilty of several drug-trafficking offenses, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and criminal forfeiture of property. Tripp appealed on the grounds that he should be immune from prosecution for his drug-related offenses, that there were errors in the State's conduct during its opening statement and closing argument, and that the jury was not provided with clear instructions. The court ruled that Maine’s immunity statutes did not apply in this case, that any prosecutorial error did not affect Tripp’s substantial rights, and that the trial court sufficiently corrected any potential confusion stemming from its initial jury instructions. The court therefore affirmed the judgment. The case involved Tripp and his wife, Amanda Tripp, who resided in a rooming house in Bangor. After the Tripps moved in, residents noticed an increase in visitors, found hypodermic needles outside the building, and frequently observed the Tripps letting visitors into the building. On one occasion, Tripp called 9-1-1 to report a person unconscious in one of the shared bathrooms of the rooming house. The person was later pronounced dead, and the cause of death was determined to be acute intoxication from multiple drugs. When the police executed a search warrant for Tripp’s room, they seized a handgun, various drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash. Tripp was subsequently charged with several offenses. View "State v. Tripp" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the probate court appointing the Department of Health and Human Services as T.'s adult guardian and conservator pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 5-301, 5-401(2), holding that the probate court did not err in determining that the emergency and final hearings on the Department's petition constituted a unified proceeding.The Department filed a petition for appointment of a full guardian and conservator for T., age eighty-six, in the probate court, and also requesting the appointment of an emergency guardian and conservator. The court held an evidentiary emergency review hearing, after which the court ordered that an emergency appointment continue pending a final hearing. The court then held a final hearing and granted the Department's petition. T. appealed, arguing that the court should not have considered certain testimony given at the emergency hearing because the court's conclusion that the two proceedings were part of a unified proceeding was erroneous. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that when the trial judge in a guardianship and conservatorship proceeding has heard the evidence presented in prior stages of the proceeding, that judge may consider the evidence in later stages because the process is a unified proceeding. View "In re Adult Guardianship & Conservatorship of T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court extending a weapons restriction placed on J because J presented a likelihood of foreseeable harm, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.While J was in protective custody for threatening behavior a doctor concluded that J was a mentally ill person within the meaning of Me. Rev. Stat. 34-B, 3801(5) and that he posed a likelihood of foreseeable harm within the meaning of Me. Rev. Stat. 34-B, 3862-A. The court subsequently prohibited J from possessing dangerous weapons pending a judicial hearing. After a hearing, the court entered a written order extending the restriction for one year. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) section 3862-A neither violates Me. Const. art. I, 16, nor is it unconstitutionally vague; (2) the extension of the weapons restriction was supported by competent evidence; and (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing arguments. View "In re Weapons Restriction of J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court denying A.S.'s petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from his detention, holding that the superior court erred when it determined that the detention was lawful.A.S. was brought by law enforcement officers to the LincolnHealth Miles Hospital Campus and was held in the hospital's emergency department for thirty days. During that time, LincolnHealth did not seek or obtain judicial endorsement of its detention of A.S., as required by Me. Rev. Stat. 34-B, 3863. A.S. sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that LincolnHealth violated the statutory procedure for emergency involuntary hospitalization. The superior court denied the petition. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding (1) A.S.'s detention was unauthorized because the hospital did not comply with section 3863; and (2) A.S.'s due process rights were violated when the superior court applied a standard of preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear and convincing evidence, to determine whether A.S. posed a likelihood of serious harm at the time of the habeas hearing. View "A.S. v. LincolnHealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the district court committing M. to involuntary hospitalization for up to 120 days, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the court's decision to order M.'s involuntary hospitalization.The district court authorized M.'s hospitalization for up to 120 days, and the superior court affirmed. On appeal, M. argued that she was denied due process and a fair appeal because there was no verbatim transcript of her commitment hearing and that the record contained insufficient evidence to support the court's findings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the opportunities afforded to M. to supplement the incomplete transcript were sufficient to satisfy due process; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's decision. View "In re Involuntary Commitment of M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed as moot Appellant's appeal from a judgment entered by the superior court ordering the involuntary medical treatment of Appellant, holding that because Appellant was no longer subject to the court's involuntary treatment order, this appeal was moot.Appellant was arrested and charged with burglary and theft by unauthorized taking. While Appellant was in preconviction detention at the mental health unit of the Maine State Prison (MSP) the Department of Corrections filed an application pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 34-A, 3049 seeking the involuntary medication of Appellant. The court entered an ex parte order granting the emergency application and permitting the immediate medication of Appellant for a period of 120 days. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that because Appellant was no longer at the mental health unit of the MSP and the involuntary treatment order had expired, the appeal was moot and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. View "In re Involuntary Treatment of K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court vacating a Department of Health and Human Services hearing officer's decision requiring AngleZ Behavioral Health Services to pay $392,603.31 in MaineCare reimbursements because of billing errors, holding that the superior court erred by finding that the Department did not submit proper evidence in support of some of its recoupment claims.After auditing the claims submitted by AngleZ between February 13, 2013 and July 20, 2013 The Department issued a notice of violation applying an error rate to all of AngleZ's claims during that time period. The Department ultimately sought a total recoupment of $392,603.31. A hearing officer concluded that the Department was correct in seeking 392,603.31 in recoupment, and the Department's acting commissioner adopted the recommendation. The superior court vacated the Commissioner's decision, concluding that the hearing officer's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding that the hearing officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "AngleZ Behavioral Health Services v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law