Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Karen Jean Anderson, a licensed advanced practice registered nurse (APRN), was accused by the Utah Division of Professional Licensing (DOPL) of unlawfully practicing medicine and exceeding her APRN license by performing tumescent liposuction and fat grafting procedures. These procedures are classified as ablative cosmetic medical procedures under Utah law. DOPL barred Anderson from performing these procedures and imposed a fine. Anderson sought agency review with the Department of Commerce, which reduced the fine but upheld DOPL’s order. Anderson then sought judicial review.The Utah Board of Nursing initially found that Anderson did not unlawfully practice medicine or exceed her APRN license, reasoning that the Nurse Practice Act (NPA) allows APRNs broad authority, including the ability to perform procedures like tumescent liposuction and fat grafting. However, DOPL rejected this recommendation, stating that the legislature had granted exclusive authority to perform non-exempt ablative cosmetic medical procedures to medical and osteopathic doctors. The Department of Commerce affirmed DOPL’s decision, leading Anderson to file a petition for judicial review with the Utah Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Utah Supreme Court.The Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah Code bars APRNs from independently performing ablative cosmetic medical procedures. The court found that the statutory scheme limits such procedures to those licensed to practice medicine or those whose scope of practice includes the authority to operate or perform surgery. Since the scope of practice for APRNs does not include such authorization, Anderson unlawfully practiced medicine and exceeded her APRN license. The court affirmed the Department’s order, maintaining the restrictions and fine imposed on Anderson. View "Anderson v. Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs' respondeat superior-related claims, holding that the district court correctly held that respondeat superior principles did not make the remaining defendants in this case vicariously responsible for the abuse committed by a physician assistant and that the Utah Physician Assistant Act did not change that conclusion.Plaintiff brought an action against Alta Pain Physicians; Oscar Johnson, a physician assistant; and Dr. Michael Chen, Johnson's supervising physician, alleging that Johnson subjected her to sexual harassment and abuse when she saw him for pain treatment at Alta Pain. After Plaintiff settled her claims against Johnson the district court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Chen and Alta Pain on Plaintiff's claims of sexual assault, sexual battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in entering summary judgment on Plaintiff's respondeat superior-based claims; and (2) Plaintiff did not met her burden of convincing the Court to overturn precedent and use a foreseeability test for plaintiffs to recover against employers of abusive employees. View "Burton v. Chen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' petitions to change their legal sex designations because the designations did not reflect their identities, holding that Appellants met the requirements for their sex-change petitions to be approved.Under Utah Code 26-2-11(1), a person who has a name change or sex change approved by an order of a Utah district court can file the order with the state registrar with an application to change their birth certificate, and if the registrar determines that the application is complete, the registrar must change the sex on the person's birth certificate. In denying Appellants' sex-change petitions the district court concluded that a sex-change matter is a nonjusticiable political question due to lack of legislative guidance. The Supreme Court reversed after providing a plain meaning interpretation of the law allowing individuals to change their sex designations, holding that Appellants met the requirements articulated by this Court - based in common law and applied by district courts - for their sex-change petitions to be approved. View "In re Sex Change of Childers-Gray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this petition for extraordinary relief asserting that the actions of Governor Gary R. Herbert, Lieutenant Governor Spencer J. Cox, and the Utah Legislature in replacing a citizens' initiative approved by Utah voters that legalized medical cannabis and replacing the initiative with H.B. 3001 were unconstitutional, holding that some of Petitioners' arguments failed on the merits and that the remainder of the petition did not comply with Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.The day H.B. 3001 passed, some of the Petitioners filed a referendum application with the Lieutenant Governor that would have allowed H.B. 3001 to be put to a vote of the people. The Lieutenant Governor denied the petition because he determined one of the referendum sponsors did not meet the applicable statutory requirements and because the Utah House of Representatives and the Utah Senate passed the bill by a supermajority, which made the bill referendum-proof. Petitioners subsequently brought this petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding (1) the Governor did not effectively veto Provision 2, and the Two-Thirds Provisions of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code applied to the legislation here; and (2) the rest of the petition is dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 19. View "Grant v. Governor Gary R. Herbert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision denying Dr. LeGrand P. Belnap discovery as to allegedly defamatory statements made by Drs. Ben Howard and Steven Mintz in peer review meetings, holding that there is no bad faith exception to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).At issue was whether there is a bad faith exception to discovery and evidentiary privileges under Rule 26(b)(1) for statements made and documents prepared as part of a health care provider’s peer review process. Dr. Belnap was denied discovery as to alleged defamatory statements concerning Dr. Belnap’s application for surgical privileges at Jordan Valley Medical Center. Dr. Belnap filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing that Rule 26(b)(1) includes a bad faith exception. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) there is no bad faith exception to Rule 26(b)(1)’s peer review privilege; and (2) even looking to the legislative history, there is still no bad faith exception. View "Belnap v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s interpretation of Utah’s Hospital Lien Statute, Utah Code 38-7-1, holding that the court correctly concluded that the Hospital Lien Statute does not require a hospital to pay its proportional share of an injured person’s attorney fees and costs when a hospital lien is paid due to the efforts of the injured person or that person’s attorney.Plaintiffs in this proposed class action were all involved in car accidents, received medical care at the healthcare institutions named as defendants in this suit, and filed personal injury claims against the third parties at fault. All had hospital liens placed on any potential recovery from these claims, and all reached settlement agreements. Plaintiffs argued that Defendants failed to pay their fair share of the attorney fees Plaintiffs incurred in generating the settlement proceeds. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of the Hospital Lien Statute creates a priority for the distribution of the proceeds in third-party liability cases and that Plaintiffs’ proportional sharing arguments were unavailing. View "Bryner v. Cardon Outreach" on Justia Law

In this case involving a therapist who caused a child to falsely accuse a parent of sexual abuse, the Supreme Court held (1) a treating therapist working with a minor child owes a duty of reasonable care to a nonpatient parent to refrain from the affirmative act of recklessly giving rise to false memories or false allegations of childhood sexual abuse by that parent; and (2) a treating therapist owes a duty to refrain from affirmatively causing the nonpatient parent severe emotional distress by recklessly giving rise to false memories or false allegations of childhood sexual abuse by that parent.As a result of Nancy Baird’s treatment of Thomas Mower’s four-year-old daughter, T.M., false allegations of sexual abuse were levied against Mower. Mower sued Baird and The Children’s Center (collectively, Defendants) for the harm he suffered as a result of T.M.’s treatment. The district court dismissed the claims under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that therapists do not have “a duty of care to potential sexual abusers when treating the alleged victim.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a treating therapists do not have “the unfettered right" to treat patients "using techniques that might cause the patient to develop a false memory [or allegations] of sexual abuse.” View "Mower v. Children’s Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendants mailed Plaintiff a letter asking for her authorization to permit the release of her medical and employment records for the last twenty years. Plaintiff declined. The district court granted a motion to compel Plaintiff to sign the authorizations. On an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the district court's order granting the motion to compel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not misstate or misconstrue the factual background in evaluating the issues on appeal; (2) because Defendants did not comply with the procedural requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 34 in serving the letters, the district court abused its discretion by compelling Plaintiff to sign the authorizations under Utah R. Civ. P. 37; and (3) the court of appeals did not err when it suggested that Defendants may use the subpoena process to obtain records from out-of-state third parties. Remanded. View "Rahofy v. Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent several medical procedures performed by Defendants, two medical doctors. Two years and three months after the treatment ended, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim against Defendants. Upon a motion by Dr. Grigsby, one of the doctors, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's claim, finding that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly found that, as a matter of law, Dr. Grigsby failed to show Plaintiff filed her claim more than two years after she discovered or should have discovered her legal injury; but (2) when a plaintiff alleges a course of negligent treatment, a defendant may show that the claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations without identifying the specific procedure within the course of treatment that caused the patient's injury. Rather, to prevail, a defendant need only show that the plaintiff filed her claim more than two years after she discovered that the course of treatment was negligent. Remanded. View "Arnold v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Patient received medical treatment from Nurse at Medical Clinic. Nurse prescribed Patient at least six medications. With all of these drugs in his system, Patient shot and killed his wife. Patient subsequently pled guilty to aggravated murder. Patient's children (Plaintiffs) filed suit through their conservator against Nurse, her consulting physician, and Medical Clinic (collectively Defendants), alleging negligence in the prescription of the medications that caused Patient's violent outburst and his wife's death. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Nurse owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs because no patient-health care provider relationship existed at the time of the underlying events between Plaintiffs and Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that healthcare providers owe nonpatients a duty to exercise reasonable care in the affirmative act of prescribing medications that pose a risk of injury to third parties. View "Jeffs v. West" on Justia Law