Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by answering that Texas law does not authorize certain state officials to directly or indirectly enforce the state's new abortion restriction requirements.Plaintiffs, who provided and funded abortions and support for women who obtain them in Texas, requested a declaration that Senate Bill 8, the "Texas Heartbeat Act," Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.201-.212, unconstitutionally restricted their rights and injunction prohibiting Defendants, state agency executives, from enforcing the Act's requirements. After a remand, the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered answered that Texas law does not grant the state agency executives named as defendants any authority to enforce the Act's requirements, either directly or indirectly. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a pause in a criminal jury trial due to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic violated an accused’s due process right to a fair trial. Here, the prosecution nearly completed its case-in-chief against Defendant-appellant John Breceda when the trial court paused proceedings on March 16, 2020, because three of the 14 jurors were ill. Breceda refused to waive time and refused to proceed with 11 jurors. The trial court denied his motion for a mistrial and continued the case. Beginning that day, and for months after, the COVID-19 pandemic caused California officials to issue a series of orders to continue to provide essential government services, safeguard constitutional rights, and protect people from a "mysterious, contagious, and deadly virus." The effect of some of those orders was jury trials could not proceed. Seventy-two days after the trial court paused proceedings, the court denied Breceda’s second motion for a mistrial. Trial resumed the following day. The prosecution completed its case-in-chief, and Breceda testified. The jury acquitted Breceda of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder and arson of another’s property. Breceda argued on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his mistrial motions because the pause in his jury trial due to the COVID-19 pandemic violated his due process right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeal disagreed: "Although the pause in the trial was lengthy, 10 weeks, Breceda’s constitutional rights were not set aside and forgotten. ... the record demonstrates the court remained appropriately focused on Breceda’s constitutional rights during the onset of an unprecedented global health crisis." Judgment was thus affirmed. View "California v. Breceda" on Justia Law

This case arose out of South Carolina's termination of Planned Parenthood's Medicaid provider agreement. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding in relevant part that the individual plaintiff had demonstrated that she was likely to succeed on her Medicaid Act claim since the free-choice-of-provider provision conferred a private right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and South Carolina had violated that provision by terminating Planned Parenthood's Medicaid provider agreement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The district court then issued a permanent injunction, which South Carolina now challenges in this appeal.The Fourth Circuit first concluded that this case presents a live case or controversy and rejected South Carolina's claim of mootness. Even assuming that the court were free to reexamine its precedents, the court declined to do so in this case. Rather, the court concluded that its previous decision was handed down as a matter of law and resolved the precise legal issue upon which South Carolina now seeks review.The court reaffirmed its prior decision, concluding that the free-choice-of-provider provision confers on Medicaid recipients an individual right enforceable under section 1983. The court stated that the statute plainly reflects Congress's desire that individual Medicaid recipients be free to obtain care from any qualified provider and it implements this policy in direct and unambiguous language. In this case, all three Blessing factors in determining whether a statute creates a private right enforceable under section 1983 are met. Furthermore, the Medicaid Act does not evince Congress's intent to specifically foreclose a remedy under section 1983. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), does not undermine the court's analysis. The court refused to nullify Congress's undeniable desire to extend a choice of medical providers to the less fortunate among us, individuals who experience the same medical problems as the more fortunate in society but who lack under their own means the same freedom to choose their healthcare provider. View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Kerr" on Justia Law

Three teaching hospitals challenged the denial of Medicare reimbursements. At that time, a teaching hospital could obtain reimbursement only by incurring “substantially all” of a resident’s training costs. Because the teaching hospitals had shared the training costs for each resident, the government denied reimbursement. The denials led the teaching hospitals to file administrative appeals. While they were pending, Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which created a new standard for reimbursement. The parties disagreed on whether the ACA’s new standard applied to proceedings reopened when Congress changed the law. The agency answered no, and the district court granted summary judgment to the agency. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "St. Francis Hospital, et al. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a technical defect in personal service on a ward does not drive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the ward where the ward is personally served and participates in the proceedings through counsel without objection.Petitioner, the daughter of Mauricette and James Fairley, asked the Supreme Court to void all orders entered in a guardianship proceeding in which Mauricette acted as James's guardian for the final three years of his life. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that personal service on her father by a private process server was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the probate court because Chapter 1051 of the Estates Code requires a proposed ward to personally be served by a sheriff, constable, or other elected officeholder. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that any deficiency with respect to the method of personal service rose to the level of a violation of due process. View "In re Guardianship of Fairley" on Justia Law

Doctors Hills, Alqsous, Elrawy, and Al-Madani were convicted of offenses connected to their employment at a publicly-owned Cuyahoga County hospital, MetroHealth, which receives federal funds. Hills solicited and received bribes from Alqsous, Al-Madani, and Elrawy in exchange for favorable treatment with respect to their employment. Alqsous, Al-Madani, and Sayegh solicited and/or accepted bribes from applicants to MetroHealth’s dental residency program. Hills and an unindicted business partner operated OHE to provide training for dentists with discipline or performance issues. Some of OHE’s business was accomplished using MetroHealth personnel, equipment, or facilities without permission or compensation. Hills received and Alqsous and Al-Madani offered or paid kickbacks for referrals to private clinics. There were recordings of discussions concerning warning a resident to stay quiet, preparing 1099 forms to hide the kickbacks, and telling a grand jury witness to “forget” seeing envelopes of cash. Hills also arranged for his attorney to receive extensive dental work without charge and assigned MetroHealth residents to work at a private clinic.The district court imposed aggregate terms of imprisonment of: 188 months (Hills), 151 months (Alqsous), and 121 months (Al-Madani). They were also ordered to pay restitution, some jointly and severally, in amounts approaching $1 million. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sentences, the loss calculation, the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, the denial of a motion to suppress, and other procedural rulings. View "United States v. Alqsous" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied defendants' motion for a partial stay of the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining the Department of Defense, United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and United States Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro from enforcing certain COVID-19 vaccination requirements against 35 Navy special warfare personnel and prohibiting any adverse actions based on their religious accommodation requests. Specifically, defendants seek a partial stay pending appeal insofar as the injunction precludes them from considering plaintiffs' vaccination statuses "in making deployment, assignment and other operational decisions."The court weighed the Mindes abstention factors and determined that this dispute is justiciable. However, the court concluded that defendants have not carried their burden to warrant the issuance of the stay. The court agreed with the district court that defendants have not shown a compelling interest to deny religious accommodations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to each of the 35 plaintiffs at issue. Rather, the "marginal interest" in vaccinating each plaintiff appears to be negligible and thus defendants lack a sufficiently compelling interest to vaccinate plaintiffs. The court also concluded that the preliminary injunction does not irreparably damage the Navy and the public; partially staying the preliminary injunction pending appeal would substantially harm plaintiffs; and issuance of the requested stay would disserve the public interest. View "U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's medical negligence claims, holding that Texas Medical Liability Act applied, and therefore, Plaintiff's failure to serve an expert report on Defendants was fatal to her claims.At issue was (1) whether Plaintiff's claims that Defendants negligently administered various treatments that caused scarring and discoloration to her skin constituted "health care liability claims" under the Act, and (2) whether the Act prohibited Plaintiff from filing an amended petition after the Act's deadline for serving expert reports. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff's claims constituted health care liability claims subject to the Act's expert report requirements; (2) the Act did not prohibit Plaintiff from filing an amended petition; and (3) because Plaintiff failed timely to serve an expert report, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed under the Act. View "Lake Jackson Medical Spa, Ltd. v. Gaytan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Fla. Stat. 120.68(3), which entitles a party to a presumptive stay upon the appeal of an agency decision that "has the effect of suspending or revoking a license," does not apply to an agency decision to administratively withdraw an incomplete renewal license application.When Ybor Medical Injury and Accident Clinic, Inc. (the clinic), applied to the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to renew its expiring license the AHCA invited the clinic to supplement its application, which was incomplete. After the clinic failed to do so, AHCA administratively withdrew the incomplete renewal license application from further consideration. The AHCA appealed and sought a presumptive stay under section 120.68(3). The court of appeals granted the presumptive stay. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the appeal of an agency’s withdrawal decision does not trigger the statute’s presumptive stay provision. View "Agency for Health Care Administration v. Ybor Medical Injury & Accident Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court opining on the constitutionality of the Governor's 2021 COVID-19 legislation and enjoining the Governor from interfering with Plaintiffs' business operations, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action.In its 2021 regular session, the General Assembly passed three bills amending the Governor's emergency powers under Ky. Rev. Stat. 39A. Plaintiff, a business, sought to enjoin the Governor from any action contrary to the 2021 legislation. The circuit court entered an amended judgment declaring the constitutionality of the 2021 COVID-19 legislation, holding any orders to the contrary imposed by the Governor unconstitutional, and prohibiting the three named defendants from enforcing any emergency order, decree or regulation in conflict with the 2021 legislation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff plainly had no standing to bring this action, and the circuit court had no jurisdiction. View "Beshear v. Ridgeway Properties, LLC" on Justia Law