Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

President Biden invoked his authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (“Procurement Act”) to direct federal agencies to include in certain contracts a clause requiring covered contractor employees to follow COVID-19 safety protocols, including vaccination requirements, in order for employees to be eligible to work on federal government projects. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin the vaccination mandate. This lawsuit revolved around four documents that comprise the Contractor Mandate: the Executive Order, the Task Force Guidance, the Office of Management and Budget Determination, and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council Guidance. The district court granted a permanent injunction against the Contractor Mandate, effective in any contract that either involved a party domiciled or headquartered in Arizona and/or was performed “principally” in Arizona.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction and dissolved the injunction. First, the panel held the Major Questions Doctrine—which requires that Congress speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political significance—did not apply. Second, the panel held that even if the Major Questions Doctrine applied, it would not bar the Contractor Mandate because the Mandate is not a transformative expansion of the President’s authority under the Procurement Act. Third, the panel held that the Contractor Mandate fell within the President’s authority under the Procurement Act. Fourth, the panel held that the nondelegation doctrine and state sovereignty concerns did not invalidate the Contractor Mandate. Finally, the panel held that the Contractor Mandate satisfied the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act’s procedural requirements. View "KRISTIN MAYES, ET AL V. JOSEPH BIDEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC (“MSP”) appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of standing its putative class action against Defendant Hereford Insurance Company (“Hereford”) and denying leave to amend. MSP has brought several lawsuits around the country seeking to recover from insurance companies that allegedly owe payments to Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAOs”) under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (the “MSP Act”). In the putative class action brought here, MSP charges Hereford with “deliberate and systematic avoidance” of Hereford’s reimbursement obligations under the MSP Act.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that MSP lacked standing because its allegations do not support an inference that it has suffered a cognizable injury or that the injury it claims is traceable to Hereford. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied MSP leave to amend based on MSP’s repeated failures to cure. The court explained that the plain language of Section 111 provides that when a no-fault insurance provider such as Hereford reports a claim pursuant to Section 111, it does not thereby admit that it is liable for the claim. The statutory context of the section’s reporting obligation and the purpose of the reporting obligation confirms the correctness of this interpretation. Because MSP’s argument that the payments made by EmblemHealth are reimbursable by Hereford rests entirely on its proposed interpretation of Section 111, MSP has not adequately alleged a “concrete” or “actual” injury or that the injury it alleges is fairly traceable to Hereford. View "MSP v. Hereford" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC, JHM HIX Keene, LLC, VIDHI Hospitality, LLC, NAKSH Hospitality, LLC, 298 Queen City Hotel, LLC, ANSHI Hospitality, LLC, 700 Elm, LLC, Bedford-Carnevale, LLC, and Carnevale Holdings, LLC, owned commercial real estate on which they operated hotels, some of which offered restaurant services along with banquet or function facilities. They contended that the COVID-19 pandemic was a “natural disaster” and that their buildings were “damaged” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. Plaintiffs sought relief from the New Hampshire municipalities involved: the Cities of Laconia, Keene, and Manchester, and the Town of Bedford. After denial of their applications, they appealed to the superior court in the applicable county. Observing that there were thirteen separate lawsuits pending in six counties, they then filed an assented-to motion for interlocutory transfer without ruling and motion to consolidate to allow the coordinated transfer of the common questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In this interlocutory transfer without ruling, the Supreme Court was asked to determine: (1) whether, for purposes of RSA 76:21, the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a “natural disaster”; and (2) if so, whether the buildings owned by the plaintiffs were “damaged” by COVID-19 such that they were “not able to be used for [their] intended use” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. The Court answered the second question in the negative. View "Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC v. City of Laconia; et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the oral pronouncement issued by the district court waiving Appellant's right to be physically present at his commitment hearing and the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of commitment issued by the district court, holding that the court committed reversible error by waiving Appellant's right to physically appear.The State filed a petition for involuntary commitment of Appellant supported by a mental health evaluation. Appellant advised the court that he desired to be present in-person at the commitment hearing. At the time of the hearing, however, counsel represented that he wished to waive Appellant's appearance and instead have him appear via two-way video conferencing due to improper behavior. The district court granted counsel's request and permitted him to appear via two-way video communication. The district court subsequently committed Appellant to the Montana State Hospital and authorized the use of involuntary medication. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutory requirements for waiver of physical presence at the commitment hearing were not met. View "In re J.D.L." on Justia Law

Betty Smith brought a negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against Belhaven Senior Care, LLC (Belhaven), a nursing home facility in which her mother Mary Hayes had resided shortly before Hayes’s death. Belhaven sought to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision in the nursing home admissions agreement Smith signed when admitting her mother. The trial judge denied arbitration, finding that Smith lacked the legal authority to bind her mother to the agreement. Belhaven appealed. The nursing home’s primary argument on appeal was that under the Health-Care Decisions Act (“the Act”), Smith acted as a statutory healthcare surrogate. So in signing the nursing home admission agreement, Smith had authority to waive arbitration on her mother’s behalf. In addition, Belhaven puts forth arguments of direct-benefit estoppel and third-party beneficiary status. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, finding that while Hayes did suffer from some form of dementia, when admitted to the nursing home, she was neither evaluated by a physician nor was she determined to lack capacity. Indeed, her “Admission Physician Orders” were signed by a nurse practitioner. It was not until eleven days later that a physician evaluated Hayes. "And even then, the physician did not deem she lacked capacity. In fact, Belhaven puts forth no evidence that—at any time during her stay of more than a year at Belhaven—any physician ever determined Hayes lacked capacity." The Court determined Belhaven failed to prove the strict requirements of the surrogacy statute to rebut this presumption. Furthermore, the Court found Belhaven’s direct-benefit estoppel and third-party beneficiary arguments were lacking: because Belhaven contends that Hayes was incapacitated, she could not knowingly seek or obtain benefits from the agreement. "Nor does Smith’s largely negligence-based lawsuit seek to enforce the contract’s terms or require determination by reference to the contract. So Smith is not estopped from pursuing these claims." View "Belhaven Senior Care, LLC, et al. v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendants' motion for an award of attorneys' fees as part of their costs under N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(d) pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 6-21.5 and the trial court's subsequent order awarding $599,262 in attorneys' fees as costs, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiffs, limited partners of the Fayetteville Ambulatory Surgery Center Limited Partnership (FASC), asserted five claims against Cape Fear Valley Ambulatory Surgery Center, LLC and its owner, Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc. Plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. Defendants subsequently brought a motion for fees. The trial court granted the motion for attorneys' fees as part of Defendants' costs under Rule 41(d) pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 6-21.5. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion granting the motion for attorneys' fees. View "Woodcock v. Cumberland County System, Inc." on Justia Law

Integra is an accountable-care organization under the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). RIPCPC is an independent practice association of physicians located in Rhode Island. The plaintiffs (Hayden, King, Corsi) are primary care physicians and operated their own independent practices. Each participated in Integra until 2018, when they terminated their respective agreements upon the sale of their respective independent practices (Integra agreements) and terminated their relationships with RIPCPC. The plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and anticipatory breach/repudiation against Integra and RIPCPC, claiming that Integra and RIPCPC owed plaintiffs certain payments and shared savings for 2017 and 2018.The defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted as to breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by RIPCPC and anticipatory breach/repudiation by RIPCPC. RIPCPC then successfully moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration as to plaintiffs’ claims against RIPCPC for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and declaratory judgment. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not err in granting RIPCPC’s motion to compel arbitration with regard to Hayden’s claims for breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment nor in granting RIPCPC’s motion to compel arbitration with regard to Corsi’s claim for breach of contract but erred in granting RIPCPC’s motion to compel arbitration with regard to Corsi’s claims and King’s claims for conversion and unjust enrichment. View "Hayden v. Integra Community Care Network, LLC" on Justia Law

Banuelos claimed that she was unlawfully charged per-page fees for copies of her UW Hospitals medical records which were provided in an electronic format. UW Hospitals argued that section 146.83(3f) is silent as to fees for electronic copies of patient healthcare records and does not prohibit a healthcare provider from charging fees for providing such copies. Banuelos argued that because fees for electronic copies are not enumerated in the statutory list of permissible fees that a healthcare provider may charge, the fees charged here are unlawful under state law. The court of appeals agreed with Banuelos and determined that Wis. Stat. 146.83(3f) does not permit a healthcare provider to charge fees for providing copies of patient healthcare records in an electronic format.The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. Although section 146.83(3f) provides for the imposition of fees for copies of medical records in certain formats, it does not permit healthcare providers to charge fees for patient records in an electronic format. Although Wisconsin statutes previously permitted a charge for the provision of electronic copies of patient health care records, that language has been repealed. View "Banuelos v. University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Kent County Memorial Hospital and Michael Dacey, M.D., in his individual capacity and as President of Kent Hospital, and dismissing Richard Gilbert, M.D.'s suit challenging the Hospital Board of Trustees' revocation of Dr. Gilbert's privileges at Kent Hospital, holding that dismissal was proper.In granting summary judgment for Defendants, the district court concluded that Dr. Gilbert had not rebutted the presumption that Defendants were immune from liability in damages under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. 11101-11152, and immune from suit under Rhode Island state law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Board was entitled to HCQIA immunity; and (2) the Board was entitled to immunity under R.I. Gen. Laws 23-17-23(b). View "Gilbert v. Kent County Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court converted this interlocutory appeal to a petition for a writ of prohibition in this negligence action and granted extraordinary relief, holding that a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue in this case.Plaintiff brought this case against West Virginia University Hospitals (WVUH) for the alleged negligence of two emergency room physicians, both of whom were employees of the West Virginia University Board of Governors, on a theory of ostensible agency. WVUH filed a motion to dismiss that was converted into a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be held liable on a theory of ostensible agency under W. Va. Code 55-7B-9(g), which insulates non-employer healthcare providers from ostensible agency liability if the agent maintains a requisite amount of insurance coverage for the injury. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the two physicians did not meet the coverage requirements of the statute so as to alleviate WVUH of ostensible agency liability. The Supreme Court granted extraordinary relief, holding that the circuit court's reading of section 55-7B-9(g) as applied was clear error because it failed to account for W. Va. Code 55-7H-1 to -6, which cannot be reconciled with the circuit court's reading of section 55-7B-9(g). View "State ex rel. W. Va. University Hospitals, Inc. v. Honorable Gaujot" on Justia Law