Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment for Appellant's mental health providers for not preventing his crime of voluntary manslaughter, holding that Defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating his responsibility.Appellant pleaded guilty but mentally ill to voluntary manslaughter. Thereafter, Appellant sued his mental health providers, arguing that they were legally responsible for his act. The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellees. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thus vacating the court of appeals' opinion, and affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was estopped from relitigating his legal responsibility under defensive issue preclusion; and (2) Appellees carried their summary judgment burden of establishing that Appellant's damages were not compensable. View "Miller v. Patel, M.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs' respondeat superior-related claims, holding that the district court correctly held that respondeat superior principles did not make the remaining defendants in this case vicariously responsible for the abuse committed by a physician assistant and that the Utah Physician Assistant Act did not change that conclusion.Plaintiff brought an action against Alta Pain Physicians; Oscar Johnson, a physician assistant; and Dr. Michael Chen, Johnson's supervising physician, alleging that Johnson subjected her to sexual harassment and abuse when she saw him for pain treatment at Alta Pain. After Plaintiff settled her claims against Johnson the district court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Chen and Alta Pain on Plaintiff's claims of sexual assault, sexual battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in entering summary judgment on Plaintiff's respondeat superior-based claims; and (2) Plaintiff did not met her burden of convincing the Court to overturn precedent and use a foreseeability test for plaintiffs to recover against employers of abusive employees. View "Burton v. Chen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's demand for a jury trial before Walworth County extended his involuntary commitment for twelve additional months, holding that Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 966 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. 2021), applied retroactively to Appellant's case and that the denial of Appellant's jury demand was erroneous.Following a mental health crisis, Appellant was involuntarily committed and forcibly medicated for six months. Walworth County later sought to extend Appellant's commitment for twelve months. Appellant filed a jury demand at least forty-eight hours prior to his rescheduled final hearing date, but the circuit court denied the jury demand as untimely. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided E.J.W., which held that a jury demand is timely filed if it is filed at least forty-eight hours before a rescheduled final hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing that E.J.W. applied retroactively. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) E.J.W. applies retroactively; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the proper remedy for the circuit court's denial of Appellant's jury demand was not remand but reversal. View "Walworth County v. M.R.M." on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law

CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSXT”) issued furlough notices to employees at its facility in Huntington, West Virginia. Shortly thereafter, over 65 employees submitted forms requesting to take medical leave based on claimed minor soft-tissue injuries sustained while off duty. The forms were similar in content; all were signed by one of two chiropractors; and all called for medical leave of eight weeks or more.Under CSXT’s benefit plans, if an employee were furloughed while on medical leave, the employee would receive health and welfare benefits for up to two years. Otherwise, a furloughed employee would receive such benefits for only four months. Suspecting benefits fraud, CSXT charged the employees with violating its workplace rule against dishonesty and, following hearings, terminated their employment.Plaintiffs, a group of 58 terminated employees, claimed violations of their rights under federal and state law, including violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the West Virginia Human Rights Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”). The district court granted summary judgment to CSXT on all claims and Plaintiffs appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Employer's belief that Plaintiff employees committed benefits fraud was a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs couldn't prove pretext or retaliation. View "Justin Adkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

In this putative class action where Students sought a refund of money from the University of Kentucky after the University switched all on-campus classes to an online format for the remainder of the spring 2020 semester, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's ruling that governmental immunity was waived and that a breach of contract claim may proceed for adjudication on the merits, holding that the Student Financial Obligation and accompanying documents were a written contract under Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245(1) such that governmental immunity was waived and the underlying breach of contract claims may proceed. View "University of Ky. v. Regard" on Justia Law

In this case brought under the Developmental Disabilities Court-Ordered Custody Act (DDCCA) the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that T.W. was a person in need of court-ordered custody and adopting the custody and treatment plan prepared by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) with additional restrictions, holding that the district court was entitled to modify the terms of the treatment plan if the additional terms are supported by sufficient evidence.The State filed a petition under the DDCCA for court-ordered custody of T.W., an adult male. The district court found that T.W. was a person in need of court-ordered custody and treatment and, in accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1124, ordered DHHS to prepare a written custody and treatment plan. After a hearing, the district court adopted DHHS' treatment plan and added conditions to T.W.'s placement that were not part of the plan offered by the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court's order, including the added conditions, conformed to the law, was supported by competent evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. View "In re T.W." on Justia Law

Dubin was convicted of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347 after he overbilled Medicaid for psychological testing performed by his company. The prosecution argued that, in defrauding Medicaid, he also committed “[a]ggravated identity theft” under section 1028A(a)(1), which applies when a defendant, “during and in relation to any [predicate offense, such as healthcare fraud], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” Dubin’s fraudulent Medicaid billing included the patient’s Medicaid reimbursement number. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Dubin’s aggravated identity theft conviction.The Supreme Court vacated. Under section 1028A(a)(1), a defendant “uses” another person’s means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of what makes the conduct criminal. Under the government’s view, section 1028A(a)(1) would apply automatically any time a name or other means of identification happens to be part of the payment or billing used in the commission of a long list of predicate offenses. The Court concluded that the use of a means of identification must entail using a means of identification specifically in a fraudulent or deceitful manner, not as a mere ancillary feature of a payment or billing method. The inclusion of “aggravated” in 1028A’s title suggests that Congress contemplated a particularly serious form of identity theft, not ordinary overbilling offenses. View "Dubin v. United States" on Justia Law

After Talevski’s move to a nursing home proved problematic, Talevski sued a county-owned nursing home (HHC) under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that HHC’s actions violated rights guaranteed him under the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, concluding that the FNHRA rights cited by Talevski—the right to be free from unnecessary chemical restraints and rights to be discharged or transferred only when certain preconditions are met, “unambiguously confer individually enforceable rights on nursing home residents,” presumptively enforceable via section 1983.The Supreme Court affirmed. The FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create section 1983-enforceable rights. There is no incompatibility between private enforcement under section 1983 and the remedial scheme that Congress devised. The Court rejected HHC’s argument that, because Congress apparently enacted the FNHRA pursuant to the Spending Clause, Talevski cannot invoke section 1983 to vindicate rights recognized by the FNHRA. FNHRA lacks any indicia of congressional intent to preclude section 1983 enforcement, such as an express private judicial right of action or any other provision that might signify that intent. HHC cited the comprehensiveness of FNHRA’s enforcement mechanisms, but implicit preclusion is shown only by a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under section 1983. There is no indication that private enforcement under section 1983 would thwart Congress’s scheme by circumventing the statutes’ pre-suit procedures, or by giving plaintiffs access to tangible benefits otherwise unavailable under the statutes. View "Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (and IVYR PLLC, doing business as Par Retina) sued Wolfe Clinic, P.C. (and three of its owner-physicians). Plaintiff alleged that the Clinic monopolized or attempted to monopolize the vitreoretinal care market. On the merits, the district court initially dismissed the monopolization, fraudulent inducement, and recission claims while remanding the remaining state law claims. In an amended judgment, the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and affirmed the dismissal of the monopolization claims, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, dismissing all state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. The information in the amended complaint was previously available to Plaintiff and should have been pleaded before the judgment was entered. Plaintiff was on notice of the deficiencies in his complaint when the Clinic filed its motion to dismiss. Despite this, Plaintiff inexcusably delayed filing the Rule 59(e) motion—waiting over five months after the motion to dismiss was filed and almost a month after the district court dismissed the complaint. The court ultimately held that Plaintiff failed to plead a plausible claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization because he did not allege a relevant geographic market. View "George Par v. Wolfe Clinic, P.C." on Justia Law