Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that in determining whether a petition for court-ordered treatment complies with statutory requirements, courts may consider contents of an extrinsic document attached to an affidavit if the affidavit specifically incorporates the attachment by reference.The trial court found that G.B. was persistently or actually disabled and ordered treatment for one year. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order on the grounds that involuntary treatment proceedings require strict statutory compliance and that two affidavits submitted by G.B. failed to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-533(B). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the order of the trial court, holding that that there was no fundamental, prejudicial error in this case because the trial court's error did not deprive G.B. of a fair opportunity to oppose the petition for involuntary treatment or to otherwise receive a fair hearing. View "In re Pima County Mental Health No. 20200860221" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court overruling the motion to intervene as a matter of right filed by St. Louis and Jackson counties (the Counties), holding that the circuit court erred in overruling the Counties' motion to intervene as a matter of right.Plaintiffs brought this suit against the Department of Health and Senior Services. The circuit court ultimately declared that 19 C.S.R. 20-20.050(3) was constitutionally invalid. Several entities filed motions to intervene, including the Counties. The circuit court overruled all motions to intervene. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding that the circuit court erred in denying intervention where the motions were timely filed, the counties had an interest in the subject matter of the action, disposition of the action would impede their interests, and the existing parties no longer adequately represented their interest. View "Robinson v. Mo. Dep't of Health & Senior Services" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Oklahoma legislature unanimously passed the Patient’s Right to Pharmacy Choice Act. In response to the Act’s passage, the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association (PCMA), a trade association representing PBMs, sued to invalidate the Act, alleging that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and Medicare Part D, preempted the Act. The district court ruled that ERISA did not preempt the Act but that Medicare Part D preempted six of the thirteen challenged provisions. PCMA appealed the court’s ERISA ruling on four provisions of the Act and the court’s Medicare Part D ruling on one provision. After its review, the Tenth Circuit determined ERISA and Medicare Part D preempted the four challenged provisions, and therefore reversed. View "Pharmaceutical Care v. Mulready, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs David P. and his daughter L.P. sought to recover health care benefits under a medical plan David P. obtained through his employer. The district court awarded Plaintiffs benefits, determining that the manner in which Defendants processed Plaintiffs’ claims for coverage violated ERISA. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed: Defendants’ deficient claims processing circumvented the dialogue ERISA mandates between plan participants claiming benefits and the plan administrators processing those benefits claims. The Court disagreed, however, with the district court as to the appropriate remedy for the violations of ERISA’s claims-processing requirements at issue here. "Rather than outright granting Plaintiffs their claimed benefits, we conclude, instead, that Plaintiffs’ claims for benefits should be remanded to Defendants for proper consideration." The case was remanded to the district court with directions to remand Plaintiffs’ benefits claims to Defendants. View "P., et al. v. United Healthcare Insurance, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that the closure of in-person education due to the COVID-19 pandemic deprived children of the free appropriate public education to which they were entitled and deprived and parents of their right to participate in their children's education, holding that none of Plaintiffs' claims were cognizable in federal court.Plaintiffs, three children with disabilities and their parents on behalf of a putative class, sued the Governor of Massachusetts, the Commissioner of Schools for Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, and several school districts and their superintendents, claiming that the closure of in-person education during the COVID-19 pandemic violated Plaintiffs' rights under the IDEA and that Defendants illegally discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of disability in violation the Americans with Disabilities Act and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed in full either because Plaintiffs lacked standing to request the relief they sought, because the claims were moot, and/or because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Roe v. Healey" on Justia Law

The Montgomery County Board of Education adopted Guidelines for Gender Identity for 2020–2021 that permit schools to develop gender support plans for students. The Guidelines allow implementation of these plans without the knowledge or consent of the students’ parents. They even authorize the schools to withhold information about the plans from parents if the school deems the parents to be unsupportive. In response, three parents with children attending Montgomery County public schools challenged the portion of the Guidelines that permit school officials to develop gender support plans and then withhold information about a child’s gender support plan from their parents. Terming it the “Parental Preclusion Policy,” the parents alleged the policy unconstitutionally usurps the parents’ fundamental right to raise their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for the case to be dismissed. The court explained that the parents have not alleged that their children have gender support plans, are transgender or are even struggling with issues of gender identity. As a result, they have not alleged facts that the Montgomery County public schools have any information about their children that is currently being withheld or that there is a substantial risk information will be withheld in the future. Thus, under the Constitution, they have not alleged the type of injury required to show standing. Absent an injury that creates standing, federal courts lack the power to address the parents’ objections to the Guidelines. Thus, the court remanded to the district court to dismiss the case for lack of standing. View "John and Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Genentech manufactures and sells Rituxan, a drug used to treat leukemia and lymphoma. Rituxan is sold in single-use vials. Williamson was diagnosed with follicular lymphoma and was treated with Rituxan. Williamson later sued Genentech, on behalf of himself and a putative class of similarly situated individuals. He claims that Genentech violates the unfair competition law by selling Rituxan (and three other medications) in excessively large single-use vials; because the appropriate dosage varies based on a patient’s body size, Genentech’s vial sizes are too large for most patients. He argues Genentech should be required to offer smaller vials to reduce the waste of expensive medicine. In addition to injunctive relief, Williamson seeks to recover the amount the class spent on wasted Rituxan (and three other medications). Williamson took only Rituxan, not the other three medications, and paid a $231.15 deductible– the rest of the payments were made by his health insurer.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of standing under California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200). Williamson suffered no economic injury caused by the alleged unfair practices and cannot establish standing by borrowing an economic injury from his insurer. The collateral source rule, under which a tortfeasor must fully compensate a victim and cannot subtract compensation the victim may have received from their insurer or another collateral source, does not apply. View "Williamson v. Genentech, Inc." on Justia Law

In summer 2010, plaintiff Carol Conforti obtained a restraining order against her husband. On September 8, he was arrested for violating the restraining order by returning to the marital home to see his son. Conforti was taken to the OCJ, where he was evaluated by a staff member of Correctional Health Services (CHS). A CHS staff member wrote on the “Intake Receiving and Screening” form that Conforti reported: (1) drinking half a gallon of vodka each day; (2) major surgery that left him with rods and screws in his back; (3) feeling “hopeless or helpless”; and (4) the “[r]ecent significant loss” of his marriage. A physician prescribed him one extra mattress and medicine for back pain and alcohol dependence, and instructed that he not be assigned work or a top bunk. After 27 days, Conforti was released. Just over a week later, Conforti was arrested for again returning to the marital home to see his son. He arrived at OCJ on October 13, 2010. A document from Conforti’s file acknowledged his previous incarceration and history of binge drinking but stated he had “[n]o current mental health issues/concerns” and was cleared for OCJ’s general population. On October 16, he requested medical attention for back pain. On October 20, Conforti wrote a suicide note to his parents, closed the door to his cell, covered the cell door window with a sheet, and hung himself. During discover, plaintiff submitted an expert report who opined that defendants the County of Ocean and the Ocean County Jail acted negligently by failing to adequately train and supervise OCJ staff to prevent inmate suicide. The County defendants moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). A jury found defendant negligent and apportioned liability 60% against the County and 40% against Correctional Health Services (CHS). Defendants moved for JNOV, reasserting their medical-facility-immunity argument. The New Jersey Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence count at the summary judgment stage, and no error in refusing to overturn the jury’s verdict after trial. View "Conforti v. County of Ocean, et al." on Justia Law

The Affordable Care Act obligates large employers to provide their full-time employees with health insurance coverage meeting certain requirements. If an employer fails to provide coverage or provides noncomplying coverage, it is liable for an exaction under 26 U.S.C. Section 4980H. In 2019, the Internal Revenue Service sent two letters proposing exactions under Section 4980H to appellant Optimal Wireless, a wireless communications company. Optimal then filed an action against the IRS and the Department of Health and Human Services, claiming that the agencies had failed to satisfy certain procedural requirements before imposing the proposed exactions. Optimal sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction barring the IRS from collecting any money without complying with those procedures. The district court dismissed Optimal’s suit for lack of jurisdiction.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Anti-Injunction Act provides that, with certain exceptions, “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” The court explained that because Congress repeatedly called the Section 4980H exaction a tax, Optimal’s suit is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. The court further wrote that Congress’s use of the phrase “assessable payment” does not conflict with—or otherwise detract from the import of—its choice to label the Section 4980H exaction a “tax” in multiple provisions. The terms are not mutually exclusive. View "Optimal Wireless LLC v. IRS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gene Moran, who was a patient at Huntington Beach Hospital (the Hospital) three times in 2013, sued defendants Prime Healthcare Management, Inc., Prime Healthcare Huntington Beach, LLC, Prime Healthcare Services, Inc., and Prime Healthcare Foundation, Inc. (collectively defendants) under various theories in 2013. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal found that while most of Moran’s claims lacked merit, he had sufficiently alleged facts supporting standing to claim the amount that self-pay patients were charged was unconscionable, and reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the case. Moran’s sixth amended complaint included both the allegations regarding unconscionability and a new theory of the case: defendants had violated the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) by failing to disclose Evaluation and Management (EMS) fees charged in the emergency room through signage or other methods. The complaint sought relief under both the old and new theories for violations of the UCL, CLRA, and for declaratory relief. Defendants moved to strike the allegations regarding EMS fees, arguing their disclosure obligations were defined by statute. The trial court agreed and struck the allegations from the sixth amended complaint. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc." on Justia Law