Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the court dealt with the suspension and subsequent resignation of a licensed obstetrician and gynecologist, Plaintiff Dr. Vardui Asiryan, from the defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center and its Medical Staff. The Medical Staff suspended Asiryan’s privileges at the hospital without holding a hearing or giving her prior notice. Asiryan sued both entities, alleging they failed to comply with statutory and common law procedural requirements in connection with suspending her privileges at the hospital. She further claimed that the Medical Staff lied to her regarding their obligations to report her suspension and resignation to the state licensing board.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the trial court correctly concluded that the Business and Professions Code is the sole source of procedural protections in connection with hospital peer review, and that the common law doctrine of fair procedure does not supplement those protections with additional guarantees. Therefore, the court correctly granted the nonsuit on Asiryan’s common law peer review claims and correctly rejected her proposed jury instructions regarding peer review.As for the court's order awarding attorney fees, the Court of Appeal held that given the court’s rulings denying certain portions of defendants’ summary judgment and nonsuit motions, a hypothetical reasonable attorney could have deemed Asiryan’s peer review claims against the Medical Staff tenable and reasonably decided to take them to trial. This same logic does not apply to the fees awarded to GAMC, because the court disposed of the claims against GAMC on summary judgment. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the court’s fee order to the extent it awards fees to the Medical Staff, but affirmed the order as it applies to GAMC. View "Asiryan v. Medical Staff of Glendale Adventist Medical Center" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed a case where an inmate with celiac disease sued a doctor for depriving him of a gluten-free diet. The district court had granted summary judgment to the doctor because the plaintiff did not have an expert witness to testify about the standard treatment for celiac disease or the causal link between the doctor’s conduct and the plaintiff’s alleged harm. The appeals court held that no expert testimony was needed to avoid summary judgment in this case. The court found that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact about the doctor's knowledge of his celiac disease and the excessive risk it posed by failing to respond reasonably, even without an expert.The court also clarified that expert testimony is not necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference. The court held that while determining whether medical professionals responded reasonably to a particular risk can involve an examination of the relevant standard of care, the fact that expert testimony may be necessary in some cases does not mean it was in this one. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Phoenix v. Amonette" on Justia Law

This case was before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission (plaintiffs) brought a suit against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corporation (defendants), three distributors of opioids. The plaintiffs alleged that these companies perpetuated the opioid epidemic by repeatedly shipping excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies, thus creating a public nuisance under West Virginia common law. The district court ruled in favor of the distributors, holding that West Virginia’s common law of public nuisance did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims.After a bench trial in 2021, the district court held that the common law of public nuisance in West Virginia did not extend to the sale, distribution, and manufacture of opioids. The court found that the application of public nuisance law to the sale, marketing, and distribution of products would invite litigation against any product with a known risk of harm, regardless of the benefits conferred on the public from proper use of the product. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy, a 15-year “Abatement Plan” developed by an expert in opioid abatement intervention. The court held that this relief did not qualify as an abatement as it did not restrict the defendants' conduct or their distribution of opioids but generally proposed programs and services to address the harms caused by opioid abuse and addiction.The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Under West Virginia’s common law, can conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance constitute a public nuisance and, if so, what are the elements of such a public nuisance claim? View "City of Huntington v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in a case involving a claimant who was denied Social Security benefits. The claimant, who had undergone surgery to treat a brain condition known as Arnold-Chiari malformation, testified to experiencing severe and frequent headaches. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected his testimony regarding the severity of his headaches, asserting that his headache symptoms were inconsistent with the medical evidence and his daily activities.The court of appeals found that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's symptom testimony regarding his headaches. It noted that the ALJ did not specify which of the claimant's symptoms were inconsistent with the record evidence. The court also rejected the argument that a claimant must provide independent medical evidence to establish the severity of headaches.Furthermore, the court found that the claimant's daily activities were not inconsistent with his testimony about the severity and frequency of his headaches. The district court's affirmation of the ALJ's decision based on the claimant's conservative treatment was also found erroneous since the ALJ did not consider this factor. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the district court, remanding it back to the ALJ to reconsider the credibility of the claimant's headache symptom testimony. View "Ferguson v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

The case involved an appeal by two brothers, Jonathan and Daniel Markovich, who were convicted for operating fraudulent drug rehabilitation clinics in Florida. They were found guilty of various charges, including health-care fraud, wire fraud, kickbacks, money laundering, and bank fraud, resulting in fraudulent claims of over $100 million.The brothers appealed their convictions on several grounds. They argued that the district court violated their constitutional rights by denying their motion to compel the prosecution to obtain and disclose confidential medical records possessed by third parties. They also claimed that the court violated Federal Rules of Evidence by admitting unreliable and confusing expert testimony about the clinics' medical and billing practices. Additionally, they argued that the court abused its discretion by admitting lay summary testimony about medical and billing records.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court ruled that the prosecution had no duty to seek out potentially exculpatory evidence not in its possession. It also determined that the expert testimony was clear and reliable, and the summary testimony was proper. The court found that any challenge to bank-fraud counts was forfeited due to a lack of explanation or supporting legal authority. Finally, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the brothers' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. View "United States v. Markovich" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal against a judgment from the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, which committed the appellant, G.M., into the custody and care of the Montana State Hospital (MSH) for involuntary mental health treatment. The key issue at hand is whether the District Court erroneously found that G.M. was unable to adequately care for her own basic needs and safety based on hearsay statements made by her husband through the testimony of a court-appointed professional.G.M., aged 66 at the time of the petition for involuntary mental health commitment in 2021, was alleged to be suffering from a diagnosed psychotic mental disorder. G.M.'s husband's statements, along with her own behavior and assessments from mental health professionals, were the basis for the court's decision. G.M.'s counsel repeatedly objected to the court-appointed professional's testimony regarding her husband's out-of-court statements, but these objections were overruled.G.M. testified on her own behalf, denying having a mental disorder or requiring treatment. Despite this, the District Court found that due to her diagnosed schizophrenic and delusional mental disorder, G.M. was “substantially unable to provide for her own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety."On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The court found that the lower court's decision was not clearly erroneous and was supported by substantial admissible evidence. The court stated that the hearsay statements of G.M.'s husband were admissible under the rules of evidence to explain the underlying rationale for the court-appointed professional person's expert opinion. The court also noted that the judgment was independently supported by the professional person's personal observations and opinions on G.M.'s condition and ability to care for her own needs and safety. View "In re Matter of G.M." on Justia Law

In 2010, Ángel M. Ayala-Vázquez was indicted and convicted on multiple drug-related charges, including conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the possession of with intent to distribute over 280 grams of cocaine base. He was sentenced in 2011 to life imprisonment. In 2021, Ayala filed a motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act and for compassionate release due to his hypertension and obesity making him vulnerable to COVID-19.The District Court denied Ayala's motion, concluding that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act because his sentences were imposed "in accordance with" the amendments made by the Fair Sentencing Act. The court also rejected his request for compassionate release, finding that Ayala failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant such relief. Moreover, the court determined that Ayala posed a danger to other persons and the community.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court affirmed the District Court's decision. It concluded that Ayala was indeed convicted of offenses involving 280 grams or more of cocaine base, and his life sentences were in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act. Therefore, he was not eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. As for the compassionate release, the court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's evaluation of Ayala's health conditions and perceived danger to the community. View "United States v. Ayala-Vazquez" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed a case involving the question of whether the federal Title X program preempts a Texas law that gives parents the right to consent to their teenagers’ obtaining contraceptives. Alexander Deanda, a father raising his children according to Christian beliefs, challenged the Secretary of Health and Human Services' administration of Title X, which funds clinics providing contraceptives to minors without parental notification or consent. Deanda contested this on the grounds that it nullifies his right to consent to his children's medical care, infringing on his state-created right. The court held that Title X does not preempt Texas's law. The statute does not preempt Deanda's parental right to consent to his children's obtaining contraceptives because Title X's goal (encouraging family participation in teens’ receiving family planning services) is not undermined by Texas's goal (empowering parents to consent to their teen’s receiving contraceptives). Instead, the two laws reinforce each other. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment to the extent it declared that Title X does not preempt Texas's parental consent law. However, the court reversed the partial vacatur of a regulation which forbids Title X grantees from notifying parents or obtaining their consent, as the regulation was not challenged by Deanda under the Administrative Procedure Act or otherwise. View "Deanda v. Becerra" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was asked to determine whether Arkansas Code § 23-92-604(c), also known as Act 1103, was preempted by federal law. Act 1103 prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from limiting the ability of healthcare providers, who are eligible for drug pricing discounts under the Section 340B Program, to contract with outside pharmacies for drug distribution.The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) sued the Commissioner of the Arkansas Insurance Department, arguing that Act 1103 was unconstitutional because it was preempted by the Section 340B Program and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, under theories of field, obstacle, and impossibility preemption.The court, however, disagreed with PhRMA's arguments. The court found that Act 1103 did not create an obstacle for pharmaceutical manufacturers to comply with 340B, rather it assisted in fulfilling the purpose of 340B. The court also found that Act 1103 did not make it impossible for drug manufacturers and wholesale distributors to comply with the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) Program under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.Therefore, the court held that Act 1103 was not preempted by either the Section 340B Program or the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. As such, the court affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the Intervenors and against PhRMA. View "Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs of America v. McClain" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dealt with the appeal of Youlian Zhong, who contested her mandatory minimum sentences for crimes related to her participation in a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute large quantities of marijuana. Zhong argued that the district court erred in finding that she did not qualify for the statutory safety valve for mandatory minimum sentences.Zhong and her husband, Housheng Xian, were found guilty of conspiring to grow more than 1,500 marijuana plants in their residence, intending to process and sell the marijuana. They were convicted on three counts: conspiring to manufacture and possess with the intent to distribute 1,000 and more marijuana plants, manufacturing and possessing with intent to distribute 1,000 or more marijuana plants, and using and maintaining their house for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing marijuana.Before sentencing, Zhong and Xian requested a non-guideline sentence of time served plus five years of supervised release, arguing that they met the requirements of the safety valve provisions. However, the court found that they did not provide all necessary information to the government, particularly regarding their mens rea, or intent, for the crimes for which they were convicted.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appeals court held that a defendant must provide the government with information sufficient to prove the mens rea required for the crimes of conviction to meet the requirement of providing “all information and evidence” concerning the offense for the safety valve provision to apply. The court concluded that Zhong did not provide sufficient information about her intent to commit the crimes for which she was convicted, and thus, did not meet her burden to prove that she qualified for safety-valve relief. View "United States v. Zhong" on Justia Law