Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the life imprisonment sentence of Azibo Aquart, who was found guilty of multiple federal homicide and drug trafficking crimes. The court had previously affirmed his conviction but vacated his death sentence, remanding the case for a new penalty proceeding. On remand, the government decided not to pursue the death penalty, and Aquart was resentenced to life imprisonment. Aquart appealed, arguing that the district court erred in refusing to address new challenges to his conviction and in sentencing him for both drug-related murder and drug conspiracy, which he argued constituted double jeopardy. The Appeals Court rejected both arguments, ruling that the district court correctly applied the mandate rule and that Aquart's double jeopardy argument was without merit. View "United States v. Aquart" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, a group of reproductive health centers and Planned Parenthood affiliates in Pennsylvania challenged the constitutionality of sections of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act and corresponding regulations which prohibit the use of state Medicaid funds for abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or to avert the death of the mother. The petitioners argued that the exclusion of abortion from Medicaid coverage violated the Equal Rights Amendment and equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the health centers had standing to bring the lawsuit on behalf of their patients who are enrolled in or eligible for aid under Pennsylvania's Medical Assistance program but whose abortions are not covered because of the exclusion. The court further held that the Commonwealth Court erred in permitting individual members of the Pennsylvania Senate and House of Representatives to intervene in the case.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's order dismissing the petition for review. The court concluded that the providers' petition for review was legally sufficient to survive demurrer. The court noted that its precedent may have misstated the breadth of the exclusion and remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not rule on the constitutionality of the challenged provisions. View "Allegheny Reprod. Health v. PA DHS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Alabama granted a writ of mandamus to Triad of Alabama, LLC, doing business as Flowers Hospital, in a personal-injury lawsuit filed by Voncille and Don Askew. The Askews sued Triad after Voncille fell and sustained serious injuries at the hospital while undergoing treatment for COVID-19. In response, Triad asserted an affirmative defense of civil immunity under the Alabama COVID-19 Immunity Act (ACIA). The Askews moved to strike this defense, arguing that their claims were related to the hospital's failure to maintain safe premises and not to any health emergency related to COVID-19. The trial court granted the Askews' motion, prompting Triad to petition the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court found that Triad was entitled to immunity under the ACIA as Voncille's injury occurred in connection with her treatment for COVID-19 at the hospital. The court held that any claim that arises from or is related to COVID-19 falls under the immunity provisions of the ACIA, rejecting the Askews' argument that the Act's immunity provisions only apply to claims expressly related to exposure or contraction of COVID-19 or efforts to prevent its spread. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to vacate its order striking Triad's affirmative defense under the ACIA. View "Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, the plaintiff, Ali Shalghoun, appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in favor of the defendant, North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc. Shalghoun, an administrator of a residential facility for developmentally disabled persons, sued the regional center after he was attacked by a resident at the facility. The resident, known as J.C., was a client of the regional center, which had arranged for his placement at the facility.The central issue in the case was whether the regional center had a legal duty to protect the employees of a residential facility from a developmentally disabled person who had been placed there. The plaintiff argued that the regional center was negligent in failing to immediately move J.C. to another facility after being informed that the facility could no longer provide the level of care he required.However, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the regional center did not owe a duty of care to the facility's employees. The court reasoned that the regional center's duty, as mandated by the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act, was to provide services and support to the developmentally disabled person (the "consumer"), not to protect third-party employees at a residential facility. The court also noted that the regional center did not have the unilateral power to relocate a consumer; it depended on the acceptance of the consumer by another residential facility.According to the court, the imposition of liability on regional centers for injuries inflicted by consumers could potentially drive the centers out of business, disrupt the entire system of services and support for developmentally disabled individuals, and contradict the Act's mandate to place consumers in the least restrictive environment. The court therefore concluded that public policy factors weighed against recognizing a duty of care running from the regional center to the employees of the residential facility. View "Shalghoun v. North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves appellant Soleiman Mobarak, who appealed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus against appellee, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Jeffrey M. Brown. Mobarak had sought to vacate his criminal convictions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court. The court of appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case and that Mobarak had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.In 2012, Mobarak was indicted on charges of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, aggravated trafficking in drugs, and aggravated possession of drugs. The charges alleged that Mobarak had possessed and sold a controlled-substance analog commonly known as bath salts. In his petition, Mobarak asserted that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his criminal case on several grounds including that there was no statute prohibiting the possession or sale of bath salts at the time his offenses were alleged to have occurred, and that the controlled-substance-analogs law was unconstitutionally vague.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District Court of Appeals' judgment dismissing Mobarak’s petition. The court held that Mobarak’s petition failed to state a mandamus claim because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and failed to show that the trial court had patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case. The court found that by virtue of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2931.03, the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case. The court also noted that Mobarak’s arguments were similar to those raised and rejected in his prior appeals. The court stated that extraordinary writs may not be used as a substitute for an otherwise barred second appeal or to gain successive appellate reviews of the same issue. View "State ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown" on Justia Law

In South Carolina, two hospitals, Walterboro Community Hospital and Trident Medical Center, appealed an Administrative Law Court (ALC) order which approved the certificate of need (CON) for the Medical University Hospital Authority (MUHA). MUHA had applied for a CON to construct a new general hospital in Berkeley County to address capacity issues at its existing hospital in Charleston. The appellant hospitals raised four issues against ALC's decision: 1) the ALC's dismissal of certain errors in the review by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), 2) a misinterpretation of the State Health Plan by the ALC, 3) the ALC's approval of MUHA's application conditional on the closure of a freestanding emergency department planned by MUHA, and 4) the appeal bond required by South Carolina law is unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the ALC's decision and held that despite errors in DHEC's review process and decision, the ALC's de novo review rendered these errors harmless. The court also agreed with ALC's interpretation of the State Health Plan and found no issue in the ALC's condition of approval. The court further held that the appeal bond requirement was not unconstitutional, as the appellant hospitals were statutory affected persons and there was a rational basis for different treatment for a party opposing an approved CON and a party appealing the denial of its own CON application. However, the court did instruct that the appeal bond be voided and returned to Trident Medical Center. View "Walterboro Comm Hospital v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to consider a class action suit brought by patients against MultiCare Health System, Inc., a Washington corporation that operates Good Samaritan Hospital. The suit arose after a nurse employed by MultiCare, Cora Weberg, improperly diverted injectable narcotics for her own use and infected some emergency department patients with hepatitis C. The patients claimed that MultiCare failed to meet the accepted standard of care in supervising and hiring Nurse Weberg. The trial court divided the class into two groups: those who were assigned to Nurse Weberg and those who were not. It then dismissed the claims of the second group. The trial court ruled that legal causation was not satisfied because Nurse Weberg did not directly treat these patients. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed both courts and held that legal causation is satisfied. The court held that both classes can proceed with their chapter 7.70 RCW claims, which govern civil actions for damages for injury occurring as a result of health care. The court reasoned that the General Treatment Class's injuries arose as a result of health care, allowing their claim under chapter 7.70 RCW to proceed. The court also found that legal causation is satisfied when a hospital’s negligent supervision and hiring potentially exposes patients to a bloodborne pathogen, inducing fear and requiring blood testing. Thus, the court concluded that the General Treatment Class's claims should not have been dismissed. View "M.N. v. MultiCare Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Laura Tartaro-McGowan, a clinical manager with Inova Home Health, was terminated after failing to perform direct patient care field visits by a specified date. Tartaro-McGowan, who suffers from chronic arthritis in her knees due to bilateral knee replacement surgeries, sued her employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for failure to accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Inova Home Health, LLC and Alternate Solutions Health Network, LLC.Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, Inova Home Health experienced a severe shortage of field clinicians and informed all staff members, including clinical managers, that they would be required to perform direct patient care field visits. Tartaro-McGowan requested an accommodation to be excused from performing direct patient care field visits due to her physical limitations caused by her chronic arthritis. In response, the defendants proposed an accommodation that involved allowing Tartaro-McGowan to screen and select appropriate visits that would greatly reduce the possibility of injury. Tartaro-McGowan refused this accommodation and was later terminated for not performing any direct patient care field visits by the specified date.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court determined that Tartaro-McGowan failed to prove the defendants denied her a reasonable accommodation, an essential element of her ADA claim. The court noted that the circumstances surrounding the pandemic were exceptional, and given the severe shortage of field nurses, the defendants' proposed accommodation was reasonable. The court also found that Tartaro-McGowan failed to establish a prima facie case for her discrimination and retaliation claims. View "Tartaro-McGowan v. Inova Home Health, LLC" on Justia Law

In a dispute with the Department of Human Services (DHS) in Minnesota, Nobility Home Health Care, Inc. (Nobility) was found to have violated Minnesota Statutes section 256B.064 and Minnesota Rule 9505.2165 by failing to maintain health service records as required by law and by submitting claims for services for which underlying health service records were inadequate. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that such conduct constitutes "abuse" under the statute, even if there was no intent to deceive the DHS. However, the court declined to interpret or apply the phrase "improperly paid... as a result of" abuse in the statute, which governs the grounds for monetary recovery. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the DHS for further analysis of this issue. The court's decision means that DHS's demand for an overpayment for Nobility’s first-time paperwork errors may not be reversed unless the DHS also establishes that the provider was improperly paid because of that abuse. View "In the Matter of SIRS Appeal by Nobility Home Health Care, Inc" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered a case where Lawrence General Hospital (LGH) sued Continental Casualty Company for denying coverage for losses LGH alleges it suffered during the COVID-19 pandemic. LGH argued that its insurance policy with Continental covered the losses under two types of coverage: coverage for "direct physical loss of or damage to property" and a Health Care Endorsement covering losses and costs incurred due to compliance with government decontamination orders.Applying Massachusetts state law, the court ruled that LGH failed to state a claim that the SARS-CoV-2 virus caused "direct physical loss of or damage to its property," affirming the lower court's dismissal of this claim. However, the court found that LGH was subject to decontamination orders due to COVID-19 and thus had a valid claim for coverage under the Health Care Endorsement. As such, the court reversed the lower court's dismissal of this claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lawrence General Hospital v. Continental Casualty Co." on Justia Law