Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of Gregory Paul Ulrich for first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and discharge of an explosive or incendiary device. Ulrich had targeted the Allina Health clinic in Wright County, where he had been treated, because he was dissatisfied with his medical care and blamed the clinic for his chronic pain. He had recorded videos threatening the clinic, purchased a gun and supplies for making pipe bombs, and then carried out an attack at the clinic, shooting several people and detonating three pipe bombs. On appeal, Ulrich argued that the lower court had abused its discretion by denying his motions to strike a juror for cause and to change the venue, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court had not abused its discretion because the juror had not expressed actual bias requiring either rehabilitation or removal, and because Ulrich had not renewed his motion to change the venue after voir dire, thereby forfeiting his right to contest the denial of his motion. The Supreme Court also ruled that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions because it supported a reasonable inference that Ulrich had planned the attack and believed that it would cause the victims' deaths. View "State v. Ulrich" on Justia Law

In the State of California, a criminal defendant diagnosed with a mental disorder can be placed on mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The provision allows such defendants to receive treatment for their mental illness and potentially avoid prosecution. However, the court may reinstate charges if the defendant's behavior while on diversion renders them unsuitable for the program. This case involved a defendant, Jasmen Lavar Hall, who was charged with carjacking and related offenses. After being placed on mental health diversion, Hall was expelled from his residential treatment program for threatening and assaulting other patients and destroying property. Following this behavior, Hall went missing for approximately six months before being apprehended. The trial court subsequently terminated Hall's diversion and reinstated the criminal proceedings. After a jury trial, Hall was convicted of the carjacking-related offenses and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of seven years eight months in prison. Hall argued that the court erred in reinstating the criminal proceedings because his actions did not meet the statutory criteria for having his diversion terminated. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One disagreed, ruling that Hall's violent conduct and failure to comply with his treatment obligations rendered him unsuitable for diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, subdivision (g)(3). The court therefore held that the trial court did not err in terminating Hall's diversion and reinstating the criminal proceedings, and it affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "People v. Hall" on Justia Law

In a healthcare fraud case involving Medicare kickbacks, defendants Lindell King and Ynedra Diggs appealed their convictions and sentences. They challenged the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas's decision to admit recordings involving them and other co-conspirators, and disputed the court's calculation of the improper benefit received for the purpose of their sentence, as well as the restitution award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined these arguments and ruled in favor of the lower court.The defendants were accused of receiving bribes from a Medicare provider, Dr. Paulo Bettega, for referring Medicare beneficiaries to him for unnecessary treatment or non-provided treatment. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' Confrontation Clause arguments, stating the recordings were not testimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. It further dismissed the defendants' assertion that the recordings were impermissible hearsay.Regarding the calculation of the improper benefit, the court concluded that the government had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the entire operation was fraudulent. The defendants failed to provide rebuttal evidence of any legitimate medical expenses that should offset the amount paid to Bettega for treatment provided to residents of their group homes.The Court of Appeals also upheld the restitution award. It rejected the defendants' argument that their maximum restitution was limited to the $70,000 they received in kickbacks. The court held the defendants jointly and severally liable for all foreseeable losses within the scope of their conspiracy.In conclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, finding no error in its proceedings or decisions. View "USA v. King" on Justia Law

The case involves Jennifer Garcia, who was charged with multiple counts, including making threats to a public officer, disobeying a court order, possessing a weapon in a courthouse, attempted murder, and assault with a deadly weapon. After her counsel declared doubt as to Garcia's mental competence, the trial court suspended the criminal proceedings for a determination of Garcia's mental competence. Based on the evaluations of a licensed psychiatrist and a licensed psychologist, the court found Garcia mentally incompetent to stand trial and lacking capacity to make decisions regarding the administration of antipsychotic medication. Garcia appealed the court's order authorizing the state hospital to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to her, alleging errors with the order and ineffective assistance of her trial counsel. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's order, the psychologist did not exceed the scope of her license in her evaluation, and the psychiatrist's opinion did not lack statutorily required information. The appellate court also found that the error in the trial court's form order was harmless and Garcia was not prejudiced by any ineffectiveness of her counsel. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In a class action suit, the plaintiffs, a group of patients, alleged that the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), who operate the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania Health System (Penn Medicine), were in violation of Pennsylvania privacy law. The plaintiffs claimed that Penn Medicine shared sensitive health information and online activity of its patients with Facebook through its patient portal. Penn removed the case to federal court, asserting that it was "acting under" the federal government, referencing the federal-officer removal statute. However, the District Court rejected this argument and returned the case to state court.This case was primarily focused on whether Penn was "acting under" the federal government in its operation of Penn Medicine's patient portal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to remand the case back to state court. The Court of Appeals determined that Penn was not "acting under" the federal government, as it did not demonstrate that it was performing a delegated governmental task. The court declared that Penn was merely complying with federal laws and regulations, which does not qualify as "acting under" the federal government. The court noted that just because a private party has a contractual relationship with the federal government does not mean that it is "acting under" the federal authority. In conclusion, the court determined that the relationship between Penn and the federal government did not meet the requirements for Penn to be considered as "acting under" the federal government, thus the case was correctly returned to state court. View "Mohr v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

In this case, the parents of W.J., a young man with a chromosomal abnormality and autism, brought a case under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 against the Secretary of Health and Human Services, claiming that the Measles, Mumps, and Rubella vaccine administered to their son had caused or significantly aggravated his health issues. They filed their petition more than 15 years after the vaccine was administered, well beyond the Act's three-year statute of limitations. The parents argued that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to their son's mental incapacitation, his minority status, and the government's alleged fraudulent concealment of a connection between the vaccine and autism.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims, which had denied the parents' petition for review and confirmed a special master’s decision to dismiss the case as untimely. The court concluded that the mental incapacitation of the son did not qualify as an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting equitable tolling because the parents, as his legal guardians, had failed to demonstrate that they were unable to file a claim on his behalf. The court also rejected the arguments for minority tolling and fraudulent concealment, finding no basis for these in the Vaccine Act or its legislative history. The court further held that the special master had not erred in raising the issue of the statute of limitations, nor in dismissing the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "W. J. v. Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

This case concerns the standard of review that the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Health must apply when reviewing the decision of a hearing officer on an application for a certificate of need to establish a new health service. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment, set forth the standard applicable to the Commissioner’s review, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court clarified that "competent substantial evidence" in the context of the Commissioner's review means evidence that is "relevant" such that "a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support" a finding of fact, and that is admissible. The court also determined that the Commissioner must provide sufficient detail in his order from which a reviewing court can determine whether the Commissioner has or has not improperly substituted his judgment for the findings of fact of the hearing officer. View "VANTAGE CANCER CENTERS OF GEORGIA, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that under Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, the definition of a "child" includes those who are unborn, regardless of their location (either inside or outside a biological uterus). The case involves multiple sets of parents who had embryos created through in vitro fertilization (IVF) and stored at the Center for Reproductive Medicine, P.C. An incident occurred in which a patient at the hospital where the center was located wandered into the cryogenic nursery and removed several embryos, causing their deaths. The parents sued the center and the hospital for wrongful death under Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act and also asserted common-law claims of negligence. The trial court dismissed the wrongful-death and negligence/wantonness claims, concluding that the embryos did not fit the definition of a "person" or "child" and thus their loss could not give rise to a wrongful-death claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court's dismissal of the wrongful-death claims, holding that the Act applies to all unborn children, regardless of their location. The court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence and wantonness claims as moot, given the court's ruling on the wrongful-death claims. View "LePage v. Center for Reproductive Medicine, P.C." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in a case involving Regenative Labs ("Regenative"), a manufacturer of medical products containing human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products ("HCT/Ps"), and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Following the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") issuing two technical direction letters instructing Medicare contractors to deny reimbursement for claims for products manufactured by Regenative, the company filed suit challenging these letters without first exhausting administrative remedies. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction as Regenative had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal, in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in part on grounds of mootness. The Court concluded that the claims raised by Regenative arose under the Medicare Act and had to be pursued through the statutorily-prescribed administrative process. The Court also found that the company’s request for the court to vacate the contested policy was moot because the policy had already been rescinded by CMS. Finally, the court rejected Regenative's argument for mandamus jurisdiction, finding that it did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for this relief. View "Row 1 Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The case in question was heard by the Supreme Court of Texas and revolved around the interpretation of the term "psychiatrist" as it applies to the involuntary civil commitment of individuals exhibiting signs of mental illness. The case involved a 34-year-old man, A.R.C., who had exhibited psychotic symptoms and delusional behavior. Two second-year psychiatry residents completed the required "certificates of medical examination for mental illness," as outlined in Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.009(a). However, a question arose as to whether these residents could be considered psychiatrists under the statute.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that these residents were indeed psychiatrists, reversing the lower court's judgment. The court determined that the residents, who were licensed under a physician-in-training program and were engaged in specialized psychiatric training, fell within the definition of a physician specializing in psychiatry. The court rejected the argument that only board-certified psychiatrists qualify under the statute, stating that physicians who specialize in psychiatry qualify as psychiatrists under § 574.009(a).The court emphasized that it is the judge, not the physician, who ultimately decides whether involuntary commitment is necessary or lawful. The court also noted that the legislature has the power to amend the qualifications for psychiatrists and other physicians as it sees fit, provided it adheres to the constitutional requirement of competent medical or psychiatric testimony.The Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of A.R.C.'s remaining challenges. View "IN RE A.R.C." on Justia Law