Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, an individual was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and later subjected to civil management under New York's Mental Hygiene Law due to a "mental abnormality." Initially confined, he was released to a strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) program in 2016. In 2019, he violated SIST conditions by tampering with an alcohol monitoring bracelet, leading to his temporary confinement based on a psychologist's evaluation and a probable cause finding by the court.The Supreme Court initially found probable cause to believe he was a "dangerous sex offender requiring confinement" and ordered his detention pending a final hearing. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the statutory scheme violated procedural due process by not providing an opportunity to be heard at the probable cause stage. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division converted the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action, ultimately declaring the statute constitutional.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court held that the statutory scheme under Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4) appropriately balances individual and state interests. It concluded that the statute provides sufficient procedural safeguards, including a prompt judicial probable cause determination and a full hearing within 30 days, to mitigate the risk of erroneous confinement. The court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to him. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed without costs. View "People ex rel. Neville v Toulon" on Justia Law

The Government of Puerto Rico sued several pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs) and pharmaceutical manufacturers in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance. The Commonwealth alleged that the PBMs, including Express Scripts and Caremark, schemed to unlawfully inflate insulin prices through rebate negotiations and price setting. The PBMs removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that they acted under federal authority in negotiating rebates and setting drug prices, and that the lawsuit related to their federal service.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico remanded the case back to the Court of First Instance. The district court found that the Commonwealth's disclaimer, which stated that it was not seeking relief related to any federal program or contract, effectively excluded any claims upon which the PBMs could base removal under § 1442(a)(1). The district court concluded that the PBMs could not claim they acted under federal authority for their non-federal PBM services and that dividing the work done for federal and non-federal clients was possible.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the disclaimer did not prevent removal because Caremark's rebate negotiations for federal and non-federal clients were indivisible. The court found that Caremark acted under federal authority when negotiating rebates for FEHBA plans and possessed a colorable federal defense under FEHBA's express preemption provision. The court concluded that the disclaimer did not eliminate the possibility that the Commonwealth would recover for Caremark's official acts, thus justifying removal under § 1442(a)(1). The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to return it to federal court. View "Government of Puerto Rico v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

The appellant, a federal prisoner serving a twenty-two-year sentence, has a history of filing numerous lawsuits regarding his prison conditions. In this case, he sought to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) despite having three prior cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. He claimed imminent danger of serious physical injury due to worsening glaucoma and alleged that prison officials denied him necessary medical treatment and incited other inmates to assault him.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied his motion to proceed IFP, finding that he did not demonstrate imminent danger of serious physical injury. The court dismissed his case without prejudice. The appellant then appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with the District Court's assessment regarding the appellant's glaucoma, finding that the appellant's allegations of being denied necessary medical treatment for his worsening glaucoma did place him under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Consequently, the court granted the appellant's motion to proceed IFP and reversed the District Court's denial of his motion, allowing his complaint to be docketed.However, the court also found that some of the appellant's claims were frivolous, particularly those against high-ranking officials such as the United States Attorney General and members of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee. These claims were dismissed under the PLRA's mandate to dismiss frivolous claims. The court's decision allowed the appellant to proceed with his claims related to his medical treatment and alleged assaults but dismissed the frivolous claims against the aforementioned officials. View "Owlfeather-Gorbey v. Avery" on Justia Law

Carter K. was scheduled to be released from jail in October 2022 when a mental health professional filed a petition for his hospitalization for evaluation. The superior court granted the petition, and Carter was transported to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API). API staff then filed petitions to commit Carter for 30 days of treatment and to administer medication. Carter waived his presence at the hearings, and his attorney appeared on his behalf. The State presented two witnesses: Carter’s primary provider at API, a nurse practitioner, and a court visitor.The nurse practitioner testified that Carter was diagnosed with schizophrenia and exhibited severe psychotic symptoms, including delusions and disorganized communication. He opined that Carter could not meet his basic needs if discharged. The court visitor corroborated this, noting Carter’s inability to make informed decisions about his treatment. The superior court master recommended Carter’s commitment for 30 days, finding him gravely disabled and unable to function independently. The master also recommended the administration of three medications: olanzapine, lorazepam, and diphenhydramine.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. Carter argued that the superior court erred in finding him gravely disabled and in approving the involuntary administration of medication. The Supreme Court held that the superior court did not plainly err in finding Carter gravely disabled, as the nurse practitioner’s uncontested testimony supported this conclusion. The court also found no less restrictive alternative to commitment was available, as outpatient treatment would not meet Carter’s needs.However, the Supreme Court found plain error in the order for the involuntary administration of lorazepam, as the superior court did not adequately consider the required factors to determine if it was in Carter’s best interests and if no less intrusive treatment was available. The commitment order and the medication order for olanzapine were affirmed, but the order for lorazepam was vacated. View "In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of: Carter K." on Justia Law

A group of skilled nursing facilities in New York and Rhode Island challenged a rule promulgated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The rule allowed certain inspections of these facilities without the presence of a registered nurse, which the plaintiffs argued contradicted the Medicaid Act's requirement for a registered nurse to be part of the survey teams. The dispute arose after an incident at Avon Nursing and Rehabilitation, where a resident was injured, leading to an inspection by a team that did not include a registered nurse. The plaintiffs contended that the rule violated the statutory requirement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The court concluded that the Medicaid Act's registered nurse requirement applied only to surveys conducted under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(2) and not to activities under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(4), which were the subject of the challenged rule. The court also determined that even if the statute were ambiguous, the agency's interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the registered nurse requirement did not extend to complaint investigations and other enforcement activities under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(4). The court reasoned that the term "survey" in the statute referred specifically to annual standard surveys, extended surveys, and validation surveys, and not to the investigatory activities described in § 1396r(g)(4). Consequently, the rule allowing inspections without a registered nurse did not contradict the Medicaid Act. View "Avon Nursing & Rehabilitation v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The case involves Lucas Sirois and Alisa Sirois, who were indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). They sought to enjoin the Department of Justice (DOJ) from prosecuting them, arguing that their conduct was in substantial compliance with the Maine Medical Use of Cannabis Act, which allows for the use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana under state law. The defendants claimed that the DOJ's prosecution violated the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, which prohibits the DOJ from using funds to prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana laws.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied the defendants' request for injunctive relief. The court held a hearing where the government presented evidence that the defendants' operations, particularly a grow operation known as the "Shoe Shop," violated Maine's medical marijuana laws by operating as a collective and engaging in black-market sales. The court found that the government had met its burden of production, showing a substantial evidentiary basis for the prosecution. However, the defendants failed to meet their burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the prosecution lacked a substantial evidentiary basis or was arbitrary or irrational.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were in substantial compliance with Maine's medical marijuana laws. The court noted significant evidence that the Shoe Shop operated as a collective and that Lucas Sirois engaged in black-market sales. The court concluded that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the DOJ's prosecution would prevent Maine from giving practical effect to its medical marijuana laws, as required under the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment. Therefore, the denial of the motion to enjoin the prosecution was affirmed. View "United States v. Sirois" on Justia Law

K.M., an adult with multiple disabilities, including autism and a seizure disorder, has been receiving Medicaid-funded developmental disabilities services for over twenty years. These services, provided by Washington County Mental Health Services (WCMHS), were supposed to include more than thirty hours of community support each week. However, since March 2020, K.M. has only received two to five hours of support weekly, leading to negative health effects.K.M. petitioned the Human Services Board to order the Department of Disabilities, Aging, and Independent Living (DAIL) to provide the full services he is entitled to. The Board dismissed his petition, stating it failed to specify the action required for compliance and that an order to provide services without available staff was too vague. The Board also interpreted K.M.'s request as seeking a broader policy change, which it deemed outside its authority, citing Husrefovich v. Department of Aging & Independent Living.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Board's dismissal. The Court held that the Board has the statutory authority to order DAIL to provide the services K.M. is entitled to under federal and state law. The Court clarified that while the Board cannot issue broad policy injunctions, it can provide specific relief to individuals. The Court found K.M.'s request for services clear and specific enough to inform DAIL of the required action. The case was remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Appeal of K.M." on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to two Montana laws, HB 544 and HB 862, and a rule adopted by the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) regarding Medicaid funding for abortions. The plaintiffs, including Planned Parenthood of Montana and other healthcare providers, argue that these provisions infringe on the constitutional rights of their patients by imposing restrictions on Medicaid coverage for abortions. Specifically, the laws and rule bar Medicaid from covering abortions provided by non-physicians, require prior authorization for abortion services, and limit Medicaid coverage to abortions deemed "medically necessary" under a restrictive definition.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County issued a preliminary injunction to halt the enforcement of HB 544, HB 862, and the DPHHS rule. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, which included violations of the right to privacy and equal protection under the Montana Constitution. The court applied strict scrutiny, determining that the laws and rule were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, as the challenged provisions infringed on the fundamental right to privacy and equal protection. The court held that the state failed to demonstrate that the laws and rule were narrowly tailored to address a medically acknowledged, bona fide health risk. The Supreme Court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction and that the balance of equities and public interest supported maintaining the injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Montana House Bill 702 (HB 702), which prohibits discrimination based on vaccination status. Plaintiffs, including health care providers and individuals with compromised immune systems, argued that HB 702 is preempted by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSH Act) and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought to invalidate HB 702 in all health care settings, claiming it prevents employers from knowing employees' vaccination status, thus hindering ADA-required accommodations and OSH Act compliance.The United States District Court for the District of Montana ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that HB 702 is preempted by the ADA and the OSH Act and violates the Equal Protection Clause. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of HB 702 in health care settings, reasoning that the law conflicts with federal requirements for reasonable accommodations and workplace safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and vacated the injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that neither the ADA nor the OSH Act facially preempts HB 702 in health care settings. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a genuine conflict between HB 702 and the ADA or OSH Act in any specific case, much less in all health care settings. The court also held that HB 702 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the classification and differential treatment of facilities could rationally reflect Montana's interest in balancing personal privacy and public health.The Ninth Circuit reserved judgment on whether the ADA and the OSH Act could preempt HB 702 on a narrower, as-applied basis in future cases. The court deemed moot the portion of the district court's order related to interim CMS regulations, as those regulations have been rescinded. The court concluded that HB 702 is not facially invalid under the ADA, OSH Act, or Equal Protection Clause and vacated the district court's injunction in full. View "MONTANA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION V. KNUDSEN" on Justia Law

Theresa Johnson, individually and as executor of her deceased husband Nathaniel Johnson's estate, filed a wrongful-death action against Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. Nathaniel, suffering from COVID-19, was admitted to Jackson Hospital on November 26, 2020. He was placed on a BiPAP device for breathing assistance. On December 6, 2020, he was to be moved to another floor. During the transfer, the BiPAP device was removed, and an oxygen mask was allegedly placed on him. However, Nathaniel experienced distress and died shortly after.The Montgomery Circuit Court initially granted Jackson Hospital's motion for summary judgment, but later set it aside to allow further discovery. Johnson argued that Jackson Hospital's actions were wanton and did not comply with public health guidance. The trial court ultimately denied Jackson Hospital's renewed motion for summary judgment, holding that Johnson's action could proceed under an exception in the Alabama Covid Immunity Act (ACIA).The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that Jackson Hospital was immune from Johnson's negligence claims under the ACIA and the May 8 proclamation issued by Governor Ivey, which provided liability protections for health-care providers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also determined that Johnson did not present clear and convincing evidence of wanton conduct by Jackson Hospital's staff. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted Jackson Hospital's petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of Jackson Hospital on all claims. View "Ex parte Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law