Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

In this case alleging health care liability claims, the trial court erred by allowing Plaintiff to amend her complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations to substitute as a defendant a health care provider to which Plaintiff had not sent pre-suit notice.The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the trial court and court of appeals, holding that Plaintiff did not comply with the mandatory pre-suit notice provision of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(1), because she did not give written pre-suit notice of the potential claim to the health care provider she later sought to substitute as a defendant after the expiration of the statute of limitations. View "Runions v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant in an action challenging an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan's denial of a claim. The plan denied plaintiff's claim for the cost of an inpatient stay in a residential mental health treatment facility. The panel held that the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 did not require that the plan's coverage for stays at licensed inpatient residential treatment facilities had to be no more restrictive than stays at skilled nursing facilities. The panel explained that the Parity Act precluded the plan from deciding that it would provide room and board reimbursement at licensed skilled nursing facilities for medical and surgical patients, but not at residential treatment facilities for mental health patients. View "Danny P. v. Catholic Health Initiatives" on Justia Law

A former small-town doctor, defendant Joel Miller, was charged with multiple counts of health-care fraud, money laundering, and distributing a controlled substance outside the usual course of professional treatment, as well as one count of making a false statement on an application submitted to the Drug Enforcement Administration. A jury acquitted him on all of the financial charges as well as several of the drug distribution charges, but found him guilty on seven counts of distributing a controlled substance, and one count of making a false statement to the DEA. The district court granted Defendant’s post-judgment motion for acquittal on one of the controlled-substances counts based on an error in the indictment. The court then sentenced him to forty-one months of imprisonment on the six remaining distribution counts, plus a consecutive sentence of nineteen months on the false-statement count, for a total sentence of sixty months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence. The Tenth Circuit found no error in the imposition of defendant’s sentence on the six distribution counts; however the Court reversed and remanded on the false statement count. The Court was persuaded that trial court proceedings “broadened the possible bases for conviction beyond those found in the operative charging document. …we are persuaded that the trial proceedings in this case effected a constructive amendment.” View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

B.A.K. appealed an order for treatment in which the district court found her to be a person who was mentally ill and requiring treatment. B.A.K. was initially hospitalized after an outburst at her regular physician's office. In March 2018, her daughter petitioned for B.A.K.'s involuntary commitment. B.A.K.'s husband also attempted to commit B.A.K. while they were in Arizona for the winter. At the treatment hearing, the district court heard testimony about B.A.K.'s mental health deterioration and her refusal to take medication. In October 2017, B.A.K. started taking anxiety and depression medication. She then experienced joint pain, and she was prescribed a steroid. B.A.K. was also taking a prescribed statin for high blood pressure. B.A.K. decided to take herself off the anxiety and depression medications, and she eventually stopped taking all medications. B.A.K. believed she was being monitored, among other delusions. On appeal, B.A.K. argued the district court's order was not supported by clear and convincing evidence to show she was a mentally ill person and a person requiring treatment. After review of the Case, the North Dakota Supreme Court was "left with a definite and firm conviction" the district court's conclusion was not supported by clear and convincing evidence: "Despite Dr. Huber's testimony that she believed B.A.K. was a person requiring treatment, she also testified B.A.K. required no restraint, medication, or seclusion while hospitalized. ... Dr. Huber identified B.A.K. was manic and had delusional thoughts, but no evidence was presented showing a reasonable expectation B.A.K. would be a serious risk to herself, others, or property." The Court held the district court clearly erred in finding B.A.K. required treatment, and reversed the district court's order. View "Interest of B.A.K." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against GBMC, seeking to recover funds to Medicare and to collect for herself under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395y, which authorizes a private cause of action for double damages where a recalcitrant payer "fails" to reimburse Medicare. Sixteen days after plaintiff filed the federal suit, GBMC paid her $403,722.24, which represented the amended final judgment amount plus post-judgment interest. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of GBMC's motion for summary judgment, holding that, although plaintiff was injured when GBMC was obligated under law to pay for her medical care but did not, GBMC did not fail to reimburse plaintiff because its payment was well within plaintiff's proposed deadline. View "Netro v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

A hospital’s compliance with the Medical Records Act (Act), W. Va. Code 57-5-4a to -4j, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) when responding to a subpoena for a patient’s records does not preclude an action based on the wrongful disclosure of confidential information in violation of W. Va. Code 27-3-1.The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant-hospital alleging that the hospital wrongfully disclosed her confidential mental health treatment records in a federal court proceeding. The circuit court concluded that Plaintiff could not rely on the protections of section 27-3-1 in bringing this action because Defendant properly complied with the Act and HIPAA regulations in responding to a subpoena for Plaintiff’s medical records and Plaintiff never objected to the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that hospitals responding to subpoenas pursuant to the Act must comply with section 27-3-1, and “confidential information” as defined by section 27-3-1(a) is not subject to disclosure under the Act unless an exception applies. View "Barber v. Camden Clark Memorial Hospital Corp." on Justia Law

Abramge is a Brazilian nonprofit professional association of private health insurance providers, many of whom were impacted by a bribery and kickback scandal in the medical device market that broke in the Brazilian media in 2015. Abramge alleged that Stryker, a Michigan corporation, masterminded an “illicit scheme, which was planned and run from Michigan, designed to increase its market share by making improper payments and paying bribes and kickbacks to Brazilian doctors to induce the use of Stryker products” and “made improper payments and paid kickbacks to Brazilian doctors with the intent of influencing those doctors to use Stryker devices and products in patients even if those devices ... did not best meet the patients’ medical needs.” The scheme allegedly increased the cost of devices and the number of devices implanted and surgeries performed; health insurance providers paid for those increases. Abramge claims that Stryker’s actions injured not only its insurer members but also the entire Brazilian public health system and patients throughout the country. Abramge filed suit in the Western District of Michigan, claiming fraud, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with contractual relationships, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed, citing forum non conveniens. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Stryker did not carry its burden of proving that Brazil is an available and adequate alternative forum in which the case may be heard. View "Associacao Brasileira de Medicina v. Stryker Corp." on Justia Law

A durable power of attorney (DPOA) provided an adult daughter with the authority to enter into an arbitration agreement with a nursing home on her mother’s behalf.Lena Nelson executed a DPOA that named her son as her attorney-in-fact. The DPOA stated that if her son could not serve as such, Nelson’s daughter, Kimberly Shanklin, should be Nelson’s attorney-in-fact. Nelson was later transferred to Hillcrest Nursing Home. Shanklin signed all of the admission documents, including an arbitration agreement. Approximately one month after leaving the nursing home, Nelson died. Shanklin, on behalf of her mother’s estate, filed this suit against Hillcrest. Hillcrest, in response, filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. Shanklin argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because she did not have the actual authority to enter into the agreement on Nelson’s behalf because she was the “alternate” DPOA. The circuit court agreed and denied the motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Shanklin had the authority to enter into the arbitration agreement with Hillcrest; and (2) under the plain language of W.Va. Code 39B-1-119(c), Hillcrest was permitted to rely on Shanklin’s authority as Nelson’s DPOA when Shanklin signed the arbitration agreement on Nelson’s behalf. View "AMFM, LLC v. Shanklin" on Justia Law

In consolidated petitions, defendant Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("MIMC") sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate portions of its May 5, 2017, discovery orders. More specifically, in case no. 1160731, MIMC sought mandamus review of the portion of the trial court's order compelling MIMC to produce certain documents previously submitted to the trial court for in camera review on the ground that the documents are protected from discovery under section 6-5-551 and/or section 22-21-8, Ala. Code 1975. In case no. 1160815, MIMC sought mandamus review of another May 5, 2017, order denying MIMC's motions seeking reconsideration of, or in the alternative, a protective order regarding the trial court's November 10, 2016 order compelling MIMC's response to various discover requests. The underlying case centered on a negligence action brought by the administrator of the estate of Rhonda Lynn Snow who sought surgery at an MIMC facility in 2013. At around 5:50 a.m. on December 11, 2013, a nurse allegedly administered a dose of Dilaudid to Rhonda; thereafter, at 6:40 a.m. Rhonda was found "non-responsive" in her room and the staff at the medical center were unable to resuscitate her. Rhonda remained on life support until her death on January 3, 2014. The Alabama Supreme Court determined MIMC demonstrated the trial court exceeded its discretion in requiring MIMC to respond to the discovery requests at issue, and accordingly, issued writs in both cases. View "Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Defendant after this Court remanded the case, holding that any error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings was harmless and that the district court did not commit prejudicial error when it found that Plaintiffs waived their negligence claim.Plaintiffs Barbara and Michael Bradley filed a second amended complaint alleging medical negligence, battery, and the failure to obtain informed consent. The district court granted summary judgment on the battery claim. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Defendant’s favor. The First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial on account of an error in excluding the testimony of Plaintiffs’ proffered expert witness. After a second trial, the jury again returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) assuming, without deciding, that the district court erred in admitting an entry from Barbara’s diary and in admitting an excerpt from Barbara’s medical records from a different hospital, these errors were harmless; and (2) the district court did not commit prejudicial error in finding Plaintiffs to have waived their medical negligence claim. View "Bradley v. Sugarbaker" on Justia Law