Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Here, the Supreme Court announced new protocols to maintain the safety of jurors, litigants, attorneys, court personnel and the public in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The Court suspended until January 15, 2021 jury trials that have not begun. The Court, however, urged that judges continue to move cases forward, either through the use of technology by virtual or telephonic hearings or through in-person hearings that meet the Arkansas Department of Health's criteria for safe gatherings. The Court held that any delay for speedy-trial purposes due to precautions against the COVID-19 pandemic shall presumptively constitute good cause under Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(h) and shall constitute an excluded period for speedy-trial purposes. View "In Response To The COVID-19 Pandemic" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the order of the circuit court directing that Saint Luke Institute, Inc. (SLI) produce a patient's mental health records under seal, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to conduct the necessary statutory relevancy analysis required by the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act, Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen 4-301 through 309.Plaintiffs filed a civil case in Massachusetts alleging that they were sexually abused by a brother or member of a religious order while they were residing in a children's group home that employed the brother. Plaintiffs filed a proceeding in Maryland seeking discovery of the brother's mental health records they believed were in the custody of SLI, a Maryland facility. The circuit court entered an order directing the SLI to produce the brother's mental health records under seal. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed and outlined the process to be undertaken by the trial court prior to disclosure of mental health records requested by a private litigant in a civil case, holding that remand was required. View "St. Luke Institute v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court entering judgment in favor of Yankton County on Sacred Heart Health Service Inc.'s (Hospital) declaratory judgment against the County, holding that circuit court did not err in holding S.D. Codified Laws chapter 28-13 is the proper mechanism for the Hospital to obtain reimbursement from the County for medical costs associated with the twenty-three patients in the involuntary commitment process.The Hospital brought a declaratory judgment action against the County seeking a declaration as to the County's liability and reimbursement for charges for the medical care and treatment of patients subject to an emergency hold under S.D. Codified Laws chapter 27A-10. The circuit court first entered a memorandum decision in favor of the Hospital, but after granting the County's motion to reconsider issued a second memorandum decision and corresponding judgment in favor of the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting the County's motion for summary judgment; (2) the Hospital did not have a claim in quantum merit for reimbursement from the County; and (3) the circuit court did not err in granting the County's motion to reconsider. View "Sacred Heart Health Services v. Yankton County" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit originally resolved the motions that are the subject of this opinion in an order entered November 9, 2020. Except in unusual circumstances, the court resolves such motions by order, not opinion. The court converted the original order and the dissent into opinions per the dissent's request.These appeals challenge Governor Andrew Cuomo's issuance of an executive order directing the New York State Department of Health to identify yellow, orange, and red "zones" based on the severity of COVID-19 outbreaks and imposing correspondingly severe restrictions on activity within each zone. Appellants, Agudath Israel and the Diocese, each challenged the executive order as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. After the district court denied appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the order, appellants moved for emergency injunctions pending appeal and to expedite their appeals.Preliminarily, the Second Circuit concluded that Agudath Israel did not move first in the district court for an order granting an injunction while an appeal is pending before filing with this court its present motion for an injunction pending appeal. Rather, Agudath Israel moved for a preliminary injunction pending the district court’s final judgment. Furthermore, Agudath Israel has not explained or otherwise justified its failure to comply with the straightforward requirement of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a). Agudath Israel has also failed to demonstrate that moving first in the district court would be impracticable, or even futile, particularly in light of the fact that a full eleven days elapsed after the district court's ruling before Agudath Israel sought relief from this court. Therefore, the court denied Agudath Israel's motion for procedural reasons.The court also denied the Diocese's motion, concluding that appellants cannot clear the high bar necessary to obtain an injunction pending appeal. The court stated that, while it is true that the challenged order burdens appellants' religious practices, the order is not substantially underinclusive given its greater or equal impact on schools, restaurants, and comparable secular public gatherings. To the contrary, the executive order extends well beyond isolated groups of religious adherents to encompass both secular and religious conduct. View "Agudath Israel of America v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that this Court's August 27, 2020 order regarding temporary extension of the time requirements under Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 5(c)(3) for first circuit criminal matters is further extended until December 31, 2020, concluding that a further extension of the August 27 order was necessary.On August 27, 2020 the Supreme Court entered the order at issue, which provided that the first circuit may temporarily extend the time requirements for preliminary hearings no longer than reasonably necessary to protect public health and safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. Because COVID-19 cases have remained high since then, the Court extended the order until November 16, 2020. Here, the Court determined that a further extension of the August 27, 2020 order was necessary and thus extended the order until December 31, 2020. View "In re Judiciary's Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak" on Justia Law

Hospitals, in calculating their Medicaid fractions -- the proportion of treatment a hospital provided to Medicaid patients -- sought to include days of care funded by Florida's Low Income Pool, an approved Medicaid demonstration project. The Secretary refused to allow the Hospitals to include these patients in their Medicaid fraction, on the ground that the patients were treated out of charity rather than as designated beneficiaries of a demonstration project.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Hospitals, and agreed with the district court that the Secretary's own regulation states that, for the purposes of calculating the Medicaid fraction, "hospitals may include all days attributable to populations eligible for [Medicaid] matching payments through a [demonstration project]" so long as the services provided under the demonstration project include "inpatient hospital services." In this case, it was "obvious to the [c]ourt that uninsured and underinsured patients received inpatient hospital services" through the Low Income Pool, because (1) the Secretary authorized federal matching funds to reimburse hospitals for these services, and (2) the hospitals rigorously documented the services provided using funds from the Pool. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Azar, 926 F.3d 221 (2019), supported this conclusion. View "Bethesda Health, Inc. v. Azar" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review related to the boundaries of the corporate attorney-client privilege and how it operated when in conflict with a plaintiff’s physician-patient privilege. In 2015, Doug Hermanson sideswiped an unoccupied vehicle and crashed into a utility pole. Hermanson was transported to Tacoma General Hospital, which was owned by MultiCare Health System Inc. Hermanson was treated by several MultiCare employees, including two nurses and a crisis intervention social worker. However, the physician who treated Hermanson, Dr. Patterson, was an independent contractor of MultiCare pursuant to a signed agreement between MultiCare and Trauma Trust, his employer. Trauma Trust was created by MultiCare; Dr. Patterson had his own office at Tacoma General Hospital and was expected to abide by MultiCare’s policies and procedures. During Hermanson’s treatment, an unidentified person at Tacoma General Hospital conducted a blood test on Hermanson that showed a high blood alcohol level. As a result, someone reported this information to the police, and the police charged Hermanson with first degree negligent driving and hit and run of an unattended vehicle. Based on this disclosure of his blood alcohol results, Hermanson sued MultiCare and multiple unidentified parties for negligence, defamation/false light, false imprisonment, violation of Hermanson’s physician-patient privilege, and unauthorized disclosure of Hermanson's confidential health information. MultiCare retained counsel to jointly represent MultiCare, Dr. Patterson, and Trauma Trust, reasoning that while Dr. Patterson and Trauma Trust were not identified parties, Hermanson’s initial demand letter implicated both parties. Hermanson objected to this joint representation and argued that MultiCare’s ex parte communications with Dr. Patterson violated Hermanson’s physician-patient privilege. The Supreme Court determined that Dr. Patterson still maintained a principal-agent relationship with MultiCare, and served as the "functional equivalent" of a MultiCare employee; therefore MultiCare could have ex parte communications with the doctor. The nurse and social worker privilege were "essentially identical in purpose" to the physician-patient privilege, making ex parte communications permissible between MultiCare and the nurse and social worker. View "Hermanson v. Multicare Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the reappointment of S.A.'s conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and the trial court's order that she can be medicated against her will. The court held that substantial evidence showed that S.A. was gravely disabled where S.A. had schizophrenia and lacked insight about her mental illness, S.A. would not take medication without the support of a conservator, and S.A. cannot provide for herself without a conservatorship and without medication. The court also held that the involuntary medication order was proper because substantial evidence established S.A. was unable to make informed treatment decisions. View "Y.A. v. S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Terri Baker appealed the dismissal of this putative class action for lack of standing. She sued on behalf of herself and her son, S.F.B., to challenge Kansas laws and school district policies that: (1) required children to be vaccinated to attend school and participate in child care programs; and (2) provided a religious exemption from these requirements. She claimed these immunization laws and policies violated various federal and state constitutional provisions and statutes. Baker argued she and S.F.B. had standing because the immunization requirements and religious exemptions injured them in two ways: (1) the District misapplied Kansas law when it granted a religious exemption for S.F.B. to attend preschool despite being unvaccinated - her fear that the District would revoke S.F.B.'s religious exemption was an injury in fact that established standing; and (2) Baker "would like the option" of placing S.F.B. in a non-accredited private school (i.e., home school), school programs, or licensed child care - she contended Kansas law inhibited her from exercising these options and caused an injury in fact because she would be unable to secure a religious exemption for S.F.B. if she tried. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley" on Justia Law

A group of prisoners (“Petitioners”) sought a writ of habeas corpus based on the conditions of their confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Petitioners were all incarcerated at the Elmore County Jail (“Jail”), contending the conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the Petitioners claimed they were in imminent danger because officials at the Jail did not implement any discernable mitigation measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Elmore County Sheriff Mike Hollinshead and Lieutenant Shauna Gavin (collectively “Officials”) denied this assertion, contending that Petitioners’ request for a writ of habeas corpus should have been denied because the Petitioners did not exhaust their administrative remedies. The Officials filed a motion for summary judgment with the district court, which was granted. The district court also awarded the Officials their attorney fees. Petitioners timely appealed the district court’s decisions to the Idaho Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the appeal on an expedited basis. After that review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment, but reversed the district court’s award of attorney fees. View "Williams v. Hollinshead" on Justia Law