Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District Court of Appeals partially upholding a temporary injunction that prohibited enforcement of certain statutory provisions relating to the regulation of medical marijuana treatment centers, holding that Appellant had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of any of its constitutional claims.The temporary injunction at issue was entered during a pending lawsuit filed by Appellant. The lawsuit included constitutional challenges to Fla. Stat. 381.986(8), claiming that two provisions were inconsistent with the recent medical marijuana amendment to Fla. Const. art. X, 29. Appellant also argued that three provisions of section 381.986(8) were special laws granting privileges to private corporations. The trial court agreed as to every argument and entered a temporary injunction. The First District partially upheld the injunction. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that Appellant did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its challenges to section 381.986(8). View "Florida Department of Health v. Florigrown, LLC" on Justia Law

Kirby received a flu shot in her arm on October 8, 2013. One week later, she complained of persistent arm pain, numbness, and tingling that began immediately after the injection. On October 16, Dr. Henry diagnosed Kirby with radial neuritis and complications due to vaccination. Two weeks later, Kirby reported that her wrist and hand had become “very weak.” On November 12, Kirby began working with a physical therapist. Her physical therapy discharge summary reported that Kirby’s pain was a “0/10,” she had regained full muscle strength except in right thumb extension, and her numbness had decreased by 80%. On December 12, Kirby reported mild right arm pain in the morning, almost normal strength, and occasional tingling, but no numbness in her thumb. Dr. Henry determined she had achieved maximum medical improvement.Kirby visited a nurse practitioner five times in January 2014-July 2015, for reasons unrelated to her vaccine injury and generally reported “feeling fine.” On October 13, 2015, she complained of mild, intermittent pain in her right arm. She had no imitations due to the pain, and no muscle weakness.The Federal Circuit reinstated Kirby’s compensation award under the Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. 300aa–1. A finding that Kirby’s vaccine injury lasted more than six months was not arbitrary. A reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Kirby’s testimony is not inconsistent with her medical records from January 2014 through July 2015. The court also rejected an argument concerning causation. View "Kirby v. Secretary of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

J.B. appealed a district court order denying his petition for treatment in community placement. J.B. was committed to the North Dakota State Hospital as a sexually dangerous individual in September 2005. At the hearing, the State called Dr. Deirdre D’Orazio, who testified that J.B. remained a sexually dangerous individual and was not ready for community placement. J.B. called Dr. Stacey Benson, who also testified that J.B. remained a sexually dangerous individual but that he was ready for community placement. Based on his expert’s opinion, J.B. petitioned for community placement. The trial court found the State established clear and convincing evidence that J.B. remained a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. 25-03.3-01(8), and denied his petition for community placement, concluding that the statute was constitutional and that because the executive director did not petition for community placement, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider J.B.’s petition. On appeal, J.B. argued the district court erred in determining that N.D.C.C. 25-03.3-24 did not violate the separation of powers. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court order. View "Interest of J.B." on Justia Law

On March 13, 2020, North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum declared a state of emergency and activated the North Dakota State Emergency Operations Plan via Executive Order (“E.O.”) 2020-03. Governor Burgum’s declaration of a state emergency was in response to the public health crisis resulting from the novel coronavirus (“COVID-19”). On March 19, 2020, Governor Burgum issued E.O. 2020-06 which closed certain business establishments in North Dakota, limited physical access to other business establishments in North Dakota, directed state agencies and offices to regulate staffing, and limited access to the North Dakota State Capitol by appointment only. These restrictions were set to expire on April 6, 2020. On March 27, 2020, E.O. 2020-06 was amended as E.O. 2020-06.1 to include the closure of salons and ordering licensed cosmetologists to cease operations. Kari Riggin appealed a criminal judgment entered after she conditionally pled guilty to a violation of Executive Order 2020-06, an infraction. Riggin challenged the Governor’s authority to restrict her ability to engage in cosmetology services within an assisted living facility as part of the State’s response to a declared state of emergency. Finding the governor did not exceed the statutory authority delegated to him through N.D.C.C. ch. 37-17.1. Riggin failed to adequately support her challenge E.O. 2020-06 was unconstitutional because it restricted her right to conduct business, engage in employment, and failed to adequately support her contention the executive order and the criminal penalties imposed for a violation of an executive order were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Riggin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed as moot Plaintiffs' appeal arguing that the Department of Correction (DOC) illegally kept them in custody after a final decision on their petitions for medical parole had been made by the Commissioner of Correction but answered two questions reported by the single justice.Plaintiffs were two prisoners recently released under the medical parole statute. Before their actual release from incarceration, Plaintiffs sought relief from a single justice of the court. The single justice denied Plaintiffs' request for relief and separately reported two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court regarding the requirements of finding a replacement for a prisoner who is granted medical parole and the timing of a prisoner's release after medical parole is granted. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal as moot and answered (1) after medical parole is granted the DOC must develop comprehensive plans including a proposed course and site for treatment; and (2) once a favorable decision by the Commissioner allows release on medical parole, the DOC must be proactive in working to release the prisoner expeditiously. View "Malloy v. Department of Correction" on Justia Law

St. Luke’s Meridian Medical Center (St. Luke’s) provided inpatient hospital care for an indigent patient from January 26, 2016, until March 9, 2016. St. Luke’s sought payment from the Board by submitting a medical indigency application. In September 2016, the Board issued an initial determination, only approving payment from January 26 through February 2, 2016. St. Luke’s appealed the denial. The Board amended its determination by only partially extending payment approval through February 18, 2016. St. Luke’s petitioned for judicial review. In October 2017, the district court affirmed the Board’s decision. St. Luke’s appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court held that the Board’s findings did not provide a reasoned analysis, as required by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA). The case was remanded back to the Board for it to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the Board entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, again denying payment and finding that the services provided were not the most cost-effective services as required under the Idaho Medical Indigency Act. St. Luke’s again filed a petition for judicial review, and the district court again affirmed the Board’s decision. Once more, St. Luke’s timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the Board’s decision reflected a misinterpretation of the definition of “medically necessary services;” the Board’s decision was set aside and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "St. Luke's Health System v. Board of Commissioners of Gem County" on Justia Law

An indigent patient was admitted to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (St. Alphonsus) on October 7, 2017, and continued to receive treatment in the hospital until she was discharged on January 12, 2018. During her stay, St. Alphonsus filed a third-party medical indigency application on her behalf, and later filed two additional requests for payment of services. The Board of Ada County Commissioners (the Board) approved payment for dates of service from October 7 until October 10, 2017, but denied payments for services provided from October 11 until December 31, 2017, relying on the opinion of the Ada County Medical Advisor that the services provided on those dates were not “medically necessary” under the definition in Idaho Code section 31-3502(18)A(e). St. Alphonsus appealed the Board’s initial determination, but the final determination upheld the denial for payment beyond October 11. Upon St. Alphonsus’ petition, a district court reversed the Board’s decision, finding that the services “currently available” to a patient were to be considered as a “necessary medical service.” The Board argued “there did exist options for the Patient to proceed to rehabilitation at a facility other than St. Alphonsus, but for the Patient’s lack of funding.” Furthermore, the Board asserted that Idaho Code section 31-3502(18)A(e) is unambiguous in that “[t]here is no wording in [sub]section (e) of the statute that limits the ‘most cost-effective services’ to services that the Patient can afford to pay for.” After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the Board exceeded its statutory authority in denying St. Alphonsus reimbursement for providing medically necessary services. “The Board’s denial of payment was not based on substantial evidence and prejudiced St. Alphonsus’ substantial right to compensation for services rendered to an indigent patient.” View "St. Alphonsus Regional Medical v. Ada County" on Justia Law

In 2018, B.W. went to his primary car provider’s office for “anxiety” and “agitation.” The provider’s notes reflect B.W. discussed making “credible threats of violence against a co-worker.” The provider recommended inpatient treatment, “involuntary if necessary.” B.W. made no threats to the provider’s staff. The provider certified B.W. needed involuntary examination and treatment, and B.W. was transported to another hospital for such examination. The hospital evaluator noted B.W. was “homicidal toward a co-worker,” and was “severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment.” B.W. was involuntarily committed and released after 72 hours. Thereafter, B.W. petitioned to expunge his mental health record, averring there was no basis for the involuntary commitment. A trial court found it undisputed B.W. made threats to harm his co-worker. Though he made no “act in furtherance” of his threats, the court concluded the medical evaluators’ records reflecting B.W.’s statement he would “strangle his co-worker the next time he saw” that person, was sufficient to support B.W. was a clear and present danger to others. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the superior court erred in ordering the expungement of B.W.’s records on grounds that the trial court’s conclusion was wrong. The Supreme Court determined the records contained sufficient facts to prove B.W. made a threat to harm another person, and acted in furtherance of that threat, which the physicians found credible. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "In Re: B. W., Appeal of: Blair Dept Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a judge of the probate court denying Appellant's special motion to dismiss the amended objection of William Charles Hamm, a protected person, to a conservator's final account, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 59H, did not apply in this circumstance.The conservator filed accounts for each of the seventeen years for which she and her husband were conservators for their son, the protected person in this case. The protected person filed an objection and amended objection to the final accountings. The conservator objected with two motions to dismiss, including the anti-SLAPP motion at issue on appeal. The probate court judge denied both motions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply in the circumstances of this case. View "In re Hamm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' petitions to change their legal sex designations because the designations did not reflect their identities, holding that Appellants met the requirements for their sex-change petitions to be approved.Under Utah Code 26-2-11(1), a person who has a name change or sex change approved by an order of a Utah district court can file the order with the state registrar with an application to change their birth certificate, and if the registrar determines that the application is complete, the registrar must change the sex on the person's birth certificate. In denying Appellants' sex-change petitions the district court concluded that a sex-change matter is a nonjusticiable political question due to lack of legislative guidance. The Supreme Court reversed after providing a plain meaning interpretation of the law allowing individuals to change their sex designations, holding that Appellants met the requirements articulated by this Court - based in common law and applied by district courts - for their sex-change petitions to be approved. View "In re Sex Change of Childers-Gray" on Justia Law