Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

After a Tessier's employee was modifying a hole cover on the roof of an unfinished building when the cover collapsed and he fell 22 feet to the floor below, OSHA issued a citation against Tessier's under 29 C.F.R. 1926.501(b)(4)(i), for failing to protect its employees from falling through holes.The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Tessier's, concluding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that the employees had removed a one-foot-by-three-foot section of the cover before it collapsed and, in doing so, exposed a hole. Because this hole was not covered and was more than six feet above the second floor, Tessier's was required to protect its employees from falling by means of an alternative form of fall protection, which it had not done. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in concluding that Tessier's had committed the violation. View "Tessier's, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Antonia Nyman was renting a backyard cottage to Dan Hanley when the COVID-19 pandemic began. She sought to evict Hanley and gave him 60 days’ notice of her intention to move into the unit herself. Due to this unprecedented pandemic, Washington Governor Jay Inslee temporarily halted most evictions, but not for landlords seeking to occupy the unit personally. A federal eviction moratorium imposed by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also temporarily halted some evictions, but not for tenants who have violated a contractual obligation (with certain specified exceptions). The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether Hanley violated a contractual obligation by holding over in his unit after his lease expired by its terms. Based on undisputed facts before us, the Court held that he did. "While the CDC order may be more protective than Washington’s eviction proclamation in some instances, it does not apply here. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court and lift the stay of the writ of restitution." View "Nyman v. Hanley" on Justia Law

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme for tobacco products, defined as “any product made or derived from tobacco that is intended for human consumption, including any component, part, or accessory of a tobacco product,” 21 U.S.C. 321(rr)(1). The 2016 FDA "Deeming Rule" deemed all products that meet the Act’s definition of “tobacco product,” including any “component” and “part” but excluding any “accessory” of those products, to be subject to the Act. Premarket review by FDA was required before the introduction into interstate commerce of any “new tobacco product.” FDA adopted “staggered compliance periods” for premarket review requirements of newly deemed products that were being marketed as of the Rule’s effective date. FDA also promulgated a separate rule addressing the assessment of user fees for manufacturers and importers of cigars and pipe tobacco.The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of FDA on five Administrative Procedure Act challenges to the Deeming Rule concerning its implementation of the premarket review requirements, underlying cost-benefit analysis, and classification of a pipe as a “component or part” of a tobacco product subject to regulation, and an APA challenge to the User Fees Rule. View "Cigar Association of America v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether, under the facts of this case, plaintiff Leah Coleman, the victim of a violent assault by social worker Sonia Martinez’s patient, could bring a negligence claim against Martinez. Martinez’s patient, T.E., suffered two violent episodes prior to her treatment with Martinez. Coleman worked for the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) and was tasked with ensuring the welfare of T.E.’s children when the children were removed from T.E.'s care after her hospitalization following her second violent incident. In a letter to Coleman dated October 1, 2014, Martinez stated that T.E. had been compliant during her sessions and with her medication and was ready and able to begin having unsupervised visits with her children with the goal of reunification. At her deposition, Martinez acknowledged the inaccuracy of representing that T.E. did not exhibit psychotic symptoms in light of what she and the group counselor had seen. During a November 7 appointment, Martinez disclosed to T.E. Coleman’s report of T.E.’s hallucinations. T.E. “became upset” and “tearful,” denied any psychotic symptoms, and reiterated her goal of regaining custody of her children. Later that day, T.E. called DCPP and spoke with Coleman. During their conversation, T.E. referenced her session with Martinez, denied that she was experiencing auditory hallucinations, and stated she did not understand why such a claim would be fabricated. Coleman advised T.E. to seek advice from an attorney as DCPP would “maintain that she [was] not capable of parenting independently due to her mental health issues.” Six days later, T.E. made an unscheduled visit to DCPP offices, where she stabbed Coleman twenty-two times in the face, chest, arms, shoulders, and back. Coleman filed a complaint against Martinez, alleging that Martinez was negligent in identifying her to T.E. as the source of information about T.E.’s hallucinations, and that T.E.’s attack was a direct and proximate result of Martinez’s negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Martinez, finding no legal duty owed to Coleman under the particularized foreseeability standard set forth in J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330 (1998). The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Martinez had a duty to Coleman under the circumstances here. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Coleman v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Agendia in an action alleging that the HHS wrongfully denied its claims for reimbursement for diagnostic tests under the Medicare health insurance program. Agendia contends that the denial was improper because the local coverage determination was issued without notice and opportunity for comment in violation of a provision of the Medicare Act—specifically, 42 U.S.C. 1395hh.The panel held that section 1395hh's notice-and-comment requirement does not apply to local coverage determinations, and that the district court erred in interpreting the statute otherwise. The panel rejected Agendia's alternative argument that the Medicare Act and its implementing regulations have unconstitutionally delegated regulatory authority to Medicare contractors by permitting them to issue local coverage determinations. The panel held that, because those contractors act subordinately to the HHS officials implementing Medicare, there is no unconstitutional delegation. View "Agendia, Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Allstate Insurance Company et al. (Allstate) filed a complaint on behalf of itself and the People of California (qui tam) against Dr. Sonny Rubin and related medical providers (Rubin). Allstate generally alleged Rubin prepared fraudulent patient medical reports and billing statements in support of insurance claims. Rubin filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the preparation and submission of its medical reports and bills were protected litigation activities. The trial court denied Rubin’s motion. "Litigation is not 'under [serious] consideration' - and thereby protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute - if the ligation is merely a 'possibility.'" The Court of Appeal found that Rubin failed to show its medical reports and bills were prepared outside of its usual course of business in anticipation of litigation that was “under [serious] consideration.” Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Rubin’s anti-SLAPP motion. View "California ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rubin" on Justia Law

Medical Recovery Services, LLC, (MRS) sued Michael Eddins to collect on debts that had purportedly been assigned to MRS by Intermountain Emergency Physicians and Intermountain Anesthesia. After a bench trial, the magistrate court dismissed MRS’s complaint, holding MRS lacked standing because it failed to prove a valid assignment occurred. MRS appealed to the district court. That court reversed, holding the magistrate court erred in limiting the admission of two exhibits that MRS relied upon to establish that Eddins’ accounts had been validly assigned to it. Alternatively, the district court held Eddins was judicially estopped from raising the assignment issue at trial because he did not raise it earlier during the litigation. Eddins timely appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. After review, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision on the magistrate court’s abuse of discretion in limiting the admission of "Exhibit 2." The Court likewise affirmed the district court’s conclusion about an agent of MRS and its standing for the purposes of prosecuting this case. The Court reversed as to all other issues and remanded for further proceedings. View "Medical Recovery Svcs v. Eddins" on Justia Law

Educational Center treats patients with severe mental disabilities, some of whom suffer from severe self-injurious and aggressive behaviors that are difficult or impossible to treat using conventional behavioral and pharmacological techniques. Some patients have suffered brain trauma, broken and protruding bones, and blindness as a result of their behaviors. Before the ban, the Center treated some self-injurious and aggressive patients with an electrical stimulation device called a graduated electronic decelerator, which briefly shocks patients causing them to reduce or cease their self-injurious behaviors. The Center is the only facility in the country that uses electric shock therapy to treat individuals who severely self-injure or are aggressive. Other health care practitioners administer electrical stimulation devices to treat a wide variety of other conditions, including tobacco, alcohol, and drug addictions, as well as inappropriate sexual behaviors following traumatic brain injuries. The Center manufactures its own devices, which are regulated by the FDA, 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(1)(B).In 2020, the FDA determined that the devices presented a substantial and unreasonable risk to self-injurious and aggressive patients and banned the devices for that purpose. The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule. Banning a medical device for a particular purpose regulates the practice of medicine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 396. View "The Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Carolyn Bowen sued Cottage Grove Nursing Home for wrongful death and medical negligence on behalf of her husband, Guy Bowen. Guy Bowen had been a resident of Cottage Grove since June 2016. In May 2017, Guy was diagnosed with prostate cancer that had metastasized into his organs and bones. In October 2017, Guy fell in the shower at Cottage Grove and sustained multiple fractures. The attending radiologist noted that the fractures were likely pathologic. Guy was transferred to a rehabilitation facility and then to Pleasant Hill Nursing Home. Guy did not return to Cottage Grove. On March 18, 2018, Guy presented to the emergency department at UMMC with various pain. A CT scan showed diffuse metastatic disease through his liver and widespread osseous disease in his bones. Guy died five days later. Carolyn in her suit, Carolyn claimed that Guy’s fall at Cottage Grove, in which he sustained multiple fractures, was the cause of Guy’s death five months later. Cottage Grove filed a summary-judgment motion for Carolyn’s failure to produce medical-expert testimony. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the trial court erred by denying Cottage Grove’s summary-judgment motion. "Cottage Grove met its summary-judgment burden by showing that Carolyn had failed to produce sworn expert testimony establishing a prima facie case of medical negligence." View "Cottage Grove Nursing Home, L.P. v. Bowen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying a guardianship petition, holding that the petition did not demonstrate that the proposed protected person was incapacitated.Appellant filed a petition for appointment of temporary guardian and to establish a general permanent guardianship over his mother, Respondent, and her estate. The district court denied the petition without prejudice, finding that, under Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.044(2)(i), a guardianship over an adult proposed protected person cannot be granted without a physician's certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) a certificate from a physician or a qualified individual demonstrating need for a guardianship is required for the district court to consider a petition for adult guardianship, but the certificate need not be based on an in-person examination of the proposed protected person; (2) whether the petition and certificate warrant the need for a guardianship or further proceedings is within the district court's discretion; and (3) the district court did not err in dismissing the guardianship petition because the petition did not demonstrate that Appellant's mother was incapacitated. View "In re Guardianship of Rubin" on Justia Law