Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of a regulation promulgated by Maine's Center for Disease Control requiring all workers in licensed healthcare facilities to be vaccinated against COVID-19, holding that the district court did not err.Under Maine law, a healthcare worker may claim an exemption from the vaccination requirement only if a medical practitioner certifies that vaccination "may be medically inadvisable." Appellants - several Maine healthcare workers and a healthcare provider - brought this action alleging that the vaccination requirement violated their rights under 42 U.S.C. 1985 and the Free Exercise Clause, Supremacy Clause, and Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court denied Appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Appellants were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. View "Does v. Mills" on Justia Law

Gray received emergency medical care at St. Mary Medical Center, owned and operated by Dignity Health. He received a bill that included an “ ‘ER LEVEL 2 W/PROCEDU’ ” charge. Gray claims Dignity’s failure to disclose, before providing emergency medical treatment, that its bill for emergency services would include such a charge—either by posting “signage in and around” the emergency department or “verbally during the patients’ registration process” —is an unfair business practice under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and unlawful under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Gray does not claim that by including an ER Charge in its billing, Dignity violated any of the extensive state and federal statutory and regulatory laws governing the disclosure of hospital billing information and the treatment of persons presenting for treatment at an emergency department. Nor does he take issue with the hospital’s “chargemaster” amount for the Level 2 ER Charge, which his medical insurance largely covered. View "Gray v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Owsley. a nurse for Care Connection, a company providing home healthcare to Medicare patients, alleged that she observed, firsthand, documents showing that her employer had used fraudulent data from Fazzi to submit inflated claims for payment to the federal and Indiana state governments. She sued both companies under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), (G), and an Indiana statute.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Owsley’s complaint provided few details that would allow the defendants to identify any specific claims—of the hundreds or likely thousands they presumably submitted—that she thinks were fraudulent, and did not meet the requirements of Civil Rule 9(b). While Owsley’s allegations describe, in detail, a fraudulent scheme: Fazzi fraudulently upcoded patient data, which Care then used to submit inflated requests for anticipated Medicare payments, that information does not amount to an allegation of “particular identified claims” submitted pursuant to the fraudulent scheme. View "Owsley v. Fazzi Associates., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court involuntarily committing Respondent to the Montana State Hospital, holding that the waiver of Respondent's presence at the initial hearing on the State's petition was invalid.The Flathead County Attorney filed a petition for involuntary commitment, and the district court convened an initial appearance. Respondent, who suffered from vascular dementia and was hard of hearing, was not present in court, and his counsel asked to waive his presence at the initial hearing. The district court agreed to waive the initial appearance. After a hearing, the court found that Respondent suffered from a mental disorder and required commitment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not meet the statutory standards when it accepted counsel's waiver of Respondent's presence; and (2) the error prejudiced Respondent's substantial rights and compromised the integrity of the judicial process required in commitment proceedings. View "In re F.S." on Justia Law

The Association of American Physicians & Surgeons (AAPS), is a nonprofit organization of physicians and surgeons. The American Board of Medical Specialties, a nonprofit provider of medical certification services, is an umbrella organization for 24 member boards, each dedicated to a particular medical practice area. The Board deems physicians who meet its requirements to be “Board-certified.” To remain certified, physicians must comply with the Board’s Maintenance of Certification (MOC) program and continuing education requirements. All states permit physicians who are not Board-certified to practice medicine.According to AAPS, the Board conspired with its member boards, hospitals, and health insurers to condition the granting of staff privileges and in-network status on physicians’ continued participation in the MOC program so that physicians find themselves forced to participate in the program to practice medicine, at least if they wish to do so in hospitals or to accept certain forms of insurance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of its suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act and claiming negligent misrepresentation on the Board’s website to “create the false impression that [the MOC program] is indicative of the medical skills of physicians.” The complaint does not plausibly allege an agreement between the Board, hospitals, and insurers. Mere legal conclusions are “not entitled to be assumed true.” View "Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. American Board of Medical Specialties" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Adam Hemmelgarn moved for compassionate release, based on an outbreak of COVID-19 at FCI Lompoc. The district court denied his motion, as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding Hemmelgarn had not established extraordinary and compelling reasons in support of a sentence reduction because of his health conditions or the risk of exposure to COVID-19. View "United States v. Hemmelgarn" on Justia Law

Western Michigan University, a public university, requires student-athletes to be vaccinated against COVID-19 but considers individual requests for medical and religious exemptions on a discretionary basis. Sixteen student-athletes applied for religious exemptions. The University ignored or denied their requests and barred them from participating in any team activities. The student-athletes sued, alleging that University officials violated their free exercise rights.The district court preliminarily enjoined the officials from enforcing the vaccine mandate against the plaintiffs. The Sixth Circuit declined to stay the injunction and proceedings in the district court pending appeal. The court called the issue “a close call” but concluded the free exercise challenge will likely succeed on appeal. The University’s vaccine mandate does not coerce a non-athlete to get vaccinated against her faith because she, as a non-athlete, cannot play intercollegiate sports either way. The mandate does penalize a student otherwise qualified for intercollegiate sports by withholding the benefit of playing on the team should she refuse to violate her sincerely held religious beliefs. The court applied strict scrutiny and reasoned that the University did not establish a compelling interest in denying an exception to the plaintiffs or that its conduct was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. View "Dahl v. Board of Trustees of Western Michigan University" on Justia Law

In the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic, petitioner Robert Williams filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) arguing that the conditions of his confinement constituted cruel punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutions. While confined in Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities, Williams asked the Washington Supreme Court to order his sentence be served in home confinement at his sister’s home in Florida until COVID-19 no longer posed a threat to him. The Supreme Court issued an order recognizing that article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution was more protective than the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution regarding conditions of confinement and that Williams’s then current conditions of confinement were cruel under the state constitution: specifically, the lack of reasonable access to bathroom facilities and running water, as well as DOC’s failure to provide Williams with appropriate assistance in light of his physical disabilities. The Court granted Williams’s PRP and directed DOC to remedy those conditions or to release Williams. DOC later reported that it had complied with this court’s order and had placed Williams in a housing unit designed for assisted living care. Williams was relocated to a single cell with no roommates and a toilet and sink, and was given access to Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant restrooms and a readily available medical staff, an assigned wheelchair pusher/therapy aide, and an emergency pendant allowing him to call for assistance. To this, the Supreme Court concluded these actions remedied the unconstitutional conditions and declined to order Williams’s release. By this opinion, the Supreme Court explained its reasoning underlying its grant of Williams' PRP. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order issued by the district court concerning the conservatorship and estate planning efforts of Appellant's elderly mother, H.D.K., holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it declined to issue a scheduling order; (2) did not abuse its discretion in declining to quash a subpoena for the file of H.D.K.'s attorney; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it concluded the conservatorship hearing after three days; (4) did not err when it issued findings regarding how H.D.K. intended to allocate her estate; (5) did not err by determining the present values of the properties in H.D.K.'s estate; and (6) did not err when it found H.D.K. had testamentary capacity. View "In re H.D.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court recommitting B.A.F. to the Montana Mental Health Nursing Care Center (MMHNCC) for a period of one year, holding that the district court did not err.In 2016, B.A.F., who had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder, was involuntarily committed to the MMHNCC for his mental illness. The district court extended B.A.F.'s initial commitment period by one year each in 2017, 2018, and 2019. In this case, B.A.F. appealed the district court's 2019 order for recommitment, arguing that the court erred when it recommitted him without a post-petition mental health evaluation by a court-appointed professional, as statutorily required. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that B.A.F. failed to establish that the district court's error resulted in substantial prejudice, and therefore, B.A.F. did not meet the second prong of plain-error review. View "In re B.A.F." on Justia Law