Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Elaine Neidig, individually and on behalf of a class, sued Valley Health System, a health care provider, for unfair and deceptive practices, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. Neidig had received three mammograms at Valley Health's Winchester Medical Center between March 2016 and June 2019. In July 2019, federal inspectors found that the center's staff were not correctly positioning or compressing women's breasts during mammograms, leading to serious image quality deficiencies. Valley Health then had to alert all at-risk patients, including Neidig, of the mammography quality problems. Neidig, who did not allege any physical or emotional harm resulting from the low-quality mammograms, sued Valley Health in August 2022. Valley Health moved to dismiss the case on the basis that it was filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations provided by the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia agreed with Valley Health and dismissed Neidig's claims as untimely. Neidig appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the case presented a novel issue of state law that needed to be addressed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The issue was whether a plaintiff's claims can fall under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act if the plaintiff does not claim any form of physical or emotional injury. The Fourth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia for resolution. View "Neidig v. Valley Health System" on Justia Law

The defendant, Rodriquies Evans, was convicted of four criminal offenses related to his involvement in a multistate conspiracy to transport and distribute methamphetamine and other controlled substances. The district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 80 years in prison. The Fourth Circuit United States Court of Appeals found that the district court had erred in calculating Evans’s Sentencing Guidelines range and vacated his sentence, remanding the case for resentencing. The court determined that the district court had incorrectly attributed nearly three kilograms of crystal methamphetamine seized from a co-conspirator to Evans. The court held that for sentencing purposes under the Sentencing Guidelines, only acts that fall within the scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake can be considered relevant conduct. The district court had attributed the drugs based on the broader standard of substantive liability under Pinkerton, which allows a defendant to be held liable for the acts of co-conspirators if they are within the scope of the overall conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. The court also found that the district court had erred in applying a threat enhancement in calculating Evans's Sentencing Guidelines range, as the possession of a firearm enhancement could not by itself be the basis for a threat enhancement. View "US v. Evans" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff, Daniella Easterbrook, appealed the denial of her application for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. Easterbrook, who has suffered from persistent back pain since 2011, argued that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) failed to provide a "good reason," supported by substantial evidence, for not giving adequate weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. John Kim.The court agreed with Easterbrook, stating that the ALJ erred in not applying the "treating source rule" to Dr. Kim's opinions and not providing a sufficient justification for giving his opinions less weight. The court noted that Dr. Kim's opinions were well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and were consistent with the substantial evidence in the record.The court also found that the ALJ's reasons for discounting Dr. Kim's opinions, such as Easterbrook's decision not to undergo certain treatments, were inappropriate and did not constitute "good reasons." The court stated that a patient's refusal to pursue a specific type of medical treatment does not automatically call into question the severity of her pain.As a result, the court reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case for a determination consistent with its opinion. View "Easterbrook v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The Montgomery County Board of Education adopted Guidelines for Gender Identity for 2020–2021 that permit schools to develop gender support plans for students. The Guidelines allow implementation of these plans without the knowledge or consent of the students’ parents. They even authorize the schools to withhold information about the plans from parents if the school deems the parents to be unsupportive. In response, three parents with children attending Montgomery County public schools challenged the portion of the Guidelines that permit school officials to develop gender support plans and then withhold information about a child’s gender support plan from their parents. Terming it the “Parental Preclusion Policy,” the parents alleged the policy unconstitutionally usurps the parents’ fundamental right to raise their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for the case to be dismissed. The court explained that the parents have not alleged that their children have gender support plans, are transgender or are even struggling with issues of gender identity. As a result, they have not alleged facts that the Montgomery County public schools have any information about their children that is currently being withheld or that there is a substantial risk information will be withheld in the future. Thus, under the Constitution, they have not alleged the type of injury required to show standing. Absent an injury that creates standing, federal courts lack the power to address the parents’ objections to the Guidelines. Thus, the court remanded to the district court to dismiss the case for lack of standing. View "John and Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Board of Education" on Justia Law

CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSXT”) issued furlough notices to employees at its facility in Huntington, West Virginia. Shortly thereafter, over 65 employees submitted forms requesting to take medical leave based on claimed minor soft-tissue injuries sustained while off duty. The forms were similar in content; all were signed by one of two chiropractors; and all called for medical leave of eight weeks or more.Under CSXT’s benefit plans, if an employee were furloughed while on medical leave, the employee would receive health and welfare benefits for up to two years. Otherwise, a furloughed employee would receive such benefits for only four months. Suspecting benefits fraud, CSXT charged the employees with violating its workplace rule against dishonesty and, following hearings, terminated their employment.Plaintiffs, a group of 58 terminated employees, claimed violations of their rights under federal and state law, including violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the West Virginia Human Rights Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”). The district court granted summary judgment to CSXT on all claims and Plaintiffs appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Employer's belief that Plaintiff employees committed benefits fraud was a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs couldn't prove pretext or retaliation. View "Justin Adkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the 2021 opinion of the district court affirming the final decision of Defendant Kijakazi, as the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, which denied Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits.   The Fourth Circuit, without resolving the merits, vacated the judgment of the district court and directed a remand to the Commissioner for a new and plenary hearing on Plaintiff’s disability benefits claim, to be conducted before a different and properly appointed administrative law judge (ALJ). The court agreed with Plaintiff’s appellate contention that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), the (“ALJ Bright”) who rendered the Commissioner’s final decision did so in contravention of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.   The court explained that the Supreme Court made clear that if an ALJ makes a ruling absent a proper constitutional appointment, and if the claimant interposes a timely Appointments Clause challenge, the appropriate remedy is for the claim to be reheard before a new decisionmaker. Plaintiff did not receive that remedy. The Appointments Clause violation as to Plaintiff was thus not cured, and the 2019 ALJ Decision was likewise rendered in contravention of that Clause. View "Camille Brooks v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order affirming the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her application for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”). In her application, she alleged major depressive disorder (“MDD”), anxiety disorder, and attention deficit disorder (“ADHD”). Following a formal hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that Plaintiff suffered from severe depression with suicidal ideations, anxiety features and ADHD, but he nonetheless denied her claim based on his finding that she could perform other simple, routine jobs and was, therefore, not disabled. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) according to only little weight to the opinion of her long-time treating psychiatrist (“Dr. B”) and (2) disregarding her subjective complaints based on their alleged inconsistency with the objective medical evidence in the record.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant disability benefits. The court agreed with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to sufficiently consider the requisite factors and record evidence by extending little weight to Dr. B’s opinion. The ALJ also erred by improperly disregarding Plaintiff’s subjective statements. Finally, the court found that the ALJ’s analysis did not account for the unique nature of the relevant mental health impairments, specifically chronic depression. The court explained that because substantial evidence in the record clearly establishes Plaintiff’s disability, remanding for a rehearing would only “delay justice.” View "Shelley C. v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lancaster Hospital Corporation (Lancaster) operates an inpatient rehabilitation facility that provides services for Medicare beneficiaries. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) denied Plaintiff’s request for reimbursement because the provider failed to submit information in a form that could be audited. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Lancaster asserts that—even if some reductions were warranted—the Board erred by denying its entire 1997 reimbursement request. There appears no doubt Lancaster provided services to Medicare beneficiaries in 1997, and denying all reimbursement for that year may seem harsh. But the principle that people “must turn square corners when they deal with the Government” “has its greatest force when a private party seeks to spend the Government’s money.” However, the court explained that under Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., “As a participant in the Medicare program,” Lancaster “had a duty to familiarize itself with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement,” including the need to provide cost data in a form “capable of being audited.” Thus, the Board’s decision to deny reimbursement for the fiscal year 1997 was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. View "Lancaster Hospital Corporation v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

The North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association (“Appellant”) to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) sought an advisory opinion about whether Appellant is required to reimburse Medicare for certain medical bills that Medicare pays on behalf of insured individuals. CMS declined to issue the requested opinion. Dissatisfied with this response, Appellant filed this action against Alex M. Azar, II, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), HHS, and CMS (collectively, “Appellees”).   In this appeal, Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that Appellant lacked standing to bring this action because it failed to plausibly allege that it suffered an injury-in-fact. Additionally, Appellant challenges the district court’s conclusion that it did not possess jurisdiction over the action because Appellant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s complaint. The court concluded that the district court properly determined that it did not have jurisdiction over this case because 42 U.S.C. Section 405(h) precludes federal question jurisdiction for claims against the United States or its agents if such claims arise under the Medicare Act. The court further wrote that the existence of the administrative appeal is fatal to Appellant’s claim that it is completely precluded from seeking review of its argument that it is not a primary plan through the administrative process. Additionally, the court agreed with the district court that the ordinary exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are inapplicable here, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Illinois Council. View "North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Genesis Healthcare was a healthcare provider participating in the federal “340B Program,” which was designed to provide drugs to qualified persons at discounted prices. Under the Program, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) enters into agreements with drug manufacturers to sell drugs at discounted prices to entities such as Genesis Healthcare, which could, in turn, sell the drugs to their patients at discounted prices. After Genesis Healthcare purchased the covered drugs from the manufacturers, it dispensed them to patients through its wholly owned pharmacies or contract pharmacies. After the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”) conducted an audit of Genesis Healthcare in June 2017 for Program compliance, HRSA removed Genesis Healthcare from the 340B Program. The audit report found, among other things, that Genesis Healthcare dispensed 340B drugs to individuals who were ineligible because they were not “patients” of Genesis Healthcare. HRSA rejected Genesis Healthcare’s challenges; Genesis Healthcare, in turn, filed suit seeking a declaration it did not violate the requirements of the Program, and injunctive relief requiring HRSA to reinstate it into the Program and to retract any notifications that HRSA had provided to manufacturers stating that Genesis Healthcare was ineligible under the Program. In response to the lawsuit, HRSA ultimately: (1) notified Genesis Healthcare by letter that it “ha[d] voided” all audit findings and that Genesis Healthcare “ha[d] no further obligations or responsibilities in regard to the audit” and (2) filed a motion to dismiss Genesis Healthcare’s action as moot based on the letter. The district court granted HRSA’s motion, finding that the action was moot. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's finding the case was moot: Genesis Healthcare continued to be governed by a definition of “patient” that, Genesis maintained, was illegal and harmful to it. Therefore, there remained a live controversy between the parties. View "Genesis HealthCare, Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law