Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Catherine Brennan, after being prescribed psychotropic medications due to a stressful job transition, began to experience symptoms of akathisia, a neuropsychiatric syndrome associated with psychomotor restlessness often seen in individuals using antipsychotic medications. Despite having no prior history of mental illness, Brennan was treated by multiple providers and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression, and generalized anxiety disorder between 2015 and 2018. In 2019, Brennan was committed due to displaying signs of mental health decompensation. She was diagnosed with bipolar disorder involving current manic episodes with psychotic features, suicidal ideations, and medication noncompliance. Brennan was committed for a period of six months. After this commitment, she commenced a federal action alleging wrongful commitment and unlawful forced medication, arguing that her symptoms were side effects of the prescribed medications and were mistaken for psychosis and mania.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, upheld the district court's dismissal of Brennan's claims. The court held that Brennan could not proceed with her wrongful commitment claim because her commitment order was still valid, as per the precedent set in Heck v. Humphrey and Thomas v. Eschen. Regarding Brennan's claim of forcible administration of neuroleptic medications, the court found that Brennan failed to show deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. The court noted that deliberate indifference is more than negligence and requires a plaintiff to show that an objectively serious medical need was knowingly disregarded by the defendants. The court ruled that Brennan did not adequately plead deliberate indifference as she failed to identify how her care exceeded gross negligence or demonstrate when the defendants knew or should have known that her psychiatric problems were the result of akathisia and not mental illness. The court thus affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Brennan's claims. View "Brennan v. Cass County Health" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Kaycee Heard, appealed his 180-month sentence for involvement in a drug-trafficking conspiracy that transported oxycodone and fentanyl pills from Michigan to North Dakota for distribution. Heard pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, and his sentence exceeded his Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. Heard's appeal centered around three key claims: the district court miscalculated his criminal history score, wrongly applied a Guidelines enhancement for his role in the conspiracy, and issued an unreasonable sentence.The Court of Appeals rejected all three of Heard's claims. First, the court found that the district court was correct to assess a criminal history point for a two-year probation term Heard served under Michigan’s Holmes Youthful Trainee Act. Despite Heard's argument that this sentence should not have counted towards his criminal history score as no conviction was entered and the underlying charges were dismissed, the Appeals Court ruled that Heard's admission of guilt by pleading guilty meant the probation term was correctly counted as a "prior sentence".Second, the Appeals Court upheld the district court's application of a three-level enhancement for Heard's role in the conspiracy, finding that Heard had exhibited sufficient managerial or supervisory authority to warrant this enhancement. The court pointed to evidence that Heard had recruited co-conspirators, used a co-conspirator’s apartment as a stash house, directed a co-conspirator to travel to get pills for distribution, and received proceeds from the pills’ sale.Finally, the court found Heard's sentence to be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court had varied up from the Guidelines range based on Heard's conduct in pretrial detention, including his participation in a prison riot and assaults on two inmates. The Appeals Court found no clear error in the district court's determination that Heard had participated in the riot, and concluded that the 180-month sentence was within the realm of reasonableness given Heard's drug trafficking and pretrial detention misconduct. The court also rejected Heard's claim that his sentence created unwarranted disparities with his co-conspirators, stating that the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities refers to national disparities, not differences among co-conspirators. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Heard" on Justia Law

In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Linda Riaski, who was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, appealed the denial of her request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware. The case involves a search warrant that was issued based on an affidavit prepared by Deputy Sheriff Jerry Brisky, who relied on information provided by a confidential informant (CI). The CI claimed to have observed Riaski packaging methamphetamine for distribution and to have seen Riaski with a black 9 millimeter handgun. The search of Riaski's residence resulted in the discovery of methamphetamine and firearms.Riaski's appeal was based on the argument that the district court erred in denying her request for a Franks hearing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. She claimed that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was misleading because it omitted information about the CI’s credibility, her criminal history, her drug use, the financial arrangement between her and Deputy Brisky, and certain facts alleged in Riaski’s own affidavit.The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Riaski failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that Deputy Brisky intentionally or recklessly omitted facts with the intent to mislead the issuing judge, and that the affidavit, even if supplemented by the omitted information, could still support a finding of probable cause. The court reasoned that the omitted information about the CI's criminal history and drug use would not have altered the probable cause determination, as the affidavit had already provided a basis for the CI’s reliability, disclosing that she previously had provided accurate information and had made controlled purchases under Brisky’s supervision. The court also found that the omission of the details and existence of the agreement between Brisky and the CI did not render the affidavit misleading. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Riaski" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs, a group of patients, sued BJC Health System (BJC) alleging that BJC had violated their medical privacy rights under Missouri state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that when they accessed their electronic health records (EHRs) through BJC’s online patient portal, their protected health information was shared with third-party marketing services. BJC removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that they acted under the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) when creating and operating the online patient portal. BJC's argument was rejected by the district court which ordered the case to be remanded back to Missouri state court. BJC appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court to remand the case to the Missouri state court. The appellate court held that BJC, while receiving federal incentive payments from HHS for creating and operating the online patient portal, was not essentially performing a basic governmental task or duty. Therefore, BJC was not acting under a federal officer in terms of the federal officer removal statute. The court concluded that the creation and operation of an online patient portal was not a basic governmental task, and BJC was not a government contractor or functioning as a federal instrumentality. View "Doe v. BJC Health System" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Bradley Ready, appealed his sentence following his guilty plea for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance. The court affirmed the district court's decision.During a search of Ready's residence, law enforcement officers found drug paraphernalia, scales, a loaded hunting rifle, and three bags of methamphetamine. Ready was subsequently charged and pleaded guilty to both counts. At sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office recommended grouping the drug and gun counts together and applying a two-level enhancement due to the possession of a dangerous weapon. Ready objected to this enhancement, but the district court overruled this objection.On appeal, Ready argued that the district court erred in applying the enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon and applied the wrong standard in determining his eligibility for safety valve relief. The appellate court found no error in the district court's conclusions.The appellate court held that the district court did not err in applying the enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, as it was not "clearly improbable" that the rifle found in Ready's bedroom was connected to the distribution of methamphetamine from his home. The court also held that the district court did not err in its application of the standard for determining Ready's eligibility for safety valve relief. Therefore, the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Ready" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit evaluated a decision by the Western District Court of Missouri, which had denied Robin M. Sims's motion for compassionate release from prison under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In 2015, Sims was convicted of drug trafficking and firearm offenses and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. In 2022, he filed a motion for compassionate release, citing changes to the Armed Career Criminal Act since his sentencing and his medical conditions as extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction in sentence. The district court denied the motion, stating that Sims's arguments did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction.The Court of Appeals found that the district court had misunderstood Sims's arguments and the government's position. Instead of arguing for compassionate release due to an increased risk of contracting COVID-19, Sims had argued that he had contracted COVID-19 in custody, was experiencing ongoing medical complications, and was receiving inadequate medical care. The government had conceded that Sims had established "extraordinary and compelling" reasons under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), but the district court mistakenly stated that the government had opposed Sims's motion on the basis that he had failed to do so.The Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court, instructing it to consider the full scope of Sims's argument in support of "extraordinary and compelling" reasons, and if such reasons were found, to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in light of these reasons. The court emphasized the need for an individualized inquiry in motions for compassionate release. View "United States v. Sims" on Justia Law

Facing a tight deadline from the Ninth Circuit, the Environmental Protection Agency banned the use of chlorpyrifos on food crops. Two environmental groups petitioned the EPA in 2007 to have all tolerances revoked. In denying the petition, the EPA concluded that their objections were “not supported by valid, complete, and reliable evidence.”   The Eighth Circuit granted the petitions, finding that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court explained that in this case, the EPA believed it lacked discretion or at least acted that way. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion had already narrowed its options down to two: revoke the tolerances or modify them. With little time to act, the agency ruled out the second option, leaving only revocation by default. In doing so, however, it misread the statute and misunderstood the “scope of its discretion”. Therefore, the court set aside the decision as arbitrary and capricious. Further, the court explained that a partial ban was a real alternative for the EPA. It could have canceled some registrations and retained others that satisfied the statutory safety margin. View "RRVSG Assoc. v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

Defendant ended up at a Twin Cities chiropractic clinic after an automobile accident. The visit resulted in a job: the clinic hired him to recruit patients. And then another one did too. Defendant’s role was to bring in as many accident victims as possible. Each new patient could undergo treatment up to $20,000, the limit of basic economic benefits available under most Minnesota automobile insurance policies. After a jury trial, the district court ordered Defendant to pay $187,277 in restitution to the insurance companies he defrauded. On remand, the amount of restitution decreased. This time, the district court concluded that Defendant qualified as a runner for only 53 of the 65 victims, which dropped the award to $155,864. Defendant, for his part, has adopted an all-or-nothing strategy: he does not believe he owes a single penny of restitution.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant received up to $1,500 per patient he recruited, which satisfies the pecuniary-gain requirement. A series of text messages establishes the remaining elements. When the clinic owner later said she was “praying for some ice and snow” to bring in more clients, Defendant replied that he had “been praying for [the] last four weeks.” It was reasonable to conclude from these messages that Hussein “directly procure[d]” these patients with at least a “reason to know,” if not actual knowledge, that the provider’s purpose was to obtain benefits under an automobile-insurance contract. View "United States v. Abdisalan Hussein" on Justia Law

A Missouri physician prescribed ivermectin and hydroxychloroquine to Minnesota residents (Plaintiffs) to treat their severe COVID-19 infections. Pharmacists at Walmart and Hy-Vee stores in Albert Lea, Minnesota, refused to fill the prescriptions. the district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal of their claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to plausibly plead that the pharmacists’ alleged actions amounted to “extreme and outrageous” conduct.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The allegation that the Hy-Vee pharmacist said he was following “corporate policy” is neither extreme nor outrageous in these stressful circumstances. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege experiencing physical or specific psychological consequences after the pharmacists refused to fill their prescriptions, nor that they sought medical or mental health treatment for their distress. To the contrary, they allege both fully recovered from COVID-19 two weeks after self-treating with horse paste. View "William Salier v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s dog, Clinton, suffered from health problems. The solution, at least according to a veterinarian, was to feed him specialized dog food available only by prescription. It has different ingredients than regular dog food but includes no special medication. Prescription dog food is expensive. The crux of Plaintiff’s complaint is that the “prescription” requirement is misleading because the Food and Drug Administration never actually evaluates the product. And the damages came from its higher sales price. The original complaint, which included only state-law claims, reflected these theories. Brought on behalf of all similarly situated Missouri consumers, it alleged a violation of Missouri’s antitrust laws, claims under Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff initially filed her complaint in state court, but Royal Canin and Nestle Purina quickly removed it to federal court. The district court then remanded it.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and send this case back to the district court with directions to remanded it to Missouri state court. The court explained that just on the face of the amended complaint, the answer is clear. Only the carryover claims and their civil-conspiracy counterpart remain, and neither one presents a federal question. It is no longer possible to say that “dependence on federal law permeates the allegations” of Plaintiff’s complaint. Further, the court wrote that the manufacturers hope to keep the case in federal court through supplemental jurisdiction. It is too late, however, to turn back the clock. View "Anastasia Wullschleger v. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law