Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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In 2003 Tipton Hospital awarded Babchuk medical staff privileges and gave his professional corporation an exclusive contract to provide radiology services. In 2012 Tipton cancelled both his medical privileges and his corporation’s contract. In Babchuk’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district judge granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, reasoning that the plaintiffs had failed to prove they had a federally protected property interest in Dr. Babchuk’s hospital privileges or in the contract between his professional corporation and the hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the conduct of which Babchuk complained was not state action and, therefore, not actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The fact that some of Tipton’s revenues are siphoned off to the state university that owns it does not make the hospital a state actor. The university may well exert pressure direct and indirect on Tipton, just as federal and state governments in manifold ways exert pressure on private institutions. “Government is omnipresent; that doesn’t make all employees of private entities state actors.“ View "Babchuk v. IN Univ. Health, Inc" on Justia Law

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On July 5, 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into a law a statute that the Wisconsin legislature had passed one month earlier prohibiting a doctor from performing an abortion unless he or she has admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin and Milwaukee Women’s Medical Services (which operate the only four abortion clinics in Wisconsin) joined by two doctors employed by Planned Parenthood, challenged the statute’s constitutionality under 42 U.S.C. 1983, first seeking and obtaining a preliminary injunction and ultimately seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute. After a trial, the trial judge granted a permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to sue; and (2) the statute is unconstitutional because it imposes a burden excessive in relation to the aims of the statute and the benefits likely to be conferred by it. View "Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff has a neurological disorder, tardive dyskinesia. Plaintiff’s involuntary movements include tongue thrusting, pursing of the lips, choking, and side-to-side chewing of the jaw. She becomes mute, screams or makes non-verbal sounds, particularly under stress. She also suffers post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder, with severe anxiety. Shortly after plaintiff was diagnosed with TD, a personal injury suit that she had filed went to trial. She had no lawyer. Before trial, she sought accommodations of her medical problems, and was permitted to have a friend and a family member take notes, was given a podium, and was allowed to take occasional recesses. She was denied other requested help—a microphone, an interpreter, and a jury instruction explaining her disorder, lest the jurors think she was just acting up. She was hectored by the judge, who told the jury that the plaintiff has a “speech impediment.” She suffered other embarrassments in front of the jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that she was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act yet had been denied reasonable accommodations. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that plaintiff was denied a full and fair opportunity to vindicate her claims. View "Reed v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law