Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
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An Illinois prisoner who alleges that he is confined to a wheelchair because of an unspecified “nerve condition” claimed that, by applying a quorum rule, prison officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Under the rule, under which outdoor recreation does not occur without participation by10 disabled individuals, defendants allegedly refused to allow him to engage in any physical outdoor recreational activity for seven weeks. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Regardless of whether state officials are immune under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, applies and the suit was dismissed prematurely. View "Norfleet v. Walker" on Justia Law

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In 2000, C&D hired Jones, who had periodic leg and back pain and bouts of anxiety, requiring him to see a physician once every two or three months and to undergo tests two or three times per year. He took prescription medication. In 2003, C&D implemented an attendance policy that assesses points for policy violations. Points are not assessed for preapproved leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 260. By October 1, 2009, Jones had accrued two and one-half points; three points results in termination. In September 2009, Jones spoke with C&D’s FMLA Coordinator, about his medical condition. His treating physician, Lubak, faxed FMLA certifications indicating that Jones required periodic treatment. Jones missed his entire scheduled shift on October 1. He claims to have left a voicemail for his supervisor prior to his absence, but the company disputes this. On October 1, he visited the doctor’s office to check on paperwork and obtain a prescription refill, but was never examined or evaluated by Dr. Lubak. C&D terminated Jones’s employment. The district court granted C&D summary judgment, reasoning that Jones was not entitled to leave on October 1 because he did not receive medical treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Jones v. C & D Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

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Ekstrand taught kindergarten from 2000 to 2005. In 2005, she was reassigned to teach a first-grade class at her own request. She was relocated to a classroom with no exterior windows in a busy, loud area of the school. Ekstrand repeatedly requested a change of classroom. The principal worked to make the classroom more hospitable, but denied requests to switch rooms. After the school year began, Ekstrand experienced symptoms of seasonal affective disorder, a form of depression. Both her psychologist and her primary care physician recommended a leave of absence. Her initial leave was only three months, but the following winter, her doctor advised that Ekstrand would be unable to return to teach for the remainder of the 2005-06 term. The leave of absence was later extended to include the 2006-07 term. The district court granted the district summary judgment, but on remand, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Ekstrand under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide that Ekstrand was a qualified individual with a disability and that the school district knew of that disability, but failed to accommodate her with a new classroom. View "Ekstrand v. Sch. Dist. of Somerset" on Justia Law

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Medicare pays teaching hospitals for work by residents when a teaching physician supervises. During the 1990s, HHS concluded that many hospitals were billing for unsupervised services and began to audit invoices. There was also a GAO report and private litigation: qui tam suits under the False Claims Act, allowing relators to collect a bounty. Under 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A), suits cannot be based upon public disclosure of allegations or transactions in public agencies’ official reports unless the relator is an original source of information. A prior case concluded that the 1998 GAO report and similar public documents disclosed that billing for unsupervised work was common practice. The district court dismissed a suit filed against a teaching hospital in 2004, claiming to describe conduct, such as inadequate supervision, not previously disclosed. The Seventh Circuit vacated. No one who read the GAO report, or followed the progress of the audits, would suspect that Rush University was misrepresenting "immediate availability" of teaching physicians during concurrently scheduled procedures. The complaint alleged a kind of deceit that the GAO report does not attribute to any teaching hospital. View "Goldberg v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

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After discovering that she had lung cancer that had spread to her brain, Killian underwent aggressive treatment on the advice of her doctor. The treatment was unsuccessful and she died months later. Her husband submitted medical bills for the cost of the treatments to her health insurance company. The company denied coverage on most of the expenses because the provider was not covered by the insurance plan network. The husband filed suit, seeking benefits for incurred medical expenses, relief for breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory damages for failure to produce plan documents. The district court dismissed denial-of-benefits and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, but awarded minimal statutory damages against the plan administrator. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals, rejecting an argument that the plan documents were in conflict, but remanded for recalculation of the statutory damages award. View "Killian v. Concert Health Plan Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, then 45 years old and having previously worked in a factory and as a health aid, applied for disability benefits in 2004, claiming an onset date in 2004. Her conditions include peripheral vascular disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, osteoarthritis, obesity, vascular dementia, depression, panic disorder, and anxiety. The Social Security Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's adverse decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ failed to adequately consider petitioner's mental impairments, her obesity, and several of her physical problems. View "Arnett v. Astrue" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff first sought treatment in 1988, at age 27, experiencing double vision, eye strain, and facial numbness, and was diagnosed with abducens nerve palsy of the left eye. He continued to work as a welder until 2004, when symptoms forced him to sell his business. In 2007, he applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging onset in 2004. In 2010 an ALJ rejected the claim, concluding that plaintiff; she noted plaintiff’s complaints of headaches, but concluded that they must be non-severe. The district court upheld the denial. The Seventh Circuit remanded to the Social Security Administration, holding that the ALJ’s credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Shauger v. Astrue" on Justia Law

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Rice, charged with attempted bank robbery, was known to have schizophrenia, and shortly before his death, was found incompetent to stand trial. Although seen by mental health professionals while detained, Rice often refused to take medications, eat, or bathe. He was hospitalized at psychiatric and other medical facilities several times and was awaiting placement at a state psychiatric facility. Rice died, about 15 months after arriving at the jail, of psychogenic polydipsia (excessive water drinking), a disorder known to manifest with schizophrenia. His estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. The district court entered summary judgment against the estate, which filed a second suit, reasserting state wrongful death claims previously dismissed. The judge dismissed, citing collateral estoppel, reasoning that a previous finding as to foreseeability of the cause of death precluded recovery on state claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that a material dispute of fact precluded summary judgment on one of the 1983 claims: that conditions of confinement were inhumane. The district court erred in dismissing state claims; the prior finding concerning foreseeability was not preclusive with respect to those claims. View "Estate of Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs." on Justia Law

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Employers must maintain a log of work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses, 29 C.F.R. 1904.4(a); an incident is "work-related" if "the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition." Employees in the company's packing department fill containers, a process requiring repetitive hand movements, and pronation. When an employee developed lateral epicondylitis, painful swelling of ligaments and tendons around a joint, in her right arm, the company did not log the injury. The Department of Labor assessed a $900 penalty for failing to log a work-related injury. An ALJ sustained the penalty. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined review. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that substantial evidence was not enough to sustain the administrative decision. The ALJ was required to take account of competing evidence and inferences; the ALJ ignored strong indications that its favored witness was wrong. The court noted that inclusion of the work-relatedness requirement, requiring employers to judge the source of injury, "is a puzzle." View "Caterpillar Logistics Servs., Inc. v. Solis" on Justia Law

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Insurers sought a declaration that they had no duty to defend or indemnify in tort suits brought against the insured village, concerning discovery of "perc," a carcinogenic common dry cleaning solvent, in one of its wells and the village's continued use of the well without disclosure. The district court, relying on a pollution exclusion in the policies, granted summary judgment for the insurers. The exclusion refers to "actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 'pollutants'" and excludes from coverage expenses for "cleaning up ... or in any way responding to, or assessing the effects of pollutants." After exploring the reasons for the exclusion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court rejected an argument that this was not a pollution case, because the amount of perc in the water was below the maximum level permitted by environmental regulations. The complaints actually filed "describe in copious detail the conduct giving rise to the tort suits, and in doing so inadvertently but unmistakably acknowledge the applicability of the pollution exclusion." View "Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood" on Justia Law