Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Welch called 911. A Wishard ambulance arrived. Welch was 34 weeks pregnant. Paramedics ascertained that her water broke and she had a prolapsed umbilical cord. After consulting with her obstetrician’s office, paramedics contacted the Beech Grove emergency room and transported her there. Beech Grove did not have an obstetrics facility. Rather than delivering the baby, the physician sent Welch in the Wishard ambulance to another hospital, where the baby was delivered by Caesarean section. He had suffered hypoxia resulting in severe brain damage. Plaintiffs alleged that Wishard violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the situation did not fit the definition of “come to the emergency room:” that an individual in an ambulance owned and operated by the hospital is deemed to have come to the emergency room unless the ambulance is operated under communitywide emergency medical service protocols that direct it to transport the individual to a hospital other than the owner. The Wishard ambulance was operating under EMS protocols when it transported the plaintiffs. Although the definition was adopted after the incident, it was merely a clarification. View "Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. IN" on Justia Law

Ruppel sued CBS in Illinois alleging CBS’s predecessor, Westinghouse, caused the mesothelioma from which he suffers. Westinghouse had included asbestos in the turbines it supplied to the U.S. Navy, and Ruppel was allegedly exposed to it during his Naval service and later when he worked on an aircraft carrier as a civilian. CBS removed the case under the federal officer removal statute, which permits removal of certain suits where a defendant that acted under a federal officer has a colorable federal defense, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Ruppel moved to remand and, without allowing response, the district court granted the motion. The district court concluded Ruppel only sued CBS for failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos for which there is no federal defense. The Seventh Circuit reversed. CBS’s relationship with Ruppel arises solely out of CBS’s duties to the Navy. It also has a colorable argument for the government contractor defense, which immunizes government contractors when they supply products with specifications approved by the government. View "Ruppel v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

Omni, a technology consulting agency, hired Messier to work as a temporary programmer for Thrivent pursuant to an agreement between Omni and Thrivent. After leaving Omni and Thrivent, Messier had a difficult time finding a new job and began to suspect that Thrivent was saying negative things about him to prospective employers who called for reference checks. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleges that during these reference checks, Thrivent was revealing information about Messier’s migraine condition to prospective employers in violation of the medical record confidentiality requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111. The district court found that Thrivent learned of Messier’s migraine condition outside the context of a medical examination or inquiry, so that the confidentiality provisions did not apply, and granted summary judgment to Thrivent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Thrivent had no duty to treat its knowledge of Messier’s migraine condition as a confidential medical record because Messier had volunteered the information in responding to an inquiry about his absence from work. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans" on Justia Law

A chiropractor pleaded guilty to defrauding health insurers and to money laundering and was sentenced to 70 months (the bottom of the guidelines range) and to pay restitution of almost $2 million. At the guilty-plea hearing the judge asked the defendant whether he was “currently under the influence of any drugs, medicine, or alcohol,” and the defendant answered: “prescription medications.” He told the judge that he was taking medicines for “high anxiety, depression, adult attention hyperactivity disorder, and depression,” but stated that he was “thinking clearly.” He waived his right to appeal, but six weeks later moved to retract the plea, claiming that he had been taking psychotropic drugs, rendering his plea involuntary. The judge denied the motion because the defendant had presented no evidence that switching from Prozac to Lexapro could have the dramatic effects he claimed it had, and because at the plea hearing he had been alert and responsive and exhibited no signs of confusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Unted States v. Hardimon" on Justia Law

Anderson, a U.S. Postal Service worker, suffers from asthma. While he is virtually symptom-free outside of the workplace, his asthma regularly flared up at his job as a part-time mail processor. Between 2002 and 2009, Anderson filed numerous Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, an Occupational Health and Safety Administration complaint, and union grievances relating to his condition, requesting reasonable accommodations. He was absent from work for extended periods of time throughout the 2002-2009 period. Anderson sued USPS, for alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and the Americans with Disability Act, for retaliation, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and violations of the Family Medical Leave Act. The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Anderson cannot point to temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse action on the part of USPS. Nor did he present evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that USPS acted pretextually. View "Anderson v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

Fleishman began working for Continental in 1984 as a trial attorney defending workers’ compensation claims. Izzo oversaw the attorneys. Beginning in 2003, Fleishman suffered a series of medical problems related to a brain aneurism. He took intermittent medical leaves between July 2003 and June 2005. Izzo mentioned to Fleishman that his numbers “were off” because he was out on leave and inquired whether Fleishman thought about retirement. Fleishman declined and did not request another leave or accommodation after his return, although he had a noticeable dent on the side of his head. He was assigned to a new group that handled high-value cases. And his supervisor began receiving a series of performance-related complaints that ultimately led to his termination in 2007 at the age of 54. Fleishman filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623 (a)(1) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court granted Continental summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Fleishman offered no evidence of age discrimination and does not meet the definition of disabled under the ADA. View "Fleishman v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, Illinois enacted Hospital Provider Funding Legislation imposing a tax on hospital providers, except for certain categories of exempt hospitals, for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, 305 ILCS 5/5A-2(a). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services disallowed the reimbursement of Medicare expenses (42 U.S.C. 1395f(b)(1)) to a group of Illinois hospitals, finding that the amount of a tax assessment paid by the hospitals was a reasonable cost, but was subject to offset by any payments those hospitals received from an Illinois State fund. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the decision was not inconsistent with established policy. The court rejected an argument that the hospitals incurred the full cost of the tax, as they were billed by and wrote checks to the state, reasoning that the argument ignored the real net impact of the tax and of Access Payments by the state.View "Abraham Lincoln Mem'l Hosp. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Bontrager filed a putative class action complaint challenging Indiana’s $1,000 annual limit for dental services covered by Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. 1396. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, holding that Indiana is required to cover all medically necessary dental services, irrespective of the monetary cap. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bontrager has an enforceable federal right capable of redress through Section 1983. The monetary cap, which excludes medically necessary treatment, is not a utilization control procedure, but allows a state to shirk its primary obligation to cover medically necessary treatments. The court acknowledged that Bontrager’s victory may be short-lived if the state decides to end coverage for all dental services. View "Bontrager v. IN Family & Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

In 2003, the airline established guidelines that address accommodating employees who, because of disability, can no longer do essential functions of their current jobs, even with reasonable accommodation. The guidelines specify that the transfer process is competitive, so that an employee in need of accommodation will not be automatically placed into a vacant position, but will be given preference over similarly qualified applicants. The EEOC challenged the policy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court ruled in favor of the airline. On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the ADA does mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer. The court concluded that contrary precedent did not survive in light of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Filus, a 50-year-old former truck driver, has twice applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming that back problems have left him incapable of gainful employment. An administrative law judge concluded that Filus could perform some light work and denied his most recent application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supports the denial. The ALJ adequately considered Filus’s testimony about the limiting effects of his pain along with his testimony that he regularly completed his daily household activities without any pain medication, not even over-the-counter products.View "Filus v. Astrue" on Justia Law