Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Congress created Health Savings Accounts to help people with high-deductible health plans save for health care costs by providing tax-preferred treatment for money saved for future medical expenses, 26 U.S.C. 223. Banas and others started a company that created a suite of software products that allowed savers to manage their Health Savings Accounts online. By 2009, the company had more than 100 employees. Venture capital and private equity firms thought the company was a solid investment and bought stock, but the company had provided counterfeit financial documents and had even “faked” customer calls. The owners started raiding clients’ Health Savings Accounts. By the time Banas and Blackburn were stopped, they had misappropriated more than $18,000,000 in client funds. Banas admitted his guilt, accepted responsibility for his actions, and has worked to secure some degree of restitution. The district judge sentenced Banas to 160 months of imprisonment for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, well below the Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, particularly noting the impact of the crime on victims. View "Unted States v. Banas" on Justia Law

Hudson filed suit in an Illinois district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, charging that medical personnel at a federal prison in Kansas, where he had been incarcerated, had negligently failed to diagnose a blood clot in his leg and that, as a result, he experienced serious health problems. The government moved to transfer the case to the federal district court in Kansas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), on the ground that the principal witnesses are in Kansas and that the Kansas court has a lighter caseload. The district court granted the motion. Hudson has petitioned the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the case should remain in Illinois because he lives here, as do his current treating physicians, who will testify about his current health problems and causation. His Illinois relatives will also testify to his continuing health problems. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that about two-thirds of the witnesses are closer to Kansas, that the medical records are in Kansas, and the ease of electronic communications. View "Hudson v. Baker" on Justia Law

After a 2008 Indiana flood, the President authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide disaster relief under the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121–5207. Columbus Regional Hospital was awarded approximately $70 million, but suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 1349, claiming that it was entitled to about $20 million more. The district judge granted FEMA summary judgment. In response to the Seventh Circuit’s questioning of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Hospital argued that the Court of Federal Claims was the right forum and requested transfer. FEMA argued that the district court had jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit agreed with FEMA, holding that the suit was not for “money damages.” The Hospital wants money, but not as compensation for FEMA’s failure to perform some other obligation, but as “the very thing to which [it] was entitled” under the disaster-relief program. The court noted that only the district court can serve as a forum for all of the Hospital’s legal theories, then rejected all of those theories. View "Columbus Reg'l Hosp. v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this employment discrimination case on behalf of Shepherd, a former sales clerk at AutoZone, alleging that AutoZone had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. Shepherd had a back injury that was aggravated by mopping floors, and he claimed that AutoZone required him to mop floors despite his requests for relief. The EEOC alleged that AutoZone had failed to accommodate Shepherd’s disability. The magistrate judge initially granted AutoZone summary judgment on the accommodation claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. On remand, a jury returned a verdict in Shepherd’s favor. The judge then approved $100,000 in compensatory damages, $200,000 in punitive damages, $115,000 in back pay, an injunction on AutoZone’s anti-discrimination practices, and the EEOC’s motion to vacate a prior award of costs to AutoZone from the first trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but remanded the injunction for imposition of a reasonable time limit. The award of compensatory damages was not excessive when compared to Shepherd’s pain and suffering; the jury heard sufficient evidence of AutoZone’s reckless indifference to Shepherd’s federal employment rights and because the punitive damages award was not grossly excessive under the Due Process Clause. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law

James has been an employee of Hyatt Regency Chicago since 1985. In 2007, James took a leave of absence due to an eye injury that occurred outside of work. James filed suit in 2009 claiming that Hyatt violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.12101. During discovery, the district court denied James’ motions to compel and awarded Hyatt a portion of attorney’s fees it expended responding to motions. The court subsequently granted Hyatt summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In light of the limitations imposed by his doctors, Hyatt did not violate the FMLA or the ADA in refusing to allow James to return to work for “light duty” before doctors released him to perform functions essential to his position. James used discovery as a weapon, rather than as a tool to gather evidence. View "James v. Hyatt Regency Chicago" on Justia Law

Since 2006 Ray has experienced pain in his shoulder. He contends that the pain stems from an injury and that an MRI scan would point the way toward successful treatment; Shah, Ray’s treating physician at the correctional center, believes that the pain stems from arthritis and that a scan would not help in diagnosis and treatment. The district court rejected Ray’s suit under 42 U.S.C.1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Ray has been examined often, x-rays have been taken, and physicians have prescribed painkillers; staff also has arranged for Ray to be assigned a lower bunk. Because Ray’s claim fails the objective component of cruel-and-unusual-punishments analysis, his contention that Dr. Shah displayed subjective antipathy is irrelevant. View "Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Devbrow entered the Indiana prison system in 2000. During intake, he told the medical staff that he had prostate problems and would need to be tested for prostate cancer within two to four years. In 2004 a test revealed an elevated PSA, but the medical staff did not order a prostate biopsy for more than a year. In a biopsy six months later, Devbrow was diagnosed with prostate cancer that had spread to his spine; treatment options were severely limited. Devbrow sued prison doctors and a nurse practitioner under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered judgment for the defendants based on the two-year statute of limitations, construing the claim as a constitutional violation that in April 2005 when the biopsy was ordered. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The statute of limitations for a section 1983 deliberate-indifference claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause. Devbrow did not know of his injury when the defendants ordered a biopsy; he discovered it six months later when he learned he had cancer that might have been diagnosed and treated earlier. View "Devbrow v. Kalu" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, business owners appealed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related regulations requiring group health insurance coverage for contraception and sterilization procedures, 42 U.S.C. 300gg‐13(a)(4). Employers who do not comply face a penalty of $100 per day per employee and an annual tax surcharge of $2,000 per employee, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a). The Seventh Circuit granted an injunction, pending appeal, concluding that the businesses had established a reasonable likelihood of success on their claims, that the equitable balance favored granting the injunction; and that harm to religious‐liberty rights outweighed the temporary harm to the government’s interest in providing greater access to cost‐free contraception and related services. The court rejected arguments that a secular, for‐profit corporation cannot assert a claim under Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000 bb; that the free‐exercise rights of the individual plaintiffs are not affected because their corporation is a separate legal entity; and that the mandate’s burden on free‐exercise rights is too remote and attenuated to qualify as “substantial” because the decision to use contraception benefits is made by third parties, individual employees, in consultation with their medical providers. View "Grote v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Roddy, born in 1964, suffers from several serious medical problems, including severe lower back pain attributable to degenerative disc disease. When her pain became unbearable, she stopped working and applied for disability insurance benefits. She was unsuccessful before the Social Security Administration. An administrative law judge found that there were jobs in the national economy within her capabilities, although she no longer could perform her old job as a shift manager at a Taco Bell restaurant. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of a physician and improperly considered Roddy’s testimony about her ability to do housework. View "Roddy v. Astrue" on Justia Law

The 57-year-old woman, diagnosed with frozen shoulder and later with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, stopped medical treatment in 2003, having no health insurance and income of $4500 to $9000 a year as a clerical worker. Her last significant employment, as a hotel night-clerk, ended in 2007. She got another clerical job, but was immediately fired because unable to lift a box of paper. She sought social security disability benefits and resumed treatment. She had regained the full range of motion, but muscles in her arms and shoulders were weak and she had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, causing bronchitis, respiratory infections, and shortness of breath. The ALJ decided that she was capable of performing as hotel clerk and was not disabled; he disregarded findings by a doctor whom he had appointed and with whom the applicant had no prior relationship. He noted the “lack of aggressive treatment” and that she smoked, overlooking that she stopped smoking 30 years earlier. The ALJ focused on her ability to do laundry, take public transportation, and grocery shop. The Appeals Council declined review. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that: “Really the Social Security Administration and the Justice Department should have been able to do better.” View "Hughes v. Astrue" on Justia Law