Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Hughes died after hanging himself from his bed in the Butler County Prison, where he was incarcerated on charges of robbery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and abuse of the drugs cocaine and Concerta. Hughes showed no outward signs that he was suicidal, but he did have a history of depression and asked to see Tepe, the prison psychiatrist, about anti-depression medication. Hughes and Dr. Tepe never met. Hughes had told an intake worker that he had attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation. There was a suicide alert in the computer system and Hughes told a paramedic that he had not been taking his prescribed medication. Hughes’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to her son’s serious medical need. Tepe sought summary judgment, arguing that he was The district court held that Tepe could not assert a qualified-immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent and public policy do not support immunity for a privately paid physician working for the public. View "McCullum v. Tepe" on Justia Law

In 2003, Kroll began working for WLAA as an Emergency Medical Technician and was considered to be “good employee” by her direct supervisor, Binns. After Kroll became romantically involved with a co-worker, the office manager, Dresen, received reports of concerns from WLAA employees about Kroll’s well-being. Kroll maintains that Dresen “requested” that Kroll “receive psychological counseling.” Later, Binns told Kroll that he had received a complaint and was concerned about Kroll’s ability to perform her job safely; he told Kroll that she must attend counseling in order to continue working at WLAA. Kroll told Binns that she would not attend the counseling, left the meeting, and did not return to work at WLAA. In Kroll’s suit under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), the district court entered summary judgment for WLAA. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Kroll presented sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the “psychological counseling” Kroll was instructed to attend did constitute a “medical examination” under the ADA, although WLAA may still be entitled to judgment if such counseling was “job related” and consistent with “business necessity.” View "Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth." on Justia Law

Four plaintiffs each established an employee benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act funded by a combination of employer contributions and covered employee payroll deductions; each entered into a Benefit Management Service Agreement with PBA, which specified that PBA would provide services, such as paying medical providers for claims incurred under the Plans. Each Agreement required PBA to establish a segregated bank account for each Plan into which it would deposit the funds that it received from the corresponding plaintiff for paying the medical claims and authorized PBA to pay medical claims by writing checks from this account. PBA not only failed to use funds supplied by plaintiffs to pay the claims incurred under the corresponding Plan, but commingled and misappropriated Plan funds. PBA did not pay all claims, despite receiving money for payment of those claims from the respective plaintiffs. The amounts unpaid for the plaintiffs are: $501,380.75, $409,943.88, $384,574.17, and $44,290.12. The district court found that PBA was a fiduciary under ERISA (29 U.S.C. 1002(21)(A)), had breached its fiduciary duties, and that ERISA preempted Permco’s breach-of-contract claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Guyan Int'l, Inc. v. Prof'l Benefits Adm'rs, Inc." on Justia Law

Watson’s father, Hickle, worked for the Department of Energy, 1954 to 1962. Hickle died of Hodgkin’s disease in 1964. Congress enacted the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act in 2000 to compensate for illnesses caused by exposure to radiation and other toxic substances while working for the Department of Energy. Covered employees or eligible survivors may receive compensation in a lump sum payment; under specific circumstances, a covered employee’s child is also eligible, 42 U.S.C. 7385s-3(d)(2). When her father died, Watson was 19 years old, not a full-time student; she lived with her parents, worked as a waitress, relied on her parents for support, and was listed as a dependent on their income tax returns. She sought survivor benefits in 2002 and received a lump-sum payment of $150,000. She later claimed further compensation as a “covered child,” under a different section of the Act, arguing that she was “incapable of self-support” at the time of Hickle’s death. The Department of Labor denied her claim. Before the district court, Watson challenged the interpretation of “incapable of self-support,” claiming that the Department impermissibly required a showing of physical or mental incapability. The district court denied her motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Watson v. Solis" on Justia Law

Banks worked as a coal miner for 17 years and smoked about one pack of cigarettes per day for 38 years. His employment ended in 1991. After two unsuccessful attempts, in 2003, Banks filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, which provides benefits to coal miners who become disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 901. An ALJ found that Banks had shown a change in his condition and that he suffered from legal pneumoconiosis which substantially contributed to his total disability. Banks was awarded benefits and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, adopting the regulatory interpretation urged by the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. The ALJ relied on reasoned medical opinions. View "Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Banks" on Justia Law

Stryker, a manufacturer of medical devices, sued its umbrella insurer XL, seeking coverage for claims stemming from the implantation of expired artificial knees. The dispute concerned the precise "defect" that triggers batch coverage under the Medical Products Endorsement. The district court held that XL was liable under the policy for the entirety of Stryker’s losses on both direct claims brought against Stryker, as well as claims brought against Pfizer that Stryker was obligated to reimburse under an asset purchase agreement. The court found that the items were defective if they were available in Stryker’s inventory for implantation by physicians beyond their shelf-life of five years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed XL’s liability for the full amount of Stryker’s losses and pre-judgment interest. XL’s payment to Pfizer applies to exhaust the policy with respect to the direct claims. The court reversed the holding that the aggregate limit of liability of the XL policy does not apply to the judgments on the direct claims and remanded for determination of what portion, if any, of the total liability for those judgments beyond $15 million represents consequential damages as defined under Michigan contract law. View "Howmedica Osteonics, Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

TIG issued a $25 million excess policy to Stryker, a manufacturer of medical devices. Coverage attached above the underlying (XL) umbrella policy, with a limit of $15 million. Stryker sued XL, seeking defense and indemnification for claims related to replacement knees (first suit). Pfizer then sued Stryker, seeking indemnification with respect to claims based on Uni-Knees; the companies had an asset purchase agreement. The court ruled in favor of Pfizer. When XL denied coverage, Stryker sued both insurers. In 2008, the district court held that XL was liable for all of Stryker's liabilities with respect to both suits and also granted declaratory judgment against TIG. XL settled directly with Pfizer, and obtained a ruling that this satisfied its obligations. TIG moved to remove the declaratory judgment ruling, arguing that the ruling that XL was responsible with respect to both suits made it impossible to subject TIG to liability. The district court denied this motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the case is not moot, noting that the claims may exhaust the XL policy; reversed a ruling that TIG is precluded from raising coverage defenses on remand, noting that TIG was not a party to the first suit; and remanded. View "Stryker Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, plaintiff had arthroscopic surgery to treat pain and instability in his shoulder joint. The doctor implanted a pain-pump catheter and, over the next two days, a Stryker pain pump delivered a regular dose of a local anesthetic, bupivicaine, to the joint. Plaintiff’s condition improved after surgery but worsened over time, and in 2008 he learned he no longer had any cartilage remaining in his shoulder, a condition called chondrolysis. He sued, alleging strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty. The district court concluded that Stryker could not reasonably have known about the risk of chondrolysis in 2004 and thus had no duty to warn of the risk and held that Plaintiff failed as a matter of law to prove causation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not present any evidence that Stryker knew or should have known that the use was dangerous or that a warning on Stryker's pain pump would have caused the doctor not to use the device in his joint space. View "Rodriguez v. Stryker Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products, alleged that provisions of the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted partial summary judgment upholding the law and partial summary judgment to plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and ruled in favor of the government on most issues, declining to apply strict scrutiny and finding that warnings required by the Act reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing deception of consumers. The court upheld bans on event sponsorship, branding non- tobacco merchandise, and free sampling (loyalty and continuity programs); a requirement that tobacco manufacturers reserve significant packaging space for textual health warnings; the restriction of tobacco advertising to black and white text; and the constitutionality of the Act's color graphic and non-graphic warning label requirement. Reversing the district court, the court upheld the Act's restriction on claims that tobacco products are "safe or less harmful by virtue of” FDA regulation, inspection or compliance" 21 U.S.C. 331(tt)(4).View "Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The company granted plaintiff leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, listing a June 27 return date. The doctor cleared plaintiff for light work beginning on May 31 and set June 13 as the probable date for unrestricted work. On May 31, plaintiff was sent home because the company did not permit employees with non-work-related injuries to perform light duty work after leave. Plaintiff did not return on June 13 and told the company that he was experiencing pain and would return on June 27. He obtained a doctor's note, but the company counted June 13 to 17 as unexcused absence and terminated his employment. The district court ruled for plaintiff on a claim of FLMA interference (29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D)); awarded $99,960 in attorney fees, $2,732.90 in costs, and $104,354.85 in back pay; and ordered the company to change the termination date, for purposes of pension and retiree health benefits. The court denied statutory liquidated damages because it found that the company acted with reasonable grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the interference claim and reversed on the liquidated damages claim, noting the company's "obdurate refusal to correct an obvious mistake that constituted a wrongful discharge of a 36-year employee."