Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners provide protection and advocacy services to individuals with developmental disabilities. After receiving a complaint regarding the discharge practices of respondent, petitioners requested access to the clinical records of all individuals residing at two respondent facilities to investigate whether they were being denied the opportunity to live in less restrictive settings. Relying on Mental Hygiene Law 45.09(b) and 33.13(c)(4), petitioners asserted that they were entitled to unrestricted access to the clinical records. Answering a certified question, the court concluded that section 45.09(b) and section 33.13(c)(4) must be read in accord with federal law and that actively-involved family members could possess sufficient decision-making authority to qualify as legal representatives under the pertinent regime. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, and the case remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion and, as so modified, affirmed. View "Matter of Albany Law School v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities" on Justia Law

Plaintiff represented psychiatrists who treated patients eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid and defendants were responsible for administering Medicaid in New York and for implementing and enforcing medicaid reimbursement rates. At issue was whether the 2006 amendment to the Social Services law found in a budget bill implementing a coinsurance enhancement for the benefit of psychiatrists who treat patients eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid was intended to be permanent or whether the amendment was intended only to provide a limited one-year enhancement. The court concluded that the Legislature only intended to provide for a one-time coinsurance enhancement, limited to the 2006-2007 fiscal year. View "New York State Psychiatric Assn., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

Five days after Charmaine D. was admitted to the hospital, petitioner, the director of the psychiatry department at that hospital, applied to Supreme Court for an order that she be retained for 30 days. Charmaine moved to dismiss the retention proceeding, arguing, among other things, that her original commitment was defective because the emergency room psychiatrist at issue was not a proper applicant under Mental Hygiene Law 9.27. The court held that an emergency room psychiatrist was "supervising the treatment of or treating" a patient within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law 9.27(b)(11), and so had standing to seek an involuntary commitment of the patient pursuant to section 9.27. The psychiatrist was not required to resort to the emergency procedure contained in Mental Hygiene Law 9.39.

Respondent brought this action against appellant to compel payment of no-fault benefits in the amount of its bill, plus statutory interest and attorney's fees, alleging that it had provided timely notice and proof of claim under 11 NYCRR 65-1.1, which required an insured person's assignee to submit written proof of claim no later than 45 days after the date health care services were rendered. At issue was whether a health care services provider, as assignee of a person injured in a motor vehicle accident, could recover no-fault benefits by timely submitting the required proof of claim after the 30-day period for providing written notice of the accident had expired. The court held that the submission of the proof of claim within 45 days of the date health care services were rendered could not serve as timely written notice of accident after the 30-day period for providing such written notice had expired.

This case stemmed from a dispute over the status of a negotiated settlement agreement pertaining to New York City's duty to provide mental health services to certain inmates in its jails. At issue was whether the terms of the agreement expired before plaintiffs filed a motion in Supreme Court seeking to extend the City's obligations. Applying the state's traditional principles of contract interpretation, the court held that plaintiffs sought relief prior to termination of the settlement agreement and their motion was therefore timely filed.

Respondent, a designee of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, petitioned for an order under Mental Health Hygiene Law 9.60 requiring assisted outpatient treatment ("AOT") for Miguel M. At issue was whether the Privacy Rule adopted by the federal government pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2, prohibited respondent from disclosing, at the petition hearing, records from two hospitals related to three occasions on which Miguel was hospitalized. The court held that the Privacy Rule prohibited the disclosure of a patient's medical records to a state agency that requested them for use in a proceeding to compel the patient to accept mental health treatment where the patient had neither authorized the disclosure nor received notice of the agency's request for the records. Accordingly, the medical records at issue were not admissible in a proceeding to compel AOT.