Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in New Mexico Supreme Court
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Eight named inmates and two nonprofit organizations (collectively, plaintiffs) filed an amended complaint in district court seeking a mixture of a classwide writ of habeas corpus and classwide injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs alleged that the State’s management of COVID-19 in New Mexico prisons violated inmates’ rights under the New Mexico Constitution. The district court dismissed the amended complaint, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the individual inmate-plaintiffs failed to exhaust the internal grievance procedures of the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) before seeking relief, as required by NMSA 1978, Section 33-2-11(B) (1990). Agreeing with the result, but not all of its reasoning, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the district court: "to satisfy the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement under Rule 5-802(C) for an entire plaintiff class, one or more named class members must exhaust administrative remedies for each claim. Because no Named Plaintiff exhausted or sought to exhaust NMCD’s internal grievance procedures, we affirm." View "Anderson, et al. v. New Mexico" on Justia Law

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The issue presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State’s public health orders (PHOs) could support a claim for just compensation under either Article II, Section 20 of the New Mexico Constitution or Section 12-10A-15 of the Public Health Emergency Response Act (PHERA) (2003, as amended through 2015). With respect to the constitutional question, the Court held that the PHOs could not support a claim for a regulatory taking requiring compensation. With respect to the statutory question, it Court held the PHOs’ restrictions on business operations regarding occupancy limits and closures could not support a claim for just compensation. Furthermore, claimants for just compensation under the PHERA had to exhaust the administrative remedies set forth in Section 12-10A-15(B), (C) before seeking judicial relief. View "New Mexico v. Wilson" on Justia Law

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The issue presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court’s review centered on the executive branch’s authority to impose business restrictions during a pandemic. Specifically, the Court was asked to address: (1) whether Petitioners were authorized to restrict or close businesses when necessary for the protection of public health; and (2) whether the renewed temporary closure of indoor dining at restaurants and breweries, mandated by a July 13, 2020, emergency public health order (July Order), was arbitrary and capricious. With respect to the first question the Supreme Court held, consistent with its opinion in Grisham v. Reeb, 2020-NMSC-___, (S-1-SC-38336, Nov. 5, 2020), that Petitioners were so authorized. With respect to the second question, the Court held that the July Order’s temporary closure of indoor dining was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Lujan Grisham v. Romero" on Justia Law

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The question this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on whether a mentally-competent-but-terminally-ill patient had a constitutional right to have a willing physician, consistent with accepted medical practices, prescribe a safe medication that the patient may self-administer for the purpose of peacefully ending the patient’s life. The implications of a "yes" from the Supreme Court would have been that a willing physician could assist the patient and avoid criminal liability because Section 30-2-4 would be unconstitutional as applied to the physician. If the Court answered "no," the alternatives for the patient would be to: (1) endure the prolonged physical and psychological consequences of a terminal medical condition that the patient finds intolerable; or (2) take his or her own life, possibly by violent or dangerous means. "Although the State does not have a legitimate interest in preserving a painful and debilitating life that will imminently come to an end, the State does have a legitimate interest in providing positive protections to ensure that a terminally ill patient’s end-of-life decision is informed, independent, and procedurally safe." The Court declined to hold that there was an absolute and fundamental constitutional right to a physician’s aid in dying and conclude that Section 30-2-4 was not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Petitioners in this case. View "Morris v. Brandenburg" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether defendant professional corporations and a limited liability company were "health care providers" as defined by the state Medical Malpractice Act so as to be able to receive the Act's benefits. The Court of Appeals determined that though Defendants did not literally meet the Act's definition of "health care provider," it nonetheless held that Defendants were health care providers under the Act because a strict adherence to the plain language of the definition would conflict with legislative intent. Although the Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court's determination that the definition of "health care provider" literally excludes Defendants. The Supreme Court concluded that several provisions in the Act indicated that the Legislature intended professional medical organizations like Defendants to be covered by the Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but on different grounds. View "Baker v. Hedstrom" on Justia Law