Justia Health Law Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Malloy v. Department of Correction
The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed as moot Plaintiffs' appeal arguing that the Department of Correction (DOC) illegally kept them in custody after a final decision on their petitions for medical parole had been made by the Commissioner of Correction but answered two questions reported by the single justice.Plaintiffs were two prisoners recently released under the medical parole statute. Before their actual release from incarceration, Plaintiffs sought relief from a single justice of the court. The single justice denied Plaintiffs' request for relief and separately reported two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court regarding the requirements of finding a replacement for a prisoner who is granted medical parole and the timing of a prisoner's release after medical parole is granted. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal as moot and answered (1) after medical parole is granted the DOC must develop comprehensive plans including a proposed course and site for treatment; and (2) once a favorable decision by the Commissioner allows release on medical parole, the DOC must be proactive in working to release the prisoner expeditiously. View "Malloy v. Department of Correction" on Justia Law
In re Hamm
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a judge of the probate court denying Appellant's special motion to dismiss the amended objection of William Charles Hamm, a protected person, to a conservator's final account, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 59H, did not apply in this circumstance.The conservator filed accounts for each of the seventeen years for which she and her husband were conservators for their son, the protected person in this case. The protected person filed an objection and amended objection to the final accountings. The conservator objected with two motions to dismiss, including the anti-SLAPP motion at issue on appeal. The probate court judge denied both motions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply in the circumstances of this case. View "In re Hamm" on Justia Law
In re J.P.
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court judge in this civil commitment matter, holding that sufficient admissible evidence was presented to warrant an order to civilly commit J.P. for a period not to exceed six months pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7, 8.Southcoast Behavioral Health filed a timely petition for J.P.'s involuntary commitment, alleging that, as a result of mental illness, J.P. presented a risk of harm to others and a substantial risk of harm to himself and that civil commitment was the least restrictive alternative in the circumstances. After a hearing, the judge ordered J.P. civilly committed for a period not to exceed six months. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge improperly considered certain evidence because it was inadmissible hearsay, but J.P. suffered no prejudice from the admission of this evidence; and (2) there was sufficient evidence presented to support the civil commitment order. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law
Ardaneh v. Commonwealth
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the Court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was indicted on several counts of rape and one count of strangulation or suffocation. Petitioner was committed for observation to Bridgewater State Hospital for a determination whether he was competent to stand trial. Petitioner was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to the hospital pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 16. Petitioner, who remains in the hospital, filed a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition claiming, among other things, that his constitutional rights had been violated. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner had an adequate alternative remedy and that his claims did not present a situation warranting extraordinary superintendence relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "Ardaneh v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law
Atlanticare Medical Center v. Division of Medical Assistance
On appeal from a federal appellate court's decision that the Federal Medicare scheme prohibits State Medicaid agencies, including MassHealth, from receiving funds from Medicare, the Supreme Judicial Court ordered that this case be remanded for modification of the declaratory judgment, holding that MassHealth demonstrated a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification to allow MassHealth to seek reimbursement where the liable third party is Medicare.In Atlanticare Medical Center v. Commissioner of the Division of Medical Assistance, 439 Mass. 1, 3, 5 (2003) (Altanticare I), the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the Federal Medicaid scheme tasked the State Medicaid agency, not individual providers, with seeking reimbursement from liable third-party insurers, including Medicare. When the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) refused to issue reimbursements from Medicare to MassHealth, MassHealth brought suit. In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Federal Medicare scheme prohibited MassHealth from receiving funds from Medicare. Therefore, a Federal Medicare regulation was amended to acknowledge the practice of State Medicaid agencies obtaining Medicare reimbursements through providers, rather than seeking such reimbursements directly from Medicare. MassHealth sought to modify the declaratory judgment and restore its ability to obtain reimbursements from providers, rather than liable third parties. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for modification of the judgment, holding that changed circumstances required modification. View "Atlanticare Medical Center v. Division of Medical Assistance" on Justia Law
Massachusetts General Hospital v. C.R.
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division dismissing as untimely Massachusetts General Hospital's (MGH) petition seeking to have C.R. committed, holding that the activity governed by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 12(a) is separate from the three-day involuntary hospitalization period established under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 12(b).The day after C.R. was admitted to a psychiatric facility but six days after she was initially brought to the emergency department of MGH by police pursuant to section 12(a), MGH filed its petition for commitment pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7 and 8. The Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court concluded that MGH's petition was untimely because the three-day window under section 12(b) begins running when the patient is initially restrained under section 12(a). The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the three-day period under section 12(b) is necessary to fully evaluate the patient and was not intended by the Legislature to be shortened by the section 12(a) time period; and (2) as applied to C.R., the statute did not violate due process, as the section 12(a) period of confinement was no longer than necessary under the circumstances of this case. View "Massachusetts General Hospital v. C.R." on Justia Law
Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of Trial Court
The Supreme Judicial Court held that, due to the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, pretrial detainees who have not been charged with an excluded offense are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of release on personal recognizance and a hearing within two business days of filing a motion for reconsideration of bail and release.To decrease exposure to COVID-19 within correctional institutions, Petitioners sought the release to the community of as many pretrial detainees and individuals who have been convicted and are serving a sentence of incarceration as possible. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the risks inherent in the COVID-19 pandemic constitute a changed circumstance within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58, tenth paragraph, and the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 57; (2) any individual who is not being held without bail under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A and who has not been charged with an excluded offense as set forth in Appendix A to this opinion is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of release; and (3) to afford relief to as many incarcerated individuals as possible, the parole board and Department of Corrections are urged to work with the special master to expedite parole hearings and the issuance of parole permits. View "Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of Trial Court" on Justia Law
Buckman v. Commissioner of Correction
The Supreme Judicial Court answered questions reported by a single justice upon Petitioners' petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 4 asserting claims for mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief after the superintendent for each petitioner refused to review Petitioners' petitions for medical parole as submitted regardless of the superintendent's view as to the completeness or adequacy of the petition.Specifically, the Court answered that, when a prisoner submits a written petition for medical parole, the superintendent or sheriff of the facility where the prisoner is incarcerated must consider the petition even if the superintendent or sheriff does not consider the petition complete or adequate. Further, the superintendent or sheriff bears the burden of preparing or procuring a medical parole plan and recommendation as to the release of the prisoner. Lastly, the commissioner, on receipt of the petition and recommendation, is required to provide the prisoner with all supporting documents submitted by the superintendent or sheriff with the recommendation. View "Buckman v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law
Commonwealth v. Stirlacci
In this case involving the indictments of Dr. Frank Stirlacci and his office manager, Jessica Miller, for violations of the Controlled Substances Act and for submitting false health care claims to insurance providers, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the superior court's judgment dismissing several of the indictments, holding that there was sufficient evidence to indict Shirlacci on twenty-six counts of improper prescribing and to indict both defendants on twenty of the twenty-two counts of submitting false health care claims.The charges against Defendants included twenty-six counts each of improper prescribing, twenty counts each of uttering a false prescription, and twenty-two charges each of submitting a false health care claim. The trial judge dismissed the indictments for improper prescribing and uttering false prescriptions and dismissed six of the indictments against each defendant for submitting false health care claims. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to indict Stirlacci on all counts of improper prescribing, but Miller's status as a nonpractitioner precluded her indictment on improper prescribing; (2) there was insufficient evidence to indict either defendant for uttering false prescriptions; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to indict both defendants on twenty counts of submitting false health care claims. View "Commonwealth v. Stirlacci" on Justia Law
Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp.
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the trial court dismissing this case alleging that a Massachusetts assisted living residence's (ALR) charge to new residents of an upfront "community fee" violated the security deposit statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 186, 15B, holding that if an ALR charges upfront fees that are not used to fund distinct assisted living services, it does so in violation of section 15B.Plaintiff alleged that the community fee, which was intended to cover upfront administrative costs, move-in assistance, an initial service coordination plan, and a replacement reserve for building improvements, violated section 15B because it exceeded the upfront costs allowed by the statute. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that ALRs are not subject to section 15B. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this case, holding (1) ALRs may institute upfront charges beyond those permitted by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 186, 15B(1)(b) to the extent those charges correspondent to the distinct services enumerated in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 19D, 13 or to other services specifically designed for ALRs; and (2) further factual development was required to determine whether the fee at issue here was permissibly charged and used for services distinct to ALRs. View "Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law