Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against the Campbell County Memorial Hospital under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (Act), alleging that Amanda Phillips, a certified nurse anesthetist for Northern Plains Anesthesia Associates, which provided anesthesia services for the hospital, acted as an employee or agent of the hospital, making the hospital vicariously liable for Phillips’ alleged negligence. The hospital filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that a government hospital could not be vicariously liable for acts of non-employees or independent contractors under the doctrine of ostensible agency. The district court denied the motion based on Sharsmith v. Hill. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its interpretation of Sharsmith and that Sharsmith did not create an implied waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. View "Campbell County Memorial Hosp. v. Pfeifle" on Justia Law

Via Christi Regional Medical Center, Inc. filed a hospital lien to collect on its bill for medical services provided to Ivan Reed after Reed's car collided with a Union Pacific Railroad train. The lien purported to encumber a portion of Reed's settlement with Union Pacific. Via Christi subsequently brought this action against Reed to enforce its lien. Reed counterclaimed, asserting that Via Christi, in an effort to enforce the lien, had engaged in deceptive and unconscionable practices in violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act. The district court judge entered judgment in favor of Via Christ on the lien and against Reed on his counterclaims. The court of appeals affirmed the enforceability of Via Christi's lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Via Christi's failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-407 rendered its lien ineffective and unenforceable against Reed; (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Via Christi knew or should have known that it misrepresented the amount it was owed for services rendered; and (3) the lower courts erred in ruling as a matter of law that a hospital's filing and pursuit of a lien could never be unconscionable. Remanded.View "Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Reed" on Justia Law

Roger Collins died following an inpatient stay at Ridgeway Nursing Home & Rehabilitation Facility. Stella Collins, Roger's wife, subsequently brought an action against Ridgeway alleging wrongful death and nursing home neglect. After pretrial discovery, Ridgeway moved to disqualify Wilkes & McHugh (W&H), the lawfirm representing Collins, alleging that an investigator for W&H violated the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct by making contact with three of Ridgeway's employees. The trial court denied the motion. Ridgeway then sought a writ of mandamus seeking the dismissal of the claims brought against it or, alternatively, the disqualification of W&H. The court of appeals declined to issue the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in finding that Ridgeway had an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise for the admission of unfairly and unethically obtained evidence. View "Ridgeway Nursing & Rehabilitation Facility, LLC v. Circuit Court " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Leslie Milliun's conservator, filed a negligence suit against Defendant hospital, alleging that, while in Defendant's care, Leslie suffered severe respiratory dysfunction which resulted in Leslie's severe brain injury. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Defendant because Plaintiff failed to offer the requisite expert testimony to create an issue of material fact regarding Defendant's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of Leslie's injuries. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in (1) refusing to admit certain medical records of Leslie's treating physicians as expert opinion on causation, and (2) concluding that its order granting Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of a commission so Leslie's out-of-state treating physicians could be deposed should be withdrawn because the physicians could not be compelled to offer expert opinion on causation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to admit certain statements contained within the medical records to establish a causal connection between Leslie's injuries and the alleged negligence.View "Milliun v. New Milford Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and/or former longtime smokers of Marlboro cigarettes, filed this putative class action in federal court against Philip Morris USA, Inc. asserting, among other claims, an equitable cause of action for medical monitoring. Plaintiffs sought the creation of a court-supervised program at Philip Morris's expanse that would provide them with a type of medical monitoring that would assist in the early detection of lung cancer. The district court dismissed the medical monitoring claim, holding that although the New York Court of Appeals would likely recognize the medical monitoring claim, Plaintiffs failed to plead that Philip Morris's allegedly tortious conduct was the reason Plaintiffs needed to secure a monitoring program. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals as to whether an independent cause of action for medical monitoring exists in New York. The Court answered by holding that, under New York law, a current or former longtime heavy smoker who has not been diagnosed with a smoking-related disease, and who is not under investigation by a physician for such a suspected disease, may not pursue an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for such a disease.View "Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, a physician. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his original action. Plaintiff subsequently filed his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff's second action was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff responded that (1) his pre-suit notice commenced his new action prior to the expiration of the one-year saving statute; and (2) alternatively, section 29-26-121 extended the saving statute by 120 days. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's action was commenced by the filing of his second health care liability complaint rather than by providing pre-suit notice; and (2) a plaintiff who files his initial action prior to the effective date of section 29-26-121 dismisses his original action, properly provides pre-suit notice, and refiles his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121 is entitled to the 120-day extension.View "Rajvongs v. Wright" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an unsworn notice of claim with the superior court pursuant to the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) alleging that Defendants were negligent in providing her medical care. The statute of limitations on Plaintiff's claim subsequently expired. Thereafter, Plaintiff served her unsworn notice of claim to Defendants. Plaintiff then filed a sworn notice of claim. The superior court subsequently dismissed Plaintiff's unsworn notice of claim on the ground that the defective notice failed to toll the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend her notice of claim pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 15 and to have the amendment relate back to the original filing date.View "Frame v. Millinocket Reg'l Hosp." on Justia Law

Nelson D. was a convicted sex offender who suffered from mental retardation. The State filed a N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 petition seeking to subject Nelson to civil management. After a dispositional hearing, Supreme Court found the State failed to establish that Nelson was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement but concluded that Nelson required strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST). Supreme Court ordered Nelson's placement at Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment was an appropriate SIST regimen as authorized under article 10. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) absent a finding of the type of condition that statutorily subjected Appellant to confinement, his placement at Valley Ridge constituted involuntary confinement in violation of article 10; and (2) involuntary commitment, as part of a SIST plan, deprived Nelson of the statutorily proscribed procedures mandated for confinement under article 10. View "State v. Nelson D." on Justia Law

A six-person jury found Milwaukee County met its burden to involuntarily commit Appellant for mental illness treatment under Wis. Stat. 51.20, and the circuit court entered an order that committed Appellant for a period no longer than six months. Appellant appealed, arguing that the six-person non-unanimous jury available to her under section 51.20 violated equal protection guarantees. Specifically, Appellant argued that her equal protection rights were violated because only a six-person jury with a five/six determination is available to those subject to involuntary commitment under Chapter 51 when compared to the twelve-person jury with a requirement of unanimity for individuals subject to involuntary civil commitment proceedings under Chapter 980. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the differences in the jury provisions for initial commitment hearings under Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 do not violate Appellant's constitutional right to equal protection.View "Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a healthcare liability suit against several healthcare providers (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on Plaintiff's noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which requires that a plaintiff's pre-suit notice to a healthcare provider include a HIPAA complaint medical authorization in order to permit the healthcare provider to obtain complete medical records from all other providers that are being sent a notice. The trial court denied Defendants' motion, concluding that Plaintiff's noncompliance with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) was excused by extraordinary cause. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff was required to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), and Plaintiff's failure to comply was not excused by extraordinary cause.View "Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc." on Justia Law