Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

The Commonwealth filed a petition requesting the circuit court to hold that Donald Gibson was a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act. After a trial, the jury found that Gibson was a sexually violent predator. Upon determining Gibson’s suitability for conditional release, the circuit court shifted the burden of proof to Gibson to demonstrate that he satisfied the criteria for conditional release. The court subsequently concluded that Gibson did not meet the criteria for conditional release and ordered that Gibson be committed to the custody of the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services for appropriate treatment and confinement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by requiring Gibson to bear the burden of proof to establish that he satisfied the criteria for conditional release. Remanded. View "Gibson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Theresa Holbrook requested her medical records from Millard Henry Clinic. Healthport, Inc., a private company that had a contract with Millard Henry Clinic to fulfill such requests, obtained copies of Holbrook’s requested medical records. Healthport subsequently sent Holbrook invoices for the records, including sales tax. Holbrook, individually and on behalf of all other Arkansans similarly situated, filed a class-action complaint seeking damages and requesting that the court find, inter alia, that Healthport illegally collected sales taxes for retrieving and copying her medical records. Holbrook later filed an amended complaint containing allegations against the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration. The circuit court granted Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied Holbrook’s motion for partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that the gross-receipts-tax statute imposes a sales tax on a patient’s ability to obtain a copy of the patient’s own medical records; and (2) the Arkansas Access to Medical Records Act does not exempt a patient’s request for copies of the patient’s medical information from any otherwise applicable tax or charge.View "Holbrook v. Healthport, Inc." on Justia Law

Veasna Sok sued Bioderm Skin Care, LLC and Dr. Quan Nguyen after Sok purchased laser hair removal treatments from Bioderm and allegedly received burns and scars on her legs due to too high an intensity setting. When Sok did not serve an expert report within 120 days of filing her original petition, Defendants moved to dismiss Sok’s claim, asserting that it was a health care liability claim under the Texas Medical Liability Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to dismiss the claim, holding (1) the rebuttable presumption that Sok’s claim was a Sok care liability claim applied in this case; and (2) Plaintiff failed to rebut this presumption because expert health care testimony was necessary to prove or refute her claim.View "Bioderm Skin Care, LLC v. Sok" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's Rule 59(a)(6) motion was denied when the jury found that defendant Dr. John Lundeby did not breach the standard of care owed to his patient, Rick Blizzard. The district court found that although the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, the ultimate outcome would not have been different if a new trial was granted. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. A such, the district court's decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Blizzard v. Lundeby, M.D." on Justia Law

In 2013, Bryan Skoric, the Park County Attorney, reconsidered the extent of his office’s participation in civil commitment proceedings and decided not to continue to participate in emergency detention hearings under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 25-10-109 or to appear and prosecute the case in chief at involuntary hospitalization hearings under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 25-10-110. Appellants, the West Park Hospital District and Yellowstone Behavioral Health Center, filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking the district court to compel Skoric to proceed in the same way as he had in the past. The district court denied Appellants’ application for the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutes in question do require a county attorney’s office to participate in civil commitment proceedings; but (2) the statutes are ambiguous, and therefore, extraordinary relief was not warranted when Appellants filed their petition. View "State ex rel. West Park Hosp. Dist. v. Skoric" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was found to be a sexually dangerous person and ordered civilly committed. While the judge found that although Defendant was only likely to commit noncontact sexual offenses in the future, the judge concluded that the offenses would instill in Defendant's victims a “reasonable apprehension of being subjected to a contact sex crime,” and thus Defendant was a “menace” as defined in Commonwealth v. Suave. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to prove that Defendant was a menace to the health and safety of others and a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A; and (2) Defendant’s commitment as a sexually dangerous person did not violate his substantive due process rights.View "Commonwealth v. Fay" on Justia Law

Following a trial, a judge of the superior court civilly committed Defendant based on the judge’s finding that Defendant was a sexually dangerous person. The judge noted that Defendant’s sexual offenses were noncontact offenses but nevertheless concluded that Defendant was likely to engage in sexual offenses in the future to a degree that made him a “menace” to the health and safety of other persons. At the time of Defendant’s trial, the Supreme Judicial Court had not yet decided Commonwealth v. Suave, in which the Court held (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A permits a finding of sexual dangerous based on a defendant’s history of committing noncontact sexual offenses and his likelihood of committing only noncontact offenses in the future, and (2) to find that a defendant is a “menace,” the State must show the defendant’s predicted sexual offenses are likely to instill in his victims “a reasonable apprehension of being subjected to a contact sex crime.” In the instant case, because the judge did not make his findings within the Suave framework, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for further consideration in light of Suave. View "Commonwealth v. Almeida" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Dr. Murphy and his employer, ECHO, alleging that Murphy was negligent in treating Anderson, who suffered a severe and permanent brain injury following emergency room treatment. ECHO billed Anderson for services physicians provided him during a previous emergency room visit, but did not bill for Murphy’s services during the Code Blue that resulted in his injury. The hospital billed Anderson for supplies used during the Code Blue. The circuit court concluded that Murphy was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act, 745 ILCS 49/25. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Act was meant to apply to volunteers, not to those who treat patients within the scope of their employment and are compensated for doing so. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Act provides “Any person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987 or any person licensed to practice the treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United States who, in good faith, provides emergency care without fee to a person, shall not, as a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the person, in providing the care, be liable for civil damages.” Murphy was fully compensated for his time that day. He responded to the emergency not because he was volunteering to help but because it was his job to do so. The agreement that ECHO had with the hospital and the agreement that ECHO had with Murphy require that ECHO physicians to comply with hospital policies, and the hospital’s written policy was that emergency room physicians were to respond to Code Blues. The legislature never intended that Good Samaritan immunity would be available in this situation.View "Home Star Bank & Fin. Servs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., Ltd." on Justia Law

In 1993, Appellants developed Risperdal, a second-generation, or atypical, antipsychotic medication, which was considered highly beneficial in treating schizophrenia patients. In 2007, the State filed suit against Appellants, alleging that Appellants (1) knowingly made false statements or representations of material fact in their Risperdal label in violation of the Arkansas Medicaid Fraud False Claims Act (“MFFCA”); and (2) violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) by distributing a promotional letter to Arkansas healthcare providers that contained “false, deceptive, or unconscionable statements.” A jury found that Janssen violated the MFFCA and the DTPA by failing to comply with federal labeling requirements and imposed civil penalties totaling $11,422,500. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and dismissed the MFFCA claim, as Appellants were not healthcare facilities or applying for certification as described by the statute; and (2) reversed and remanded the DTPA claim, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting certain hearsay into evidence.View "Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant filed this action against Prairie Fields Family Medicine, P.C., bringing claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy and alleging that a Prairie Fields employee disclosed her positive HIV test results to a third party, and as a result, the information spread throughout the community where Appellant did business and had friends. The district court (1) dismissed Appellant’s invasion of privacy claim, concluding that it was time barred; and (2) granted summary judgment for Prairie Fields on Appellant’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, concluding that Appellant failed to create an issue of fact that someone from Prairie Fields had disclosed her diagnosis to a third party. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment order, holding that Appellant raised a genuine issue of material fact that someone at Prairie Fields disclosed information from her private medical records. Remanded.View "C.E. v. Prairie Fields Family Med., P.C." on Justia Law