Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners were found not responsible for crimes they committed by reason of mental disease or defect. Petitioners were eventually released from confinement into the community, subject to a five-year order of conditions. The New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) later requested that the supervising court extend the order of conditions. In its proposed order, OMH asked the court to include an effective-evaluation provision, which would allow the OMH to seek judicial approval of a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility if Petitioners failed to comply with the conditions of their release and refused to undergo voluntary examination. Petitioners sought writs of prohibition barred enforcement of the effective-evaluation provisions, arguing that the provisions were inconsistent with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 330.20(14)’s specific procedure for recommitment orders. The Appellate division granted the petitions, concluding that the effective-evaluation provision was barred by the recommitment provisions in section 330.20(14). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 330.20(14) does not prohibit inclusion of an effective-evaluation provision in an order of conditions.View "Allen B. v. Sproat" on Justia Law

In 1968, Respondent pleaded guilty to rape and robbery. A federal court later vacated Respondent’s convictions. In 1978, Respondent was convicted of rape in the first degree. After Respondent was released on parole, he pleaded guilty in 1996 to rape in the first degree. Prior to Respondent’s release from custody, the State filed a petition under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. Respondent moved to preclude expert testimony relating to both the 1968 charges and an uncharged rape Respondent allegedly committed in 1978. Supreme Court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality qualifying him for civil management under article 10. Supreme Court subsequently ordered Respondent committed to a secure treatment facility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) basis hearsay related to Respondent’s 1968 indictments for rape and robbery met minimum due process requirements and was properly admitted at trial; and (2) basis hearsay about Respondent’s uncharged rape was unreliable and should have been excluded, but its admission was harmless error.View "State v. John S." on Justia Law

Petitioner worked as a charge nurse at a facility of the State’s Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS). After an incident with a patient who later died, DHSS concluded that Petitioner should be dismissed for patient neglect, failure to perform a thorough assessment of the patient’s condition, and unprofessional and unacceptable behavior. Petitioner’s employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between a union and HDSS. After arbitration as prescribed by the CBA, the arbitrator concluded there was just cause for Petitioner’s dismissal. Petitioner brought this action challenging the arbitrator’s decision. The Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of DHSS, holding that the arbitrator (1) correctly held DHSS to its burden to demonstrate good cause for termination in reaching his decision; (2) applied the correct standard of care as to the definition of “neglect”; and (3) necessarily rejected Petitioner’s effort to obtain back pay.View "AFSCME, Council 81, Registered Nurses Unit, Local 2305 v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Petitioners were two medical providers whose patients included individuals insured by the State’s primary health benefit plan. The State Comptroller reviewed Petitioners’ billing records as part of an audit of billing practices in the health care industry for claims paid by the State. While Petitioners conceded that the State paid eighty percent of the costs of their services, Petitioners challenged the Comptroller’s authority to audit their books. Supreme Court concluded that the Comptroller lacked constitutional authority to audit Petitioners because Petitioners were “not a political subdivision of the State.” The Appellate Division modified Supreme Court’s orders to reinstate the audits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State Constitution does not limit the Comptroller’s authority to audit, as part of its audit of State expenditures, the billing records of private companies that provide health care to beneficiaries of a State insurance program.View "Martin H. Handler, M.D., P.C. v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit, individually and per proxima amici, against numerous defendants, alleging, inter alia, negligence, lack of informed consent, and vicarious liability for injuries sustained by their minor daughter, Yendee, who was born with a genetic blood disorder. Four groups of defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-14.1(1), an act that tolls the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims when the person claiming injury is a minor, barred Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred but that Yendee retained the right to bring suit on her own behalf when she reached the age of majority, and up to three years thereafter. After issuing an order to show cause, the Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgments entered in favor of defendants Corning Incorporated and Quest Diagnostics, LLC because Plaintiffs’ allegations against these defendants were not medical malpractice claims; and (2) directed that Plaintiffs’ appeal, as well as the appeals and cross-appeals of Rhode Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital and each hospital’s associated medical professionals, be assigned to the Court’s regular calendar for further briefing and argument.View "Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, which provided laser hair removal services, for negligence after she allegedly suffered burns and scarring on her face and neck while receiving laser hair removal treatments. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss because Plaintiff had not served an expert report as required by the Medical Liability Act for health care liability claims. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not rebut the presumption that her claim for improper laser hair removal was a health care liability claim, and therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to serve an expert report precluded her suit.View "Rio Grande Valley Vein Clinic, P.A. v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant-health care providers. Six days before filing his complaint, Defendant sent a pre-suit notice of his potential claim to each Defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, as permitted by Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(1). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff failed to file with his complaint an affidavit of the person who had sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed but noted the harsh results strict compliance produces in cases such as this one where no prejudice is alleged. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the complaint, holding (1) the statutory requirement that an affidavit of the person who sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail be filed with the complaint may be satisfied by substantial compliance; and (2) Plaintiff substantially complied with the statute in this case.View "Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC " on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff, frustrated with then-proposed budget cuts to mental health services, sent the Governor a series of emails that were interpreted as threatening. Plaintiff was delivered to MaineGeneral Medical Center for a psychiatric evaluation, where she was eventually subjected to a search and held against her will for the night in a locked room. Plaintiff later filed an action against MaineGeneral and Scott Kemmerer, an emergency room physician, alleging that Defendants deprived her of liberty without due process and subjected her to an unreasonable search in violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA). Defendants filed for entry of summary judgment as to the MCRA claims. The court (1) granted the motion as to MaineGeneral, determining that MaineGeneral could not be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees under the MCRA; and (2) denied the motion as to Kemmerer. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to Kemmerer on issues of immunity, holding that Kemmerer was not entitled to absolute immunity or common law qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s MCRA claims; and (2) did not reach Kemmerer’s remaining arguments in this interlocutory appeal. View "Clifford v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Defendant and the victim in this case were intellectually disabled adults who lived together in a State-licensed residential facility. After Defendant pushed the victim into a bathroom, causing injuries to the victim, Plaintiff filed an application for an abuse prevention order on behalf of the victim. A district court judge granted an abuse prevention order pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, determining that, because Defendant and the victim lived “in the same household,” the district court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order against Defendant, concluding that individuals who share a common diagnosis or status, rather than marriage, blood, or other relationships enumerated in chapter 209A, and who live together in a facilities run by the State, do not qualify as “household members” within the meaning of chapter 209A. View "Silva v. Carmel" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a mother who serves as the guardian for her intellectually disabled adult son must obtain court approval before arranging a vasectomy for him. Maria Kennedy was the legal guardian of Stuart Kennedy, a twenty-one-year-old man with intellectual disabilities who lived in a group home. In 2013, Stuart filed a petition to terminate the guardianship. Maria, in turn, petitioned for appointment of an involuntary conservator for Stuart. Concerned that Stuart was having sex with his coworker, Maria took Stuart to the doctor’s office to get a vasectomy. Stuart’s attorney subsequently filed a further petition to terminate or modify the guardianship because Maria had forced Stuart to undergo sterilization. After a combined hearing on the petitions, the probate court (1) declined to terminate Stuart’s guardianship, (2) found Maria did not violate Iowa Code 633.635(2)(b) by arranging for Stuart’s vasectomy without court approval, and (3) ordered Maria’s appointment as Stuart’s conservator. The Supreme Court (1) held that section 633.635(2) required Maria to get prior court approval for Stuart’s vasectomy; but (2) affirmed the guardianship and conservatorship orders entered by the probate court.View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Kennedy" on Justia Law