Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

Vaccinations are not “medical treatment” within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-10(c), and therefore, the statute does not authorize the Commissioner of Children and Families to vaccinate a child temporarily placed in her custody over the objection of that child’s parents.The children’s parents in this case entered pleas of nolo contendere as to neglect allegations and agreed to commit their two children temporarily to the care and custody of the Commissioner. The parents, however, objected to vaccination of the children for common childhood diseases in accordance with the Department of Children and Families’ usual practice. The trial court granted the Commissioner permission to vaccinate the children, concluding that the Commissioner had the authority and obligation to vaccinate the children pursuant to section 17a-10c. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute does not authorize the Commissioner to vacate children committed to her temporary custody without parental consent. View "In re Elianah T.-T." on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with several criminal offenses. Petitioner pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. After a nonadversarial proceeding, the court rendered a judgment acquitting Petitioner of all offenses on the basis of mental disease or defect and committed Petitioner to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services (Respondent) for a period not to exceed twenty-five years. Respondent later transferred custody of Petitioner to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. Petitioner remained committed to the custody of the Board for more than twenty-five years. Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus challenging his extended confinement. The habeas court denied Petitioner’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the habeas court properly denied Petitioner relief on his claim regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea; and (2) the habeas court correctly determined that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Dyous v. Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services" on Justia Law

Decedent admitted herself to Hospital for treatment for major depression and personality disorder. At the time of her admission, Decedent was diagnosed with high suicide ideation and had previously attempted suicide. One week later, Decedent committed suicide at Hospital. Plaintiff, the executor of Decedent's estate, filed a medical malpractice action against Hospital and Decedent's treating psychiatrist. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The appellate court remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court improperly declined to the poll the jury to determine whether any of the jurors had read an article regarding the subject matter of the case published prior to trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the appellate court improperly determined that the trial judge abused his discretion in declining to poll the jury. View "Kervick v. Silver Hill Hosp." on Justia Law

Doctor was a physician who worked for Hospital on a study he claimed would assist in the treatment of children with abnormally low rates of growth. In actuality, Doctor was a child pornographer and pedophile and used the study as a cover to recruit and sexually exploit hundreds of children. The named plaintiff (Plaintiff), one of the exploited children, brought this action against Hospital alleging (1) Hospital negligently failed to supervise Doctor's activities in connection with the study, and (2) Hospital breached the special duty of care it owed to children in its custody. The trial court rendered judgment for Plaintiff on both claims and awarded him $2,750,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury. View "Doe v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Claimant brought a claim before the Claims Commissioner seeking damages from the State as the coadministrator of the estate of her deceased daughter, who had died while confined in a correctional institution. In the course of Claimant's case, the Commissioner issued subpoenas to the Charlotte Hungerford Hospital requesting information about the decedent's treatment there. The Hospital refused to comply with the subpoena, arguing that the Commissioner had no authority to issue subpoenas to nonparties. The trial court enforced the Commissioner's subpoena, and the appellate court affirmed. Subsequently to the Supreme Court's certification of the Hospital's appeal, Claimant settled underlying case, and consequently, the State no longer sought to enforce the subpoenas. The Supreme Court dismissed the Hospital's appeal as moot and vacated the judgments of the lower courts, as the Court could no longer grant relief. View "State v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the department of labor against her employer (Employer), alleging a violation of the Connecticut family and medical leave statute, which applies only to employers that employer seventy-five or more employees. Although Employer employed more than 1,000 employees nationwide, the commissioner of labor dismissed the complaint on the ground that the leave statute does not apply to Employer because it does not employ seventy-five or more employees within the state of Connecticut. The trial court sustained Plaintiff's appeal and rendered judgment in Plaintiff's favor, concluding that all employees of a business are to be counted in determining whether the business is an employer under the leave statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section Conn. Agencies Regs. 31-51qq-42, which has the force and effect of a statute, makes clear that only Connecticut employees are to be counted under the leave statute. View "Velez v. Comm'r of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, an obstetrician and gynecologist, contending that Defendant's failure to advise her that she should have her ovaries removed due to a family history of cancer resulted in her developing ovarian cancer. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court improperly permitted expert testimony and instructed the jury in a manner consistent with a claim of traditional medical negligence and asserting that Plaintiff's complaint necessarily sounded exclusively in informed consent rather than in medical negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court's decisions were proper because Plaintiff's complaint properly alleged medical negligence. View "Downs v. Trias" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in this case was a physician who was granted clinical privileges as a member of Defendant hospital's medical staff beginning in 1974. The hospital declined to renew Plaintiff's privileges for 1984. In response to the nonrenewal of privileges, Plaintiff brought an action against the hospital seeking damages and injunctive relief for his loss of gross income. The trial court rendered judgment awarding Plaintiff nominal damages only. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of injunctive relief but reversed the part of the judgment awarding nominal damages, concluding that the trial court should have deemed Plaintiff a lost volume seller and awarded him damages equal to his lost profits in 1984 only. The Supreme Court determined that the appellate court had incorrectly concluded that Plaintiff was a lost volume seller and incorrectly determined that Plaintiff was entitled to damages for lost profits in 1984 only. On remand, the trial court found that Plaintiff was a lost volume seller and awarded him damages in the amount of $258,610. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp. " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Erik and Carrie Pin, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, orthopedic surgeon David Kramer and Danbury Orthopedic Associates, seeking, inter alia, compensatory damages for Kramer's negligence in his surgical treatment of a spinal tumor suffered by Erik. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed, holding that a new trial was required because the trial court had failed to grant Plaintiffs' request for a curative instruction following remarks by Defendants' expert witness, during his direct examination testimony, concerning increased health care costs caused by defensive medicine practices arising from the proliferation of medical malpractice claims in Connecticut. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court court did not err in its judgment. View "Pin v. Kramer" on Justia Law

The substitute Plaintiff, the successor administrator of the estate of Decedent, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, Physician and Medical Center, claiming, inter alia, that Physician had failed adequately to warn Decedent of certain risks associated with the use of birth control pills and the symptoms of those risks. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Defendants and rendered judgment accordingly. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to present the case to the jury and correctly reversed the trial court's ruling granting a directed verdict in favor of Defendants. View "Curran v. Kroll" on Justia Law