Justia Health Law Opinion Summaries

In the 1990s, José A. Vega-Figueroa was involved in a drug-trafficking operation in Puerto Rico. He was charged in 1994 with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder, but was acquitted by a jury in 1995. In 1997, a federal grand jury indicted him for his role in a criminal enterprise involving the distribution of various drugs and related violent acts. After a thirty-day trial, he was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to multiple life sentences. Vega has since made several unsuccessful attempts to challenge his conviction and sentence.In February 2021, Vega filed a motion for compassionate release in the District of Puerto Rico, citing his health conditions and the risk of COVID-19 complications. He also argued that his rehabilitation efforts and the double jeopardy of being tried for the same conduct warranted his release. The district court denied his motion, finding that the Bureau of Prisons had taken adequate measures to protect inmates from COVID-19 and that Vega's health conditions did not meet the criteria for compassionate release. The court also determined that Vega remained a danger to the community, given his criminal history and prison infractions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Vega's health conditions and the measures taken by the Bureau of Prisons did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. The appellate court also upheld the district court's assessment that Vega continued to pose a danger to the community, thus justifying the denial of his motion for compassionate release. View "United States v. Vega-Figueroa" on Justia Law

T.M. has a medical condition that causes psychosis when she ingests gluten. After an episode in 2023, she was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center. Despite her and her father's request for voluntary admission, an administrative hearing led to her involuntary commitment. A clinical review panel approved forcibly injecting T.M. with antipsychotic medication, a decision affirmed by a Maryland administrative law judge. T.M. and the medical center later reached an oral agreement for her release, which was formalized in a consent order by a state court. The consent order required T.M. to follow certain conditions, including taking prescribed medications and dismissing other lawsuits.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed T.M.'s claims, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over T.M.'s claims and dismissed the parents' claims for failure to state a claim. T.M.'s claims were dismissed with prejudice, while the parents' claims were dismissed without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of T.M.'s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court held that T.M. was a state court loser seeking to overturn a state court judgment, which is barred by the doctrine. The court vacated the dismissal with prejudice and remanded with instructions to modify the judgment to dismiss T.M.'s claims without prejudice. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the parents' claims for failure to state a claim, noting that the complaint did not allege a violation of their First Amendment rights. View "T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation" on Justia Law

Evan Brown Bull was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute 500 or more grams of methamphetamine. The government presented evidence from thirteen witnesses and various forms of documentation, including videos and Facebook messages, detailing Brown Bull's drug dealings from 2016 to 2023. The Probation Office's Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a base offense level of 32, with adjustments that increased the total offense level to 40, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Brown Bull objected to the PSR's findings and requested a downward variance to 180 months.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota overruled Brown Bull's objections and applied three sentencing enhancements: a two-level increase for obstruction of justice, a four-level increase for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants, and a two-level increase for committing the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood. The court ultimately sentenced Brown Bull to 400 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court's application of the sentencing enhancements. The court held that Brown Bull's pretrial jail messages and Facebook post constituted obstruction of justice, that he was an organizer or leader of the drug conspiracy, and that his criminal conduct was part of his livelihood. The court concluded that the district court's findings were supported by the evidence and upheld the 400-month sentence. View "United States v. Bull" on Justia Law

Michelle Wierson was charged with vehicular homicide after allegedly causing a fatal car accident while speeding. Two psychiatrists concluded that Wierson lacked the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong and suffered from a delusional compulsion at the time of the accident. Wierson filed a notice of intent to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. The State moved to introduce evidence that Wierson had stopped taking some of her psychiatric medications before the accident. The trial court granted the State's motion.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that evidence of medication non-compliance was not relevant to the statutory defenses of insanity. The court explained that the insanity-defense statutes do not mention how or why a defendant may have come to her mental state, only that she is not guilty if she has that mental state at the time of the offense. The court also held that evidence of medication non-compliance was not relevant to show Wierson’s intent to commit vehicular homicide and reckless driving.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine whether evidence that a defendant voluntarily contributed to her mental state is relevant to the statutory insanity defenses and whether the precedent set in Bailey v. State should be reconsidered. The court concluded that the plain language of the insanity-defense statutes does not provide any exception for voluntary inducement of the mental state. The court overruled Bailey, which had held that the insanity defenses are not available to a defendant who voluntarily induced the relevant mental state. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment, holding that evidence of Wierson’s medication non-compliance was not admissible to show that she voluntarily induced her lack of mental capacity or delusional compulsion. View "THE STATE v. WIERSON" on Justia Law

M.G. received health care coverage through Medi-Cal and was treated by Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) after an automobile accident. Dameron required M.G. or her representative to sign a conditions of admissions (COA) form, which included an assignment of benefits (AOB) clause. This clause assigned to Dameron the right to direct payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) benefits from M.G.'s automobile insurance policy with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (Progressive). Dameron sought payment from Progressive for M.G.'s treatment at rates higher than Medi-Cal would pay. Progressive settled a UM claim with M.G. but did not pay Dameron, leading Dameron to sue Progressive for damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County sustained a demurrer to Dameron's complaint without leave to amend, citing collateral estoppel based on a prior decision in Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (Dameron v. AAA). The court found the COA forms to be contracts of adhesion and the AOBs unenforceable, as it was not within the reasonable expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly from their UM benefits.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the COAs were contracts of adhesion and that it was not within the reasonable expectations of Medi-Cal patients that their UM benefits would be assigned to the hospital for payment of medical bills at rates higher than Medi-Cal would pay. The court concluded that the AOBs were unenforceable and did not need to address arguments regarding collateral estoppel or the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act. The court also denied Progressive's motion to strike exhibits from Dameron's reply brief. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

M.H.W. has been involuntarily committed to the Montana Mental Health Nursing Care Center (NCC) since June 16, 2020, due to paranoid schizophrenia and an inability to manage his diabetes. The Tenth Judicial District Court extended his commitment several times, with the most recent extension being on January 6, 2022. On December 14, 2022, a petition was filed to extend his commitment for another year. Notice was served, indicating that if a hearing was requested less than 10 days before the termination of the previous commitment, the commitment would be extended until the hearing. However, the court did not issue an order extending the commitment beyond January 6, 2023.On February 8, 2023, M.H.W.'s counsel requested a contested hearing, which was scheduled for April 6, 2023, and later rescheduled to June 1, 2023. The District Court ordered that M.H.W. remain committed until the hearing. At the hearing, the court found that M.H.W. continued to exhibit symptoms of schizophrenia and could not manage his basic needs, including his diabetes. The court ordered his recommitment to NCC for up to one year.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the expiration of M.H.W.'s commitment did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction, as the commitment was extended by operation of law when no hearing was requested before January 6, 2023. The court also held that the District Court's failure to enter an order extending the commitment did not constitute plain error, as M.H.W. received due process through the contested hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's order of recommitment. View "In re M.H.W." on Justia Law

In 2008, Santiago Alirio Gomez Rivera began working with co-conspirators in Latin America to obtain and transport cocaine for importation into the United States. Rafael Segundo Castro Diaz joined the conspiracy later, helping transport 1,200 kilos of cocaine in April 2013. The United States Coast Guard intercepted the boat carrying the cocaine, and the men aboard were arrested. Years later, a federal grand jury returned three indictments against Gomez Rivera and Castro Diaz, with the second superseding indictment expanding the conspiracy period from January 2008 to September 2013.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the second superseding indictment, which they argued was untimely and broadened the original charges. The defendants then negotiated a stipulated bench trial, preserving their right to appeal the denial of their motions to dismiss. The district court adjudicated them guilty, but there were clerical errors in Castro Diaz's judgment documentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a superseding indictment can satisfy the statute of limitations if it is independently timely or relates back to a timely prior indictment. The second superseding indictment was independently timely, as it was returned within five years of the alleged conspiracy period. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, as both defendants stipulated to facts indicating their involvement in the conspiracy until September 2013. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences but remanded for the correction of clerical errors in Castro Diaz's judgment. View "USA v. Santiago Alirio Gomez Rivera" on Justia Law

The City of Huntington and the Cabell County Commission filed lawsuits against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corp., alleging that the defendants contributed to the opioid epidemic by distributing excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' actions created a public nuisance that should be abated under West Virginia common law. The cases were consolidated and remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, which held a ten-week bench trial.The district court ruled in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants' conduct was unreasonable or that it proximately caused the opioid epidemic. The court found that the defendants substantially complied with their duties under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the volume of opioids distributed was excessive or that the defendants failed to maintain effective controls against diversion. The district court also determined that the plaintiffs' proposed abatement plan was not appropriate.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, contesting the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions. The Fourth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, asking whether conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance can constitute a public nuisance under West Virginia common law and, if so, what the elements of such a claim are.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia declined to answer the certified question, citing the disputed factual findings and related legal conclusions on appeal. The court emphasized that it could not address the legal issue without a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record, and any answer would be advisory given the unsettled facts. View "City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee (BlueCross) is an insurer and fiduciary for an ERISA-governed group health insurance plan. A plan member in New Hampshire sought coverage for fertility treatments, which BlueCross denied as the plan did not cover such treatments. The Commissioner of the New Hampshire Insurance Department initiated an enforcement action against BlueCross, alleging that the denial violated New Hampshire law, which mandates coverage for fertility treatments. BlueCross sought to enjoin the state regulatory action, arguing it conflicted with its fiduciary duties under ERISA.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied BlueCross's request for relief and granted summary judgment to the Commissioner. The court found that the Commissioner’s enforcement action was against BlueCross in its capacity as an insurer, not as a fiduciary, and thus was permissible under ERISA’s saving clause, which allows state insurance regulations to apply to insurers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the Commissioner’s action was indeed against BlueCross as an insurer, aiming to enforce New Hampshire’s insurance laws. The court noted that ERISA’s saving clause permits such state actions and that BlueCross could not use its fiduciary duties under ERISA to evade state insurance regulations. The court also referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward, which established that state insurance regulations are not preempted by ERISA when applied to insurers. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that ERISA did not shield BlueCross from the New Hampshire regulatory action. View "BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee v. Nicolopoulos" on Justia Law

AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP and AstraZeneca AB challenged the Drug Price Negotiation Program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to negotiate prices for certain high-expenditure drugs. CMS issued guidance on selecting qualifying drugs for 2026, including Farxiga, manufactured by AstraZeneca. AstraZeneca sued the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the CMS Administrator, claiming the Negotiation Program violated procedural due process and that parts of CMS’s guidance violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Delaware ruled that AstraZeneca failed to state a due process violation and lacked standing to pursue its APA claims. The court entered judgment in favor of the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that AstraZeneca lacked Article III standing to challenge the CMS guidance under the APA because the company did not demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury. AstraZeneca's claims about the impact on its business decision-making and difficulty valuing Farxiga in negotiations were deemed hypothetical and conjectural.Regarding the due process claim, the court held that AstraZeneca did not have a protected property interest in selling its drugs at a market rate. The court noted that federal patent laws do not confer a right to sell at a particular price, and the Negotiation Program only sets prices for drugs reimbursed by CMS, not private market transactions. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of the government on both the APA and due process claims. View "AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v. Secretary United States Department of Health and H" on Justia Law